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ABSTRACT 
STARTING RIGHT: DIAGNOSING INSTITUTIONAL READINESS 
TO ENGAGE IN SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIC PLANNING 
MAY 1997 
BRYAN C. HARVEY, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
M.P.A., HARVARD UNIVERSITY 
Ed.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Arthur W. Eve 
In the decades following World War II American higher education enjoyed a 
period of unprecedented growth and development. By the 1970s, however, it was clear 
that the growth curve was flattening. The prospect of fiscal stringency sparked interest 
in formal planning, and campuses experimented with Program Planning Budgeting 
Systems (PPBS) and other "rational" planning approaches. As the 1980s unfolded, 
however, the sense that fiscal problems would persist deepened, and the emphasis 
shifted to effectiveness. "Strategic" approaches to planning — emphasizing adaptive 
change in response to environmental analysis — came into wide use. 
The comprehensiveness and complexity of strategic approaches introduced new 
challenges for which institutions were poorly prepared, and many had disappointing 
experiences. The literature offered only fragmented and often inconsistent advice for 
institutions contemplating strategic planning. The author reviewed the literature with an 
eye toward identifying "conditions" that support successful planning. Five such 
conditions were identified: (1) consensus for change; (2) focus on institutional needs; (3) 
good "fit" between planning and the campus culture; (4) effective faculty participation; 
and (5) effective leadership. It is argued that an institution which satisfies these 
vi 
conditions increases its chances of success; conversely, an institution which falls short in 
these areas diminishes its chances. 
This hypothesis was explored in a case study of planning efforts at the 
University of Massachusetts at Amherst between 1971 and 1992. The campus engaged 
in seventeen planning efforts, nine of which were judged to be "strategic." Of the nine, 
only two could be considered "successful," both quite modest in scope. An examination 
of the campus's status with respect to the five "conditions" suggested that they were 
useful in understanding the planning outcomes. 
The five conditions were then recast as a "diagnostic" tool, a set of questions to 
be answered before embarking on strategic planning. This tool should help the 
institution understand its "readiness" to undertake strategic planning; identify areas in 
which ameliorative action is needed; form a more realistic set of planning expectations. 
A number of 
power of the 
directions for future research are suggested to both test the predictive 
five conditions and to enhance the usefulness of the diagnostic tool. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE QUEST FOR EFFECTIVE PLANNING 
The Evolution of Planning 
The idea of self-conscious “planning" in American higher education is relatively 
new. Prior to the Second World War, colleges and universities had enjoyed a long 
period of generally steady growth and development in which individual institutions and 
the higher education enterprise as a whole flourished, largely by accretion. (Peterson 
1986). 
In the years following the War, however, several factors led colleges and 
universities to look for more formal ways of ordering their activities and structuring their 
decisions. Foremost among these factors was the extraordinary growth of the higher 
education enterprise. Enrollment, faculties, and facilities swelled, and institutions 
struggled to meet the new management demands. The increase in the scope of higher 
education activities induced a corresponding increase in complexity, as well, and 
campuses found their familiar, often informal, management practices poorly suited to 
the new environment (Keller 1983; Norris and Poulton 1991; Peterson 1986). 
However great the pressures to plan may have been in the post-War boom years, 
they became inescapable as the decade of the seventies unfolded. Still reeling from two 
decades of rapid growth, higher education began to come to terms with a much different 
challenge: the prospect of stasis or even decline. By the late sixties it was manifestly 
clear that the population of 18-to-22 year olds would begin to fall in the late seventies, 
and each year's birth statistics reinforced that grim reality. Even the most optimistic 
observers understood that the dizzying growth in federal research support could not 
continue at the same rate indefinitely. Formal planning, still in its infancy, began to shift 
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its focus from growth to scarcity (Keller 1983; Norris and Poulton 1991; Peterson 1986; 
Schmidtlein and Milton 1988). 
It would not be an easy transition. To begin with, the idea simply fell outside the 
experience — and often, the comprehension — of institutions and institutional leaders. 
As Cohen and March observed, administrators often "rejected the idea of scarcity" 
(1979, 193-194). A "thick, deep adherence" to the kind of incrementalism with which 
institutions had long been comfortable made it difficult for new ideas about planning 
and management to take root (Keller 1983, 106). 
The need for something new was, however, on the minds of some. Even before 
the end of the decade of the seventies, observers were warning that the tools and 
techniques of the growth years would be inadequate in light of the changes to come 
(Millett 1977b, Millett 1977c). But the need had not yet arisen, and most were content 
to carry on in familiar ways. Less formal approaches fit the needs of the day: "one 
explanation of the absence of administrative interest in formal strategic planning during 
the 60's and most of the 70's is the general lack of difficulty in making choices among 
mostly desirable alternatives" (Richardson and Gardner 1985, 10). But, as the long- 
predicted demographic changes and other shifts in higher education's circumstances 
began to arrive with full force, institutions had to learn how to deal with having been 
"thrust from an epoch of luxuriant growth and expansion into an era of instability and 
competition" (Steeples 1990, 101). 
Gradually, new approaches emerged, often borrowed or adapted from industry. 
Beginning in about 1970, a revolution of sorts swept through higher education as 
institutions attempted to be more formal, rational, comprehensive, or strategic (or all at 
once) in their responses to and anticipation of rapid and ongoing change. Early efforts 
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emphasized tying together existing management processes so as to allow institutions to 
develop a more comprehensive view of their activities. Because the perceived need was 
for order and control, "planning" was viewed as a rational exercise. A 1977 survey of 
the 56 largest American research universities revealed both considerable interest in 
formal planning and a strong reliance on rational approaches. Nearly three-quarters 
(72%) of the responding institutions reported that they were developing formal, 
integrated planning approaches. These efforts tended to be highly centralized (with 
strong presidential control, central planning offices, and minimal faculty involvement); 
highly structured (with formal guidelines and the requirement that plans be put in 
writing); highly quantitative (with heavy reliance on data collection and analysis); and 
highly influenced by resource considerations. Interestingly, however, the "rational" 
approach was already under attack: the same institutions reported that interest groups 
were seeking a place at the decision-making table. Trustees, faculty and students were 
demanding greater participation and external agencies were demonstrating greater 
interest and influence (Freeman 1977). 
Frustration with the rigidity of rational models and with their failure to take into 
account the environment in which institutions operated led to the introduction of 
"strategic" planning approaches borrowed from industry (Jones 1990). In addition, 
several "pervasive problems" which defied solution through rational planning promoted 
experimentation with strategic approaches: "The primary motivators appear to have 
been strategic planning as a way to respond to the downturn in high school graduations 
and to the financial squeeze of the late 1970s and early 1980s" (Cope 1987, 2). 
Thus, as new conditions unfolded over a period of years, so too did thinking 
with respect to planning approaches. Some observers mark distinct "eras" in the 
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evolution of higher education planning, roughly coincident with the decades of the 
seventies and eighties. Table 1.1 shows two views of these planning eras. 
Table 1.1. Two Views of the Planning “Eras” of the 1970s and 1980s 
1970s 1980s 
Fragmentation, Formalization Consolidation, Sophistication 
Problems Constraint, reduction Decline, uncertainty 
Needs Efficiency Effectiveness 
Planning: 
• Purpose Problem Solving 
• Emphasis Technique, process 
• Orientation Internal 
Renewal 
Strategic 
External 
(From Peterson 1986, 8) 
Age of Pragmatic Application Age of Strategic Redirection 
Conditions • Stabilizing enrollments 
• Revenue shortfalls 
• Need to reallocate resources to 
deal with imbalances caused by 
1960s growth 
• Selective growth and retrenchment 
and promise of decline in 1980s 
• Goal fragmentation 
• ...Decline in ... traditional college 
cohorts, but increase in ... 
enrollments 
• Decline in some institutions, 
substantial ... variations 
• Resource shortfalls 
• Changes in student characteristics 
• Need to invest... in computing, ... 
equipment, and capital plant " 
Primary Focus • Internal orientation 
• Existing programs 
• Resources 
• Efficiency 
• Recruitment 
• State relations 
• External orientation 
• Effectiveness 
• Quality 
• Outcomes 
• Competitive advantage 
• Economic development 
• Telematics 
Nature of 
Institutional 
Decision Making 
• Reallocation mentality 
• Incremental, imperfect decision 
making... 
• Some institutions ... [use] growth in 
the late 1970s to prepare for 1980s 
• Others wait for conditions to get so 
bad they will have to act 
• Proactive relationship to 
environment 
• External environment affects 
internal decision making 
• ...Harsh penalties for poor 
decisions or deferral of choices 
• Enhanced use of analysis and 
decision support systems 
• Information management is key 
Nature of Planning 
and Strategy 
Formulation 
• Comprehensive master plans 
• Program planning and evaluation 
• Resource reallocation 
• Management of decline 
• New techniques and advances in 
management science applications 
• Planning as staff function 
• Strategic management emerges in 
late 1970s 
• Strategic planning gains popularity 
• Re-emergence of master planning 
• Selective focus on new clienteles, 
...partnerships, ...relationships 
• Experiences with shortcomings of 
analysis and planning 
• Emphasis on applications rather 
than techniques 
• Planning as line function.. 
(From Norris and Poulton 1991,44) 
4 
So, as the seventies began, institutions began to cope with constraint and 
reduction, decline and uncertainty. Efficiency — doing things cheaper — and 
effectiveness — doing things better — dominated decision making. New techniques 
borrowed from management science, organizational behavior, applied economics and 
other disciplines began to enter the higher education administrator's toolbox. A new 
process of learning, largely by trial and error, had begun. 
In the subsequent quarter-century many lessons were learned, both by institutions 
grappling with the practical realities of planning in complex, open systems and by 
scholars and observers of higher education seeking to identify successful approaches 
that might have a broad application. In reviewing the evolution of institutional planning 
throughout this period, however, one lesson stands out: few planning efforts produce the 
kind of transformational change that is generally desired and frequently promised. 
Dooris and Lozier (1990), reporting on twenty years of planning experience at The 
Pennsylvania State University, warn that one should reasonably expect planned change 
to occur only on the margins. Steiner (1979), applying lessons from corporate strategic 
planning to the not-for-profit sector, suggests that the primary benefit of planning comes 
from the process, not the plan itself, and that it is important to avoid excessive 
expectations. Meredith (1993), reporting on the results of a survey of 133 colleges and 
universities in the United States and Canada, found that only 12% of institutions had 
"solved" the problem of implementing their plans, and that none (0%) claimed to have 
solved the problem of achieving major resource shifts. And a study involving site visits 
to sixteen campuses yielded the following rather discouraging finding: 
While almost all site visit campuses had tried one or more formal campus-wide 
planning processes, none had been able to sustain a particular approach for more 
than two or three years. More significantly, few interviewees could enumerate 
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specific outcomes or substantive benefits of the processes conducted at their 
campuses. (Schmidtlein and Milton 1988, 7) 
These grim analyses should not be taken as an indictment of the efficacy of 
formal planning in higher education. Some of these same observers note that planning 
efforts, while not "solving" an institution's problems, were more effective than their 
routine management approaches in helping a campus adapt to change. And many 
observers note that adaptive change is often accomplished a step at a time, and rarely if 
ever in an epiphanal moment that galvanizes and redirects an institution. 
The Origins of Strategic Planning 
Referring again to Table 1.1, the decade of the seventies saw higher education 
responding to the end of the boom years and the beginning of an era in which demands 
would grow faster than resources. The initial tendency among institutions was to treat 
the slowdown as a temporary setback, an interruption in a pattern of growth that might 
eventually be restored. Despite the fact that the widespread retrenchment of the early 
seventies stubbornly resisted "correction," universities equally stubbornly "dealt with 
each subsequent cutback as a short-term crisis" (Alpert 1985, 242). This attitude had 
important implications. Any organization confronting a period of retrenchment is 
faced with a central dilemma: should it respond by increasing organizational efficiency 
or should it embark on innovative efforts to improve effectiveness?" (Alpert 1985, 242). 
Or, as Alpert casts the choice in the terms of Argyris and Schon's classic work, 
...does the situation call for "single-loop" organizational learning, that is, 
retaining the existing norms, goals and structures and doing better the things we 
are now doing? Or does it call for "double-loop" learning, that is, reformulating 
the norms, goals and structures and embarking in innovative directions to create 
acceptable outcomes? (Alpert 1985, 242-243) 
Choosing between these approaches is the central challenge of planning in the 
environment of scarcity in which most institutions of higher education operate. 
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There is broad agreement that, at least during the decade of the seventies, 
efficiency won the day. It represented the central need (Peterson 1986) and a primary 
focus (Norris and Poulton 1991) of 1970s planning. 
Alpert argues that this is in part because "efficiency" can be framed in financial 
terms, which simultaneously signals that the problem cannot be ignored and implies no 
failure of leadership (if only sufficient money could be found, the problem would 
disappear). Financial difficulties are attributable to changes in the external economic 
environment, an arena in which universities are presumed to have little control" (Alpert 
1985, 243). 
As the decade wore on, however, hopes that the glory days might return — at 
least quickly began to dim. As constraint and reduction were replaced with decline 
and uncertainty (Peterson 1986), and as revenue shortfalls mounted to become 
structural resource imbalances (Norris and Poulton 1991), the focus of higher education 
planning shifted toward effectiveness. 
A complementary transition occurred with respect to the venue within which 
planning activity occurred. In the seventies institutions looked within, focusing largely 
on changes in the ways in which they did business. The emphasis was on problem 
solving, resource allocation, and new approaches to management. In the eighties, 
however, universities began to take a fresh look at their environments. Having exploited 
most of the easy (and many of the hard) opportunities to improve internal efficiency, 
they increasingly sought new relationships with partners and markets that might 
revitalize their resource bases (Peterson 1986; Norris and Poulton 1991). 
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The need for fundamental reexamination of educational products and processes 
and the growing importance of environmental factors required planning approaches that 
were more active, more comprehensive, and more definitive than the incrementalism of 
the fifties and sixties and the inward-looking rationalism of the seventies. Higher 
education was poorly positioned to respond to the rapid changes it was encountering, 
even though the need to respond was becoming manifest: "the notion that higher 
education should — or could — function in ways buffered from external realities had 
slowly and painfully given way to the realization that grappling directly with changes in 
the environment was unavoidable" (Schuster et al. 1994, 19). Moreover, the need for 
new management and planning approaches 
emerged from a critique that decision making, particularly faculty decision 
making, involved numerous committees — entities, according to critics, that 
failed to grasp the urgency of change and instead indulged in discourse to fine- 
tune a system already at risk of becoming inadequate if not irrelevant. (Schuster 
et al. 1994, 18) 
Dooris and Lozier (1990) describe an evolution of planning during this period 
that began with across-the-board cuts in response to revenue shortfalls ("horizontal 
reduction"), moved into differential cuts and investments ("vertical reallocation") in 
order to preserve quality, and finally resulted in externally oriented, anticipatory 
strategic planning and management. 
The move into "strategic" approaches reflected in part the failure of other 
models to cope with emerging conditions in higher education. The traditional 
incremental style of planning, rooted in a political model of decision making, could not 
move fast or far enough to keep campuses competitive. The "management science" 
revolution of the seventies, while relevant to certain efficiency-related challenges, had 
proved too quantitative and too cumbersome to lead campuses through the kinds of 
fundamental choices called for in the eighties. Schmidtlein and Milton (1988), following 
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a three-year study of campus-wide planning, concluded that none of the planning 
approaches developed through the seventies was adequate. 
.. .The degree of goal consensus and hierarchical authority needed to effectively 
use structured approaches ... was lacking on many campuses. Frequently, even 
when planning documents were completed and apparently accepted by key 
campus constituencies, they became "shelf" documents that were used mainly 
for presentations to external audiences rather than as guides for campus 
decisions and actions. (Schmidtlein and Milton 1988, 3) 
George Keller, in his profoundly influential book. Academic Strategy: The 
Management Revolution in Higher Education (1983), called for a "third way," a planning 
approach that 
eschews the arrogant excesses of the highly quantitative management science 
experts, their disregard for human frailties and politics, and their reams of 
computer printouts, but also the supine accommodations of the highly political 
brokers, their neglect of costs, values, and the future, and, their ready excuses 
about how so-and-so "won't buy it".... (Keller 1983, 108) 
As the eighties unfolded it became clear that the new, "strategic," approach to 
planning was not simply another in a series of theories to appear on the scene and enjoy 
its moment in the spotlight, only to be replaced by another. Rather, as higher education 
accumulated experience with different approaches to planning educational leaders 
became more familiar with the strengths and weaknesses of the tools available to them. 
The formal pursuit of planning "experienced a learning growth curve whereby new 
planning innovations over the years ... added to the existing institutional planning 
knowledge base" (Winstead and Ruff 1986,16). From a review of the planning 
literature from the 1940s into the 1980s Winstead and Ruff (1986) identified fourteen 
planning "paradigms" that gained currency at one time or another, each of which added 
a dimension to the practice of planning which was incorporated into good planning 
practice. These paradigms are shown in Table 1.2. 
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Table 1.2. Planning “Paradigms” and Contributions to Planning Practice 
Paradigm Added Dimension 
Planning, Organizing, Staffing, Directing, Planning as a Management Function 
Coordinating, Reporting, and Budgeting 
(POSDCORB) 
Formal Planning 
Long-Range Planning 
Master Planning 
Contingency Planning 
Systematic Planning 
v&'M ; isifpiiim 
■ ; 
Program Planning and Budgeting Systems 
(PPB3) 
Program Evaluation Review Technique (PERT) 
Management by Objectives (MBO) 
Delphi Studies 
Zero-Based Budgeting (ZBB) 
Futures Research 
®m§S$i iUfsl! Mi 1111111 
Quality Circles 
Strategic Planning 
(From Winstead and Ruff 1986, 5-6) 
Discrete Documentation of Planning 
Extrapolation Forward and Use of a Planning 
Specialist 
A Look at the Total Picture 
Asking “What If” with Alternative Solutions 
How Factors Interrelate 
Emphasis on Programmatic Information Rather 
Than Line Items 
Network Analysis 
Emphasis on Results and Accountability 
Consensus Building 
Total Program Justifications 
Alternative Scenarios 
Staff Input Into Decision Making 
Environmental Assessment 
Over a very challenging two decades, then, higher education borrowed and built 
planning approaches designed to help complex, tradition-bound institutions respond 
more nimbly and effectively to their changing circumstances. "Strategic" planning was 
not simply about environmental assessment: it introduced environmental considerations 
as the capstone to all that had come before. The full set of planning techniques 
developed over time was placed at the command of strategic planning's adaptive 
perspective. 
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This development responded to a growing realization that, however dramatic the 
changes of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s had been, the future held greater challenges still. 
Keller (1995), who had sounded an alarm in the early 1980s, saw no reason for higher 
education to lower its guard as the 1990s unfolded. He identified six trends — three 
demographic in nature and three related to social change — that remain fundamental 
challenges for American colleges and universities. In terms of demographics, Keller 
highlighted patterns of immigration, the dissolution of the traditional family structure, 
and the emerging age profile of the American population. With respect to social change, 
he focused on the impact of a growing class polarization, the waxing economic and 
strategic importance of the Pacific Rim, and new communications technologies. In 
consequence, he concluded, "U.S. colleges and universities will need to rethink and 
restructure much of what they are currently doing" (Keller 1995, 26). The significance of 
this statement lies not so much in its point — most observers would agree that Keller's 
six trends will force adaptive change in higher education — but that it came at the end 
of a decade of what many considered to be wrenching upheaval. Many institutions had 
been buffeted by change already, and had found themselves sorely taxed to develop 
effective planning approaches. 
Even where planning had found some success, the prospect of further adaptation 
was not necessarily welcome. A planner at the University of Michigan, noting with some 
satisfaction her campus's success in meeting its planning challenges, nonetheless 
observed, "it took substantial effort to accomplish what we did, and it is important to 
remember that we enter the 1990s fatigued from the efforts required to get through the 
1980s" (Knepp 1992, 79). But Keller's message is clear: there is to be no rest for the 
weary. 
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Clark Kerr (1990), another respected observer of American higher education, 
took a similar view of the challenges facing colleges and universities in the 1990s and 
beyond. "Each decade has had its own characteristics," he noted, "... more shaped by 
what was happening outside the academy than inside, that is, higher education was 
mostly not in control of its own fate" (Kerr 1990, 5). The nineties, in his view, were to 
be characterized by unprecedented upheaval: 
The battle for a place in the academic sun will become more fierce, particularly 
among the research universities. In a period of fifteen years, when there may be a 
75 percent turnover in the faculty, the chances that some universities will do 
better than others in the recruitment battles are very high. The historical 
hierarchy of prestige may be shaken up as seldom if ever before — who will win 
and who will lose? (Kerr 1990, 14-15) 
Moreover, he noted that changes of all kinds would occur in a resource environment far 
different from that which accompanied the upheavals of the 1960s. Then, "the big 
investment made in higher education was clearly supported by vast increases in student 
enrollments, but this will not be so in the 1990s" (15). The result, he predicted, would 
be a "ferocious" competition for resources, and "rising pressure, compared with the 
1980s, on decision-making processes within higher education, particularly at the levels 
of trustees, presidents, and faculty senates." (Kerr 1990, 16) 
Finally, these demographic, social, and competitive challenges were to be met in 
an environment which, if not explicitly hostile to higher education, was increasingly in 
need of proof that colleges and universities were responding to the needs of students 
and society at large. Kerr saw a two-fold task: "Higher education will need to put more 
effort both into rebuilding the public trust that has eroded over the past thirty years as 
scandals and complaints have accumulated and into resisting increased external 
coordination and control. The two tasks go together..." (Kerr 1990, 15). Kerr's 
sentiments were echoed in the same year by a public university president who saw the 
historic relationship between institutions and state governments shifting: 
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Many state officials appear to want to give increased support to higher 
education, but they are demanding some response on the part of institutional 
leaders as a price for their support. The quid pro quo may be better plans for 
assessment, more responsiveness to demands for enhancing the state's 
competitiveness, greater links between higher education and economic 
development, or some combination of these factors. (Mortimer and Edwards 
1990, 74) 
On the cusp of a new and more challenging era one could look back over the 
previous two or three decades and see the evolution of planning approaches from highly 
rationalistic, almost institution-indifferent frameworks to highly adaptive, context- 
dependent principles which would in execution look, feel and behave differently at each 
institution. The focus of planning moved from the market sector to the market niche, 
from characteristics held in common across institutions to characteristics distinguishing 
among institutions. As Mortimer and Edwards observed, "there appears to be a 
growing feeling among faculty and administrators that there is no one future for higher 
education, but rather there are three thousand futures" (Mortimer and Edwards 1990, 
76). The need would be for planning tools that could help each campus find its way. 
Learning from Experience 
The evolution of formal planning in higher education occurred, relatively 
speaking, in a fishbowl. Unlike many corporate planning activities, the strategic 
planning efforts of American colleges and universities have been generally easily 
observed and well-documented. The former is rooted in the fact that institutions of 
higher education are by definition "open systems" with highly permeable membranes 
and complex paths over which information passes internally and externally. Indeed, of 
major social institutions colleges and universities may be the most "open." Public 
institutions, subject to the norms of intellectual discourse, the dictates of state and 
federal open meeting and public records statutes, and the growing expectation that they 
should be "accountable" to their many investors and stakeholders, are extraordinarily 
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open to public scrutiny. Private institutions, while still enjoying a measure of insulation, 
have also felt the rising pressures of accountability to those outside the college gates. 
Moreover, "strategic" planning, by definition, must engage the diverse internal and 
external interest groups present in all institutions, public and private. This requires 
formal — often written — communication and carries the strong likelihood that some 
individual or group will be motivated to disseminate planning-related information 
widely. 
The tendency for planning efforts to be well-documented is rooted in part in 
these routine communication needs, and in part in the fascination the process of change 
holds for many scholars and administrators. Many planning practitioners have been 
willing to share their experiences and insights through journal articles and case studies, 
and scholars of higher education, organizational change, and a variety of other fields 
have employed numerous analytic frameworks and tools to explore the trials and errors 
of higher education as it has grappled with the challenges of the late twentieth century. 
The product of all this communication and analysis is a rich — albeit uneven — 
literature exploring institutional responses to changing circumstances. It is of interest, 
however, that while examination of the literature reveals widespread recognition of 
common themes inducing the need for change — notably demographic shifts, resource 
constraints, and changing public expectations — relatively little has been said regarding 
common themes emerging from institutional responses to the imperative for change. 
Rather, the literature tends to focus on the particulars of planning in higher education — 
experiences at a single institution or a small group of institutions, for example, or 
inquiries into a specific planning approach or framework — and includes relatively little 
in the way of synthesis and discussion of broad patterns that might help institutions fit 
their local planning efforts into a broader context. 
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This represents a serious weakness in the existing planning literature. Modern 
colleges and universities are too complex, the tensions inherent in adaptive planning are 
too fundamental, and the stakes — in terms of institutional success or even survival — 
are too great to permit continued reliance on trial-and-error as the principal form of 
guidance for planning design. Some better way of discerning common themes and 
effective approaches is needed. 
And common themes do emerge as one listens to the stories told by and about 
American colleges and universities engaging in adaptive change. Lessons learned on one 
campus, while not necessarily prescriptive or even suggestive in a different context, can 
nevertheless inform the thinking of institutional leaders seeking to craft workable 
strategies for planned change. Widely shared elements of a common culture lend 
structure and some measure of predictability to the experience of institutions responding 
to similar stimuli. It should be possible to learn something useful from the travail of 
those who pioneered organized planning. 
This is not to suggest, of course, that a cookie-cutter approach to planning is 
possible or even desirable. Much of the genius of American higher education lies in its 
diversity, the willingness and ability of institutions to meet the needs of widely varying 
groups of learners. Differing missions and markets demand planning strategies that are 
highly sensitive to the factors that set an institution apart. Indeed, the underlying 
concept of adaptive change — the imperative to fit institutional decisions to a set of 
unique circumstances — argues against any effort to prescribe a common or unified 
approach to planning. 
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The search for useful lessons in the experience of institutions that have engaged 
in planning must therefore begin with a realistic sense of the limitations to which such an 
effort is subject. First, it is necessary to respect the fundamental differences in 
institutional purpose that pervade higher education. The challenges and opportunities 
confronting a regional, sectarian institution, for example, are obviously different from 
those relevant to a national research university. Similarly, a mission which emphasizes 
professional or technical training implies choices that would make little sense for another 
institution organized around advanced study in the performing arts. As one "blue- 
ribbon" panel exploring the future of a state university system observed, 
Institutions of higher education cover a broad spectrum of purposes, functions 
and activities. ... It would make little sense for a community college ... to debate 
the acquisition of a particle accelerator, or for a university to devote a major 
portion of its attention to. two-year vocational programs. (Saxon 1989, 5) 
Differences in institutional mission suggest, among other things, that 
generalizations about experience in planning should emphasize the core values and 
experiences that tend to be shared across many institutions and avoid factors that 
apply to relatively small groups of institutions. They also suggest that, while valuable 
insights may be found almost anywhere, it would be wise to select some subset of 
reasonably "representative" institutions for the closest study. 
To capture the full range of issues at work in higher education it makes sense to 
look at the experience of the larger and more comprehensive institutions. As institutions 
grow in size and in scope of mission they increase their organizational complexity and, 
hence, the complexity of their planning strategies. The tradeoffs and tensions inherent in 
adaptive planning are most likely to be evident in the research universities and other 
comprehensive campuses with multiple missions and diverse stakeholders. In part 
because of their diverse stakeholders, the more comprehensive institutions also tend to 
be the most open. For these campuses, planning involves more communication with 
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more groups — and therefore more opportunities for debate and discussion — than is 
likely to be the rule at smaller and more narrowly focused institutions. And the 
comprehensive institutions, perhaps because of their size and scope, perhaps as a 
function of an informal but pervasive "pecking order," tend to serve as the stage on 
which the drama of change and renewal in higher education is played out. For all these 
reasons it is wise to focus on the broad themes represented in the experience of 
comprehensive universities, and to recognize that individual institutions will vary in the 
extent to which they find these themes relevant to their own circumstances. 
A second, and related, limitation on the usefulness of generalization involves the 
flow of the planning process itself. In the broadest sense, an institution can be said to 
engage in several phases of planning. First, it assesses its situation, the circumstances 
which form the context in which adaptive change finds its meaning. Second, it develops 
a planning approach or strategy that fits the situation. Third, the institution engages in 
the analysis which forms the intellectual core of the planning process. Finally, the 
plans are implemented; that is, the judgments emerging from the planning process are 
given practical force through the institution's ongoing management and resource 
allocation. 
Some of these phases of activity are more susceptible to useful generalization 
than others. The point is clearest if one considers the planning phases in reverse order, 
from outcome back to origin. 
The problems associated with implementation have proven remarkably resistant 
to general treatment. The array of interests and issues affecting the success of planned 
change is unique at each institution, and effective implementation can hinge on personal 
qualities and political realities of the moment. 
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The analytic element of planning is by definition wholly dependent on the facts 
pertaining to a given institution at a given moment: the opportunities and threats it 
perceives in its environment and the internal capacities present within it. No two 
institutions ever confront precisely the same set of facts, and therefore no institution's 
analytic judgments — however carefully arrived at — can have more than illustrative 
value to another. 
The choice of a planning strategy is also highly dependent on local circumstances, 
but in this more formative stage of the process opportunities to learn from the experience 
of others increase. While the range of circumstances affecting the choice of a planning 
approach is theoretically infinite, in practice the number of variables can be reduced to a 
manageable — or at least comprehensible — level. For example, are resources increasing, 
diminishing, or holding steady? Are student markets stable or shifting, and, if shifting, 
in what directions? Does the institution express confidence in its leaders, or is there a 
sense of unease when difficult decisions arise? The institutional //profiles,/ which emerge 
from the answers to these and similar questions can be helpful as institutions seek to 
identify others that have traveled a similar path. 
Finally, the means by which a campus assesses its situation — the initial step of 
the planning process — can be highly relevant to other institutions. How institutions 
think about their place within the broader higher education enterprise involves 
fundamental questions visited by any campus seriously considering its future. 
Understanding the extent to which an institution's "unique" challenges are rooted in 
larger trends at work throughout higher education can yield important insights in the 
early stages of planning. Perhaps most important, the relationship between the way in 
which planning questions are framed — the logic underlying the initial assessment phase 
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— and subsequent success in the design, analytic, and implementation phases of 
planning can only be understood through the experience of others. 
In this view, planning is a progression from the general to the specific, an analytic 
narrowing process in which general directions (which may take the form of vision or 
mission statements, definition of core institutional values, competitive positioning, and 
so on) set the stage for increasingly specific and tangible decisions intended to maximize 
the effective use of institutional resources. In the early stages of this progression, when 
analysis tends to be exploratory and broad orienting questions are the focus, 
generalizations from the experience of other institutions are most helpful. In the later 
stages, when the emphasis moves to tradeoffs among competing goals and the practical 
prospects of different implementation strategies, the experience of others diminishes in 
importance. 
The differences in the extent to which generalization from the experience of 
others may be usefully applied at different points in the planning process has been 
expressed here as a limitation. This is because, as noted above, it is important to 
recognize that any effort to construct a comprehensive, prescriptive approach to 
institutional planning would be a fool's errand, indeed. At the same time, it has also 
been noted that relatively little in the way of generalizable guidance appears in the 
literature even with respect to assessment and design considerations, areas in which 
useful advice appears possible. In that sense, examining institutional experience in the 
early stages of the planning process represents a considerable opportunity. 
Each institution confronts the same fundamental conundrum: it must chart a 
course for its planning effort — that is, it must assess its situation and design an 
appropriate methodology — but it must do so before it has engaged fully the tensions 
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and conflicts that must be resolved if planning is to be "successful/' It is impossible to 
predict how a planning process will play itself out, to understand in advance how a 
complex organization and all its constituent parts will behave when subjected to the 
stresses of a decision-making process that most find challenging and many find 
threatening. Yet, that is precisely what one must attempt to do in the early assessment 
and design stages. It is too late, for example, to realize in the midst of analysis that a 
better strategy for developing information to support planning decisions should have 
been devised. Or, if implementation bogs down because of unresolved turf conflicts one 
cannot turn back the clock and start over. If the conditions conducive to successful 
planning are not present at the outset of the process, little can be done in the later stages 
to compensate for that weakness. 
So, there appears to be a need for useful advice, rooted in experience, that can be 
made available to institutions as they contemplate the design of a strategic planning 
process. Moreover, it is important to frame that advice in practical terms. While there 
can be no blueprint for effective planning, there can at least be a discussion of broad 
design principles available to those responsible for crafting an institution's planning 
strategy. And, to be useful, generalizations from experience should focus on the early, 
formative stages of the process where problems common to many institutions are likely 
to be encountered, and where intervention can make the greatest difference. 
Conditions for Successful Planning 
One way to think about practical advice is in terms of first steps, the conditions 
that seem most likely to permit a planning process to take root and engage the energies 
of an institution. By looking at the experiences of institutions that have passed through 
the various phases of planning, is it possible to identify circumstances that must exist in 
order to permit success as the process matures? Can methods be suggested that would 
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allow a campus to recognize — at a point early enough to permit remedial action — that 
its planning approach is likely to run into trouble in the later phases? 
Focusing on the conditions that underlie successful planning would, of course, 
help institutions be more efficient by reducing the frequency of false starts and dead 
ends. For that reason alone the search for useful advice would be desirable. 
But the value may go beyond efficiency. Strategic planning is not a routine 
management task. It addresses the kinds of questions that shake organizations — and 
people — up. It demands imagination, innovation and risk-taking. It therefore also 
demands that the members of the campus community step outside the safety of their 
familiar roles, suspending — if only temporarily — their adherence to the practices and 
norms that permit smooth functioning on a day-to-day basis. This is not easy, and it is 
not something that can be asked of an institution lightly or frequently. 
Moreover, planning is intervention, sometimes intervention on a massive scale. 
Flow an institution carries itself through a planning process affects not only its corporate 
decisions, but also its sense of itself as an organization. Planning well-executed can 
build an institution's confidence and help to knit together the different communities of 
interest that exist on any campus; planning poorly executed can undermine even routine 
decision making and exacerbate tensions which the planning process was intended to 
help resolve. Reflecting on their planning experience at Cardinal Stritch College, Johnson 
and Jonas (1995) note the danger of planning gone awry: "A failed attempt at strategic 
planning will create so much cynicism that it will be a long time before support exists for 
another attempt..." (6). Or, as Richardson and Gardner (1985) observe, "planning is 
not new. All institutions have engaged in some measure of planning since their founding. 
21 
Indeed, efforts to resurrect formal planning on campus are frequently met with 
skepticism and cynicism because of the perceived failure of previous attempts" (10). 
In this sense, then, helping an institution understand and satisfy conditions that 
support successful planning may also affect the extent to which planning is possible, let 
alone efficient. Like sky-diving, beginning a serious planning effort involves a leap of 
faith. One very much hopes that the chute will open at the first pull. 
Design of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to explore the experience amassed by institutions of 
higher education over the past quarter-century, and in that experience to look for 
patterns of behavior that might suggest a set of conditions operating in the early stages 
of planning that permit — even if they do not guarantee — success in the later stages. 
To the extent that such a set of conditions can be identified, the goal is then to array 
them in the form of a tool an institution might employ as it approaches strategic 
planning. The need is for a diagnostic tool, a protocol enabling the development of a 
frame of reference relating to the readiness of an institution to begin the long and 
difficult process of adaptive planning. From this analysis it should be clear if there are 
issues that need to be addressed prior to or in parallel with the execution of the planning 
strategy. 
This study will be conducted with the following logic, and in the following 
sequence. Chapter two will review the literature related to the theory and practice of 
strategic planning in American higher education over the past quarter decade. This 
review will be organized in terms of themes that suggest conditions of the kind discussed 
above, yielding a set of working hypotheses drawn from the larger body of available 
evidence. 
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It will then be necessary to test these hypotheses — these "conditional 
conditions" — for validity and force. Since these observations will be rooted in the 
experience of many different institutions, it seems appropriate to balance breadth with 
depth by examining them in the context of a single institution over an extended period of 
time. Chapter three will seek to achieve this balance through an in-depth, single case 
study of the planning activities at one institution — the University of Massachusetts at 
Amherst — between 1971 and 1992. 
The choice of UMass Amherst for this study makes sense from several 
perspectives. First, it is the flagship campus in a state university system; one of the 
original institutions created under the provisions of the Morrill Land Grant Act; and a 
Carnegie Research I university with extensive undergraduate and graduate programs in 
the professions and the arts and sciences. It therefore must address in its planning the 
full range of issues at work in American higher education. While no single institution's 
experience can represent every nuance of strategic planning, UMass Amherst forms a 
canvas broad enough to permit the major issues to be sketched out. Second, UMass 
Amherst was actively engaged in formal planning throughout most of the period to be 
studied. In fact, in the twenty-one years surveyed the campus engaged in seventeen 
distinct planning processes. Some of these processes originated in the statewide system 
of public higher education, some in the University of Massachusetts system, and some 
on the campus itself. The profusion and variety of planning efforts involving the 
campus make it a rich source of evidence and, it is hoped, insight. Finally, the author's 
personal familiarity with the campus and its planning activities — developed during 
fifteen years as a professional planner on the campus — provides a solid foundation for 
a study of this kind. It is difficult to capture a true sense of an institution's evolution 
over time strictly from the written record or retrospective accounts. This is particularly 
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true with respect to the kinds of issues embodied in formal planning, where formalisms 
can obscure the give and take which truly drives the process. The author's personal 
experience and insights are no substitute for the formal record, which will form the 
principal basis for the case study, but are useful in helping to bring coherence to a body 
of evidence that is not always complete or clear. 
In chapter three, then, the provisional set of conditions developed in chapter two 
will be tested against the experience of UMass Amherst as it struggled with its set of 
planning challenges. Those that survive will then form the basis for the development of 
a diagnostic tool suitable for general application, which will be undertaken in chapter 
four. This tool will take the form of a set of structured questions, the answers to which 
will reveal the extent to which the institution has satisfied each of the conditions for 
successful planning. In total, administration of the tool will provide a profile of the 
institution in terms of its readiness to engage in adaptive planning, and will suggest the 
steps to be taken to overcome any weaknesses that may be revealed. 
The fifth and final chapter will consider a number of issues arising from the 
availability of a diagnostic tool of this kind. The discussion will have two emphases: 
first, the implications for the practice of planning in cases where a self-conscious effort 
is made to prepare the soil for planning before the seeds are actually sown; and second, 
the opportunities for further research which the existence of this tool will make possible. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CONDITIONS THAT SUPPORT EFFECTIVE PLANNING 
The literature of higher education planning is rich but varied. It consists in part 
of scholarly work emerging from many disciplines and traditions, in part of theories and 
practice exported from the study of planned change in business and industry, and in 
part of case studies, war stories, and other evidence gathered on the ground. The 
literature reflects the nature of planning itself: expansive, diverse, innovative, often 
contradictory. It is possible, however, to sift through this rich jumble and extract from it 
some ideas that seem strongly related to success. 
These are not prescriptions of management practice, nor are they specific tools or 
techniques that a campus should employ in its planning. Rather, the following 
discussion identifies five "conditions" that seem often to be present when successful 
planning occurs: building consensus for change, focusing on institutional needs, ensuring 
good "fit" with campus culture, promoting effective faculty participation, and securing 
effective leadership. While no single planning effort can be expected to put all of these 
conditions into place, it seems safe to say that the more often these conditions are 
present, the more likely it is that a planning process will live up to its promise. 
Building Consensus for Change 
The purpose of "strategic" planning, as opposed to other formal planning 
approaches, is to promote organizational change that is responsive to changing 
circumstances. Strategic planning is distinguished by the sense that institutions seek to 
be active rather than passive regarding their position in history, that higher education is 
subject to increasingly strong competition, and that a key element of any effort to 
compete successfully is to look outward and keep the institution in step with its 
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environment (Keller 1983a). "Strategic planning's primary focus is on enhancing 
institutional adaptation to the external environment. This focus is considered critical to 
institutional survival and vitality in changing or difficult environmental conditions" 
(Schmidtlein and Milton 1988, 4). 
Resistance to Change 
However, organizations in general, and colleges and universities in particular, 
tend not to embrace change. There is widespread agreement among participants in and 
observers of strategic planning that building consensus for change within the institution 
is the first critical step in the process (Cyert 1988; Keller 1985; Roach 1988; Schuster et 
al. 1994; Schmidtlein 1990). 
Before one can contemplate methods of developing such consensus, however, it 
may be informative to consider some of the factors that seem to make the thirst for 
change so rare in colleges and universities. The literature offers many possibilities from 
which to choose, but touching on just a few of those most commonly cited will illustrate 
the depth and breadth of the resistance to change. 
A number of observers simply write it off to complacency or indifference. 
Faculty members and even most administrators have traditionally been so well shielded 
from society's judgments and expectations that the occasion for considering an alternate 
course of action can literally never arise. Despite the upheavals shaking the ground 
under the higher education industry as a whole, many faculty members have yet to 
perceive a tremor. 
For a generation, college and university faculties have been unusually stable, in 
role and responsibility, in size, and in membership. .. .There has been a pervasive 
feeling that the faculty's role, variable as it may be from institution to institution. 
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is known and knowable, stable and stabilizing, and, therefore, predictable to 
individual faculty members (and aspiring faculty members) and their institutions. 
After so long a period of quiescence for one group within a system undergoing 
such a monumental upheaval, why should there be change now? (Jacobs 1990, 
43-44) 
There is a sense within the academy that, however loud the alarm being sounded 
by legislators, trustees, or administrators, "this, too, shall pass." Despite numerous 
predictions to the contrary the world as most faculty know it has not ended, and a 
"wait and see" attitude may be both predictable and rational. "Rooted in centuries of 
tradition, practice, and even pomp, the reigning college and university culture has been 
remarkably resistant to the many social realities that currently press for change" 
(Kashner 1990, 19). 
Indeed, the very idea that the academy should accommodate itself to the fads 
and fancies of the world outside is antithetical to many. Colleges and universities are 
intended to remain apart from — if not above — the concerns of the world. The job of a 
college president is to guard the door, not to invite the barbarians in to discuss the role 
of the institution: 
There is a view of higher education that tends to see its objectives in a priori, 
abstract, permanent terms. For example, it may be postulated that the purpose 
of higher education is to expand the frontiers of knowledge, improve its quality 
or assure that all students are exposed to the literature and languages of Western 
civilization. Moreover, it is the role of administration to gain public support for 
these objectives. Insofar as the administration moves away from these 
educational ideals to life-long learning, vocationalism or the creation of new 
industries, they argue that even if these new goals are successful, they would not 
be worthwhile because such efforts would violate certain educational ideals 
(Young 1981, 6). 
Along these lines, Clark Kerr (1990) observed that the interest in higher education 
reform that blossomed during the 1980s seemed to engage everyone but those within 
the academy. The "back to basics" movement, he said, did not energize most faculty 
members or most students. "The students, instead, are flocking to the professions ..., 
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and faculty members, by and large, are pursuing what Bertrand Russell once called the 
'fiercer specializations/ even in the humanities. The dire rhetoric of tomes on the best¬ 
seller lists is not being matched by action at ground level" (Kerr 1990, 12). 
This complacency can seem ironic or even arrogant in light of higher education's 
willingness to serve as social critic. When it comes to reform, what is good for the goose 
seems not to be endorsed by the gander. As Millett (1977a) noted in the early days of a 
period of upheaval now two decades long, 
if we in the academic world are asked to change our accustomed patterns of 
behavior, we are likely to resist. We have accepted the proposition that a major 
purpose of higher education is criticism of social institutions and behavior in the 
interest of self-renewal. But confronted with the task of self-renewal of its own 
social institution and behavior, higher education has yet to demonstrate its 
capacity for effective action, (vii) 
Clearly, any institution which sees its role as social critic will take the backtalk of its 
subject with a grain of salt. The therapist does not ask the patient for advice. From this 
perspective it is perhaps easy to understand why many institutions of higher education 
are slow to respond to the demands of society. 
One must also take into account the difficulty of developing consensus about 
anything in higher education. The forces at work in the system are centrifugal, not 
centripetal. The autonomy of individual perspectives is not only tolerated, it is revered. 
This value is perhaps most pronounced in research universities, where the ideal of the 
lone scholar working on a single strand of a grand tapestry still holds force 
(notwithstanding the growing reality of interdisciplinary teams and other forms of 
collaboration). "Institutions of all kinds," however, "have fed the value system that 
rewards independent entrepreneurial activity" (Pew Higher Education Research Program 
1992b, 1A). 
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The consensus-resistant character of higher education is perhaps easiest to 
explain by reference to the nature of the relationships among actors. Colleges and 
universities are, at basis, collections of individuals without a strong chain of command 
or meaningful accountability systems. 
University strategies tend to exhibit a remarkable degree of stability, 
discouraging any form of strategic "revolution." .. .Perhaps the most 
fundamental reason is that responsibility for strategy is divided among so many 
people: many autonomous individuals are unlikely to change their collective 
mind, at least not simultaneously, radically, and consistently. (Hardy et al. 
1983, 429) 
This kind of autonomy is typically seen as a strength of the system; when circumstances 
call for unified action, however, it can become a liability. 
Even when a measure of consensus is possible it frequently operates in a 
direction counter to that which would support planned change. Faced with the real and 
imminent prospect of change the academy often closes ranks around the status quo. 
Often, this resistance can be seen as a response to anxiety over the possible 
consequences of change. While conditions in most colleges and universities are perhaps 
less desirable than they were in the growth years of the 1960s, they are probably 
nonetheless superior (from the standpoint of the faculty member) to what one finds in 
the contemporary business climate, where downsizing, outsourcing, and wage and 
benefit give-backs have increased. In the minds of many faculty members and 
administrators, "change" smacks of a closer alignment with those disturbing external 
trends rather than a strategy to preserve institutional autonomy and vigor. George 
Johnson (1988), president of George Mason University in Virginia during years in which 
it was seen as one of the nation's most entrepreneurial campuses, described the 
difficulty of promoting responsiveness and adaptation in the face of uncertainty and 
anxiety: 
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When one's whole identity is called into question, it is not easy to contemplate 
changes, and it is even harder to act. .. .1 would guess that it was ... in the early 
1970s, that colleges and universities began to lose the critical detachment that 
had been their defining characteristic. Perhaps a storm-cellar mentality was our 
natural sanctuary; in any case, we became increasingly intolerant of threatening 
ideas and less able to watch ourselves with amusement and humility." (Johnson 
1988, 66) 
Because any change is likely to upset the distribution of benefits and burdens among 
members of the campus community, it is likely to create both winners and losers. This 
likelihood approaches certainty when total resources available for distribution are stable 
or declining. Foster (1990) described such a situation at the University of Minnesota 
during the 1980s: 
Many of those who stood to gain from reallocations saw the new resources as 
distant, inadequate, and hypothetical and therefore not worth a vigorous 
political battle, while those who stood to lose saw the threat as immediate, real, 
and devastating and therefore worth an enormous outpouring of energy to guard 
against it. (35) 
Finally, it should be acknowledged that certain structural factors may influence 
the ease with which colleges and universities perceive and align themselves with forces 
that argue for change. One such factor is the structure through which resources are 
allocated. Despite brief flirtations with Program Planning and Budgeting Systems 
(PPBS), Zero-Based Budgeting (ZBB) and similar schemes during the 1960s and 1970s, 
most institutions identify and respond to resource needs through traditional incremental 
budgeting. Foster (1990) argues that under such a system resource allocations are 
associated with constituencies (departments, research institutes, etc.), and the budget 
process becomes a method of "encoding" the balance among competing interests. Any 
change that threatens these allocations (which would be true of almost any substantive 
change) is seen as an assault on the fragile balance among interests. Thus, "orchestrating 
a change of direction for a university faces a considerable risk of failure because of the 
deals that have been struck among entrenched political interests, hallowed by time and 
custom" (Foster 1990, 34). 
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The attractiveness of the status quo can also be explained in part by the 
structure of influence within the academy. Older faculty members tend to dominate 
departments and senates, and they tend to have a greater stake in existing arrangements 
and a correspondingly limited interest in upsetting the apple cart: 
The demographic realities of the present and future professoriate create a 
dramatic tension. The older group, politically powerful in their professional 
organizations and on their institutional campuses, are comfortable with the 
culture and expectations they have created. At the same time, those faculty 
members acknowledge that the system must be replenished. (Jacobs 1990, 45). 
Younger members of the faculty may see more opportunity in change, but the tension is 
seldom resolved through self-conscious efforts at institutional renewal that require 
abandonment of existing power relationships. 
Factors that Contribute to a Consensus for Change 
Given the vigor and variety of the factors that make it difficult for institutions to 
reach consensus about the need to change, one might well ask whether seeking such 
consensus is simply a fool's errand. After all, if one states a condition for success that 
cannot be met, then the whole process of strategic adaptation should be seen as futile. 
It is not the purpose of this study to suggest that adaptive change — nor any of 
the conditions that support it — is impossible. Difficult, yes, but possible under the 
right circumstances. It is therefore appropriate to examine the literature for clues as to 
what seems effective in promoting the formation of a consensus for change on American 
campuses. 
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Given the loose organization of most colleges and universities, some observers 
argue that motivating interest in change requires the efforts of some influential 
individual: 
Inertia is an inevitable, indeed desirable, characteristic of any established 
organization. Members are busy getting today's work done; they have policies 
and routines to simplify action, and they have learned how to depend on each 
other. Change, especially a major upsetting change, is not welcome. 
Consequently, new ideas are filtered in terms of how easily they can be fitted 
into the existing patterns. Threatening ideas tend to be suppressed; they don't 
bubble up through the hierarchy as serious proposals. In such a setting, vigorous, 
persistent advocacy by a missionary is needed to propel a novel proposal into 
the strategic planning system (Yavitz and Newman 1982, 100). 
Hardy et al. (1983) see the change process as having three general phases: identification 
of the problem, development of alternatives, and selection among alternatives. It is in 
the identification phase that the organization must reach the conclusion that change is 
needed. While certain routine decisions present themselves for action (such as personnel 
decisions), the kinds of extraordinary decisions usually involved in adaptive change do 
not: 
Changes to the organization or to its established procedures ... need 
identification, and this tends to happen more by individual initiative. Given the 
complexity of decision making in universities ... change is difficult to imagine 
without the individual "champion" or "sponsor." (Hardy et al. 1983, 417) 
Hardy (1988) develops this idea further in the context of a study of "turnaround" 
strategies among a group of liberal arts colleges facing the need for strategic change. She 
suggests that while task forces may be useful in assessing the dimension of a problem 
and brainstorming possible solutions, "a powerful change agent — someone with both 
formal authority and respect within the community — will have to take responsibility 
for the change" (Hardy 1988, 16). This finding has two interesting implications. First, it 
suggests that even after a problem has been identified and subjected to analysis, the 
urgency of solving it may dissipate unless a champion takes responsibility for it. 
Second, Hardy makes it clear that the change agent need not necessarily be the 
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institution's chief executive. This observation will recur in the later discussion of the 
requirements of leadership in organizations pursuing adaptive change. 
But, although a champion or sponsor may strike a spark, the change agent acting 
alone is unlikely to start a fire. Unless the community includes a significant number of 
members who have personal contact with and understanding of the external 
environment, it will be very difficult for a change agent, however persuasive, to 
communicate exactly what the problem is. Cope (1981) identifies two "adaptive" 
characteristics of colleges and universities that promote this kind of receptiveness to 
change. 
The first is the presence of "permeable boundaries related to segmented markets" 
(Cope 1981, 3). By this he means direct and frequent interaction between individuals 
within the university and communities of interest in the world outside. In insular 
organizations, like universities, it is hard to imagine a consensus for change arising 
spontaneously, purely as a result of thought and reflection. It must be triggered through 
contact — and probably fairly widely dispersed contact — with individuals and 
organizations outside the campus who signal conditions or expectations requiring 
adaptive change. To the extent that these signals are received and communicated on 
campus, one might expect a sense of the need for change to emerge. 
Second, Cope argues that it is important to have "a preponderance of staff 
employed in adaptive substructures" (Cope 1981, 3). This has to do with the nature of 
their work. Just as an individual with frequent external contacts is more likely to 
perceive discontinuities that signal the need for change, so too is an individual whose job 
emphasizes "adaptive" functions, such as developing new products in collaboration 
with the private sector, or undertaking public policy research for a government agency. 
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Cope likens this kind of predisposition to what Mahan described, in a classic analysis 
of the origins of British sea power, as a "natural" advantage resulting from having a 
large proportion of the population living along the coast. Britain's coastal population, 
he said, gave her "a proclivity to go to sea" (16). Similarly, the existence of sizable 
numbers of faculty engaged in interactive work might constitute a "proclivity" to engage 
in adaptive change. 
A similar point is made by Gardner, Warner and Biedenweg (1990) in a case 
study of a change process at Stanford University. They drew their parallel not with the 
development of British sea power but with the restructuring of the Union Pacific 
Railroad. The Union Pacific CEO, faced with a rapidly deteriorating competitive 
position, discovered that "most people in his organization didn't understand what had 
happened since [railroad] deregulation. They didn't know that all the growth in their 
markets had gone to trucking nor that their own cash was going to invest in that rival 
industry" (Gardner, Warner and Biedenweg 1990, 24). Likewise, at Stanford, few 
understood that cost-plus pricing was no longer possible: 
It was becoming clear that public pressure in the form of resistance to high tuition 
increases was putting the university in a difficult position. And, as federal 
research funds tightened, sponsoring agencies focused on putting their limited 
funds into the direct — not overhead — costs of research." (25) 
In both cases, the organizations suffered from their insularity and from their lack of 
understanding of profound changes affecting their competitive positions. The clear 
implication is that awareness must precede the willingness to act. 
This principle was put into action at St. Edward's University, where the campus 
leadership chose to use the accreditation self-study process as a vehicle for raising the 
campus's awareness of changes in its environment. Nearly one hundred members of the 
campus community volunteered to work on the self-study committee, and the entire 
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campus participated in a "Community Day" with an address by noted planning scholar 
George Keller and several rounds of "strategy forums" (Houghton and Jurick 1995). The 
reported result: 
Research and analysis led inexorably to the conclusion that the external forces 
facing higher education generally and St. Edward's in particular are so powerful 
in their implications as to undercut the possibility of adaptation through 
tinkering or add-ons. Those forces require basic reformulations of theory and 
practice and thus call for a self-study with the goal of redesigning the university. 
(Houghton and Jurick 1995, 47) 
While this account may seem utopian to those who have struggled through less convivial 
change processes, it nonetheless suggests that awareness can be a powerful antecedent 
to action. 
If awareness is the carrot inducing receptiveness to change, then crisis is the stick. 
Hardy et al. (1983) suggest that institutional strategies are not necessarily self-conscious 
or pre-determined. Rather, they say, strategies can emerge as themes or patterns in the 
behavior of the members of the community, perhaps only becoming evident in retrospect. 
This view of strategy, with its emphasis on the cumulative effect of many individual 
choices, underscores the difficulty of building explicit consensus around a given problem 
in the environment. It also, however, offers insight into why a state of crisis can 
sometimes seem to cause a sudden and lasting change in institutional direction. 
Confronted with the obvious need to respond to crisis, the academic community tends 
to cede greater authority to the central administration. This is generally felt to be a 
temporary expedient, not a permanent redistribution of power and authority, and there 
is strong pressure to return to established decision-making processes once the crisis has 
passed. But "strategies, as patterns, often emerge from precedent-setting decisions, and 
these often occur during times of crisis, when radical actions must be taken quickly" 
(Hardy et al. 1983, 426). Put another way, the crisis authorizes the administration to 
act, and in taking action new ways of thinking about the situation are embedded in the 
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institutional consciousness. In this sense, the crisis has led to a new awareness 
powerfully shaped by the thinking (and corresponding action) of the central 
administration. 
Cope (1987), summarizing what he sees as the "practical fundamentals of 
strategic choice making" (22), suggests that the process begins with an "outside" force 
for change. This outside force often represents a crisis, especially when quick action is 
demanded. Both Cope and Foster (1990) draw on the planning experiences of the 
University of Minnesota in the mid-1980s to illustrate this point. In one case, Foster 
describes a challenge to downsize and refocus the institution from an activist governor 
as a threat-induced crisis that created a willingness to consider change: "the initial 
shock to the system administered by the governor's challenge provided an environment 
in which change was possible" (Foster 1990, 35). In the other case. Cope (1987) 
observed that two successive rounds of budget-induced retrenchment forced the 
University of Minnesota to focus on costs, including comparative costs. These cost 
questions, which had not been taken seriously prior to the retrenchments, moved to 
center stage in the context of crisis. 
Interestingly, Cope concluded that the primary importance of the university's 
response to the need for retrenchment was the impact it had on the perceived need to 
change. The strategies themselves were important at the time, but the lasting value was 
in a change in attitudes: 
Perhaps little more was gained during those difficult years that translated much 
beyond survival strategies for retrenchment. Important, however, was the 
growing awareness of the need to begin planning institutionwide and laterally, 
with new processes, that attempted to provide for more attention to the external 
environment and to such matters as comparative advantage and how to get it. 
(Cope 1987, 31) 
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Institutional leaders who have attempted to build consensus for change agree 
that it depends on the perception — widely held within the campus community — that 
crisis is truly at hand. Richard Cyert, reflecting on his experience leading a strategic 
restructuring of Carnegie Mellon University, observed that "only the adverse and 
challenging circumstances of institutions encountering financial stress could prompt 
greater emphasis on strategic planning as well as on careful management" (Cyert 1988, 
91). Ed Roach, commenting on his experience at West Texas State University, affirmed 
Keller's view that strategic planning is least likely to take hold when an institution is 
experiencing success (although he saw both positive and negative incentives for change): 
"rather, a real or perceived external threat, new opportunities, or an ambition for 
greatness seem to be requisites for gaining support for strategic planning in higher 
education" (Roach 1988, 62). Keller himself cited a conversation with Lawrence Cremin, 
who commented on his efforts to build understanding of the crisis facing Teachers 
College as a stimulus to strategic rethinking. "...I opened our financial books for all the 
faculty to see. Unveiling the budget was an eye-opener. It gave people a sense of our 
grim reality and helped build a consensus for change" (Keller 1988, 94). 
The direct observations of these institutional leaders conform with the broader 
theoretical framework relating to change in complex organizations. In his pathbreaking 
study of scientific "revolutions," T. S. Kuhn noted the dogged determination with which 
members of a scientific community will adhere to the known truths and existing theories 
of their discipline. Evidence challenging the dominant paradigm is frequently repressed, 
rejected, redefined or otherwise held at bay until the discipline's cognitive distress 
becomes so acute that a state of "crisis" is induced. That unhappy state releases the 
imaginative faculties of the practitioners within the discipline, and new ways of looking 
at the world become not only permitted but demanded (Kuhn 1970). 
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Attempts have been made over the years to apply Kuhn's work to many 
communities of interest outside the scientific disciplines which were his special study 
(Gutting 1980), with varying degrees of success. While Kuhn's model cannot be 
extended indefinitely, it is interesting to note that the individuals whose behavior as 
scientific researchers Kuhn sees as so predictable are to a very large extent the same 
individuals who, as faculty senators, academic department heads, deans, provosts and 
presidents, populate the "discipline" of academic management. It should perhaps not 
be surprising to find that these individuals behave as managers much as they do as 
members of a research community. The strong implication for strategic planning is that 
new ways of thinking about an institution are not likely to be entertained unless and 
until the old paradigms are discredited. 
This same general lesson can be found in the contemporary literature of 
organizational culture and change. Schein (1985) argues that, before they can change, 
organizations must be "unfrozen." They must put their problems in the open, defeat the 
denial which inevitably greets problems, and induce anxiety sufficient to stimulate 
changed thinking and behaviors. The more comfortable the old ideas, the harder it is to 
"unfreeze" the organization: 
If a company has had a long history of success with certain assumptions about 
itself and the environment, it is unlikely to want to challenge or reexamine those 
assumptions. Even if the assumptions are brought to consciousness, the 
members of the company want to hold on to them because they justify the past 
and are the source of their pride and self-esteem. 
Such assumptions now operate as filters that make it difficult for key 
managers to understand alternative strategies for survival and renewal. .. .Clear 
alternatives can be identified; but no matter how clear ... some alternatives will 
not even be understood if they do not fit the old culture, and some alternatives 
will be resisted even if understood (Schein 1985, 292). 
Substitute "university" for "company," and Schein's observation describes very well the 
situation confronting higher educational leaders seeking to launch a reappraisal of their 
institution's strategic position. 
38 
Dealing with this challenge can be very difficult. Schein notes that "the key to 
both unfreezing and to managing change is to create enough psychological safety to 
permit group members to bear the anxieties that come with reexamining and changing 
parts of their culture" (Schein 1985, 295). Alpert (1985) agrees that the "safety" 
question deserves broad attention: 
...The presidents of our universities are subject to criticisms from so many 
constituencies, internal as well as external, that they find it difficult to discuss 
publicly substantive inadequacies in any dimension of performance. Similar 
vulnerabilities are experienced by faculty members, who are typically held 
accountable to their immediate departmental colleagues in formal deliberations 
regarding larger academic issues. Under these circumstances, a first step in 
organizational learning, either at the local or the national level, is the creation of a 
"safe place" for the candid discussion of matters that have been heretofore 
undiscusscible. Some form of informal organization seems essential, transcending 
the governance structures of individual institutions and transcending the 
professional disciplinary and professional communities (Alpert 1985, 277). 
How one might create a "safe place" would necessarily vary widely as a function of 
institutional history, values and circumstances. Recognition that mutual vulnerabilities 
should be acknowledged and respected, however, is the first step, and the underlying 
lesson is that one cannot necessarily begin the strategic planning process with 
"planning." As Schein cautions, "...the period of change has itself to be defined as a 
stage to be managed" (Schein 1985, 256). 
In summary, then, both theories of change and practical experience suggest that 
building consensus around the need for change — if necessary, by inducing a sense of 
crisis — is a fundamental prerequisite for successful strategic planning. At the same 
time, care must be taken to anticipate and manage the anxieties that a sense of crisis 
inevitably engenders. 
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Focusing on Institutional Needs 
"Strategic" approaches to planning can occur at any level. An academic 
department can seek to reposition itself within its environment (an important element of 
which is the institution with which it is affiliated); a multi-departmental group of faculty 
with common research interests can seek a new organizational structure better suited to 
their sense of emerging opportunities; a university system can attempt to be more 
responsive in the way in which it arrays its resources. The focus of this review, however, 
is on institutional planning, the process by which a campus examines the threats and 
opportunities in its environment, assesses the strengths and weaknesses represented 
across the range of its programs and activities, and develops a strategy that capitalizes 
on the best "matches" among them. 
This is a fundamental characteristic of strategic planning that distinguishes it 
from other forms of planning: 
Most definitions say strategic planning is planning for the whole organization in 
reference to the organization's external environment. Proponents argue that this 
emphasis of whole organization to whole environment is essential to institutional 
vitality, even survival. Strategic planning appears to have one essential 
characteristic: It is direction finding for the whole enterprise in relation to the 
ecosystem. (Cope 1987, 3) 
The institutional view is also the "glue" that holds the planning process together. 
Without some notion of how the pieces fit together, the individual actors within the 
institution — even if they have the best of intentions — cannot contribute effectively. "If 
individuals do not see the 'big picture,' it is difficult for them to understand the 
importance of their overall effort" (Jones 1990, 53). 
40 
However detailed, rational, or well-informed, a planning process can only be 
deemed "strategic" if it is successful in developing an overall strategy that transcends 
the thinking of its constituent parts. 
.. .Strategic planning is for the whole institution and for its long-term stature and 
excellence, not for satisfying dozens of separate internal hopes spun in isolation 
from a college's overall needs. A university is something more than the aggregate 
of its parts. A strategic plan is something more than a list of individual wants 
and aspirations. (Keller 1985, 141) 
This does not mean, however, that one could or should suppress "individual wants and 
aspirations." It is those aspirations that animate the planning process, that provide the 
emotional content to what would otherwise be a set of lifeless calculations, and that 
provide the basis for believing that a plan, once arrived at, will be implemented. This is 
one of the key tensions inherent in the strategic concept of planning. The process must 
operate at both the micro and the macro level, encouraging individual dreams, but in the 
context of institutional vision. 
In practical terms, however, "micro" tends to outnumber "macro." The natural 
constituency for a truly "institutional" view can be quite small, perhaps as small as the 
campus president and a handful of aides. A successful strategic planning process can 
begin with the push-and-pull of unconnected aspirations, but it cannot end that way. 
"It is essential to develop campuswide understanding and acceptance of institutional 
goals in order to effect necessary change" (Lisensky 1988, 20). For pragmatic reasons 
alone, therefore, it is vitally important to incorporate a focus on institutional needs into 
the planning process, and to build a broader constituency for the institutional view. 
While a focus on institutional issues is of practical importance to the success of 
the planning process, it may also have therapeutic value for the institution and its 
members: 
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There will be many discussions and arguments about departmental or individual 
goals and priorities, but the key is to view and interpret most matters at the 
institutional level. Encouraging campus constituents to think in the best interest 
of the institution as a whole is probably a good way of resolving many of their 
inter-departmental squabbles and of promoting intra-institutional cooperation 
and understanding. (Tan 1990, 7) 
This observation reinforces the sense that, as with so many other features of the strategic 
approach to planning, what is good for the process may ultimately be most important in 
that it is also good for the institution. 
The Power of Parochial Thinking 
As with developing a consensus for change, the ideal of promoting an 
institutional perspective is often difficult to attain. Individual wants and aspirations 
tend to represent the first — and often the only — interest of many faculty members and 
academic administrators. Once again, centripetal forces of several kinds seem to be at 
work. 
One such force has to do with differing expectations of the planning process that 
exist at different organizational levels. Schmidtlein (1990b) commented on this 
discontinuity in the context of a discussion of the difficulty of linking planning and 
budgeting: 
Organizational units nearly always view planning as a means to enlarge their 
budgets, while central staff frequently seek reallocations and reductions. As a 
result, unit plans frequently contain "laundry lists" of new items for which they 
seek resources. One faculty member, commenting on a new planning process at 
his campus, said the president wanted plans to mesh with the budget. However, 
people on (planning) committees get "wild eyed" and embarrass the president 
with demands. The politics of reconciling financially unrealistic unit requests 
with institution-wide priorities complicates the development of explicit plans. 
(Schmidtlein 1990b, 15) 
Schmidtlein and Milton (1988) found ample evidence of this tendency in their site visits 
to campuses engaged in planning: 
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Virtually all faculty and department chairs viewed planning as a means to obtain 
more resources for their units. They related the success or failure of planning 
efforts to increases in the resources received. ...Administrators, on the other 
hand, were upset with unit plans that were "wish lists," requests not constrained 
by realistic expectations of available resources. (Schmidtlein and Milton 1988, 
13) 
This tendency is, of course, far more likely to manifest itself when competition for 
resources is most intense. As Moore and Langknecht (1986) observed, "in a declining 
economic environment optimizing individual and institutional needs simultaneously is 
very difficult." Under such circumstances, they say, institutions "need to put the 
welfare of the total enterprise ahead of the needs of special interest groups" (4). In 
theory, one might expect a happier convergence of unit and institutional thinking when 
the institution is able to satisfy a significant portion of unit requests. In practice, 
however, strategic planning is often undertaken precisely because of a need to respond 
to existing or prospective financial stringency. The tension between the wish lists of the 
units and the limited resources of the institution should therefore be seen as a central 
dilemma of strategic planning. 
Irrespective of tensions related to resource considerations, many observers see a 
general decline in the notion of institutional "citizenship." Faculty members, in 
particular, are described as increasingly self-absorbed or motivated by loyalties that 
originate beyond the institutions with which they are associated. One university 
president described the phenomenon as having roots in a broader social trend: 
Academicians have forgotten the habits of holistic thinking. An intense emphasis 
on self-development, a legacy of the 1960s, has become common among many 
faculty members, so that priorities and management are viewed as inimical, and 
the ideal academic state is considered to be one in which one hundred flowers 
are allowed to bloom without direction or constraint. Faculty senates are poorly 
attended, conflicts of interest that once would have been abhorrent are now 
widely ignored, and collective responsibilities (as opposed to prerogatives) tend 
to be shunned. (Johnson 1988, 69) 
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This view suggests that the challenge is not how to marshal support for a particular 
institutional perspective, but rather how to establish the legitimacy of the "institution" 
itself. It is as if any appeal to "institutional" interests, however wholesome, is suspect. 
One theory of the decline of institutional citizenship focuses on the growth of the 
research model in the decades following World War II. This view describes an 
"academic ratchet... whereby individual faculty members increase their discretionary 
time (time for pursuing professional and personal goals) largely by loosening their 
institutional ties and responsibilities" (Massy and Zemsky 1992, 4B). Since such 
behavior tends to be rewarded in the research university culture, it leads to a self¬ 
reinforcing cycle and "an unmistakable weakening of the social contract that binds 
faculty to one another and to the community of students and colleagues they share." 
There is little incentive for faculty members to work to create or even to pay attention to 
institutional interests. The trend, it is suggested, will ultimately lead to "faculties of 
independent contractors who principally share only the privileges of an academic 
calendar and lifestyle" (Pew Higher Education Research Program 1992b, 3A). 
Henry Rosovsky, long-time dean of the faculty of arts and sciences at Harvard, 
gave voice to similar feelings in a set of widely noted valedictory remarks. He lamented 
that his faculty had "become a society largely without rules, or to put it slightly 
differently, the tenured members of the faculty frequently as individuals — make their 
own rules. .. .When it concerns our more important obligations — faculty citizenship — 
neither rule nor custom is any longer compelling" (Rosovsky 1992, 2B). 
A key factor contributing to the "academic ratchet" is the growing specialization 
of scholarly work and the consequent fragmentation of the community of scholars. Even 
colleagues in the same department may find themselves less and less familiar with the 
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current questions and future directions of each others' areas of special interest. Since the 
academic reward structure is geared toward professional recognition, and since faculty 
are often judged more by colleagues off campus than on, the trend toward increasing 
specialization has important implications for accountability. Generally, lines of 
accountability are increasingly horizontal (Hardy et al. 1983). 
Hardy et al. provide a very practical description of the consequences: 
The fact that a certain Roger Bennett teaches marketing in McGill University's 
MBA program by the case method is hardly independent of the fact that he was 
so trained in Harvard's MBA and DBA programs. And as professional norms 
change, so, too, do the strategies: if Bennett's notion that the "marketing 
concept" has outlived its usefulness catches hold among his marketing colleagues 
(a process Bennett encourages through his publications in professional journals 
and his speeches at professional meetings), then the nature of marketing courses 
all over North America will change.... 
To a great extent, many important strategies associated with mission cut 
across universities. Because of the standardization of skills and the sharing of 
norms, it becomes more accurate to talk of a strategy for teaching marketing than 
a strategy for teaching at McGill. That is, there is probably far greater 
consistency among marketing professors all over the world than there is among 
Bennett's neighbors in the Faculty of Management at McGill University. This is 
the result of the fact that the range of professional influences is far greater than 
the more focussed institutional influences, at least in the sphere of the provision 
of the basic mission. (Hardy et al. 1983, 425) 
Thus, to develop a focus on institutional issues, it is necessary to countervail the 
enormous force that pulls faculty toward their disciplinary colleagues and away from 
the center of the organization. 
A final factor that complicates the development of an institutional perspective 
involves the human cost paid when individuals find themselves caught between 
opposing forces. To be effective, a planning process must draw broad participation 
from the campus. With the exception of a few senior administrators and central staff 
members, however, all the participants in the planning process will have their roots in 
the schools, colleges, academic departments and other units that make up the campus. 
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The interests of the units may very well differ from those of the institution as a whole. 
Individual participants in the process, then, will likely find themselves torn between 
their loyalties to their home units and their desire to take the broad view necessary to 
support a successful planning effort. 
Flack (1994), in a review of a strategic planning effort at Glassboro State College 
(now Rowan College) in New Jersey, quotes some participants' accounts of the tension 
they experienced. First, a faculty member who served on the campus's Strategic 
Planning Committee (SPC): 
We were committed to not viewing ourselves as representatives of our school or 
of departmental or ideological interests, but maintaining that perspective was 
often difficult. As the months went by, I felt a growing sense of alienation from 
my faculty colleagues. We had decided that all discussions of individuals and 
academic units would be confidential so that we could speak freely and change 
our minds. But this confidentiality led to an awkwardness with my faculty 
colleagues who wanted to know what was going on. A few charged that the 
process was too secret or too "top down." (Flack 1994, 27) 
A similar awkwardness was felt by a dean who also served on the SPC: 
I think the committee acted fairly. But some members of my school's faculty felt 
their school had been negatively impacted, and held me partly responsible for 
program reductions and phase outs — even though other schools had programs 
reduced or phased out also. Although I had personal opinions and differences 
with some of the committee's decisions, I publicly supported all the final 
decisions of the strategy committee. By the end, I believed we all had to avoid 
violating the college-wide nature of the planning process. (28) 
A common theme running through both accounts is the personal price these 
individuals paid for rising above their particular interests and adopting a stance in 
which the institution's interests came first. These first-person accounts suggest that, 
while demonstrations of institutional citizenship are possible, they are not without their 
cost. One would expect that many members of the campus community would rather not 
be placed in the position of defending a "secret" process, or be accused of failing to 
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protect their friends and colleagues. These kinds of personal considerations would tend 
to further complicate a situation already made difficult by the factors cited earlier. 
Factors that Contribute to "Institutional" Thinking 
Promoting a focus on institutional issues, like forming consensus on the need for 
change, can be seen as both necessary and difficult. The literature suggests several 
strategies that can increase an institution's chances of success. 
The first of these is the complement to a problem listed above: inducing the 
participants in the planning process to rise above narrow concerns and take the 
broadest possible view. Wharton and Corak (1992) argue that is "imperative that 
participants in the process ... be demonstrably able to don "university hats," to see 
themselves as representing the whole of the enterprise and to act accordingly" (8). This 
implies a selection criterion to be applied when the president or other responsible party 
considers possible members of the planning committee or committees. This point is 
made explicitly by Flack (1994): 
In selecting the committee members, a most important caution is that members 
not be mere spokespersons of a particular group, e.g. the faculty union, the 
student government, or a minority, ethnic, or gender caucus. The president and 
deans, and perhaps the faculty senate, ought to identify and select individuals 
who are independent and courageous, who are forward-looking, and who are 
interested in the good of the whole institution. (Flack 1994, 27) 
Flack's interviews with participants in the Glassboro State planning process suggest that 
this caution may have special relevance to the selection of individuals who are asked to 
take leadership roles in the planning process, such as the chairs of departmental 
committees or topical task forces. A department head reported that he had entered the 
process with less than pure motives, but that he had been influenced by the demeanor of 
those around him: 
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When I was first asked to serve on the committee, I thought I could use the 
opportunity to protect the interests of my department. Several members of my 
department thought the same thing. As the committee got into its work, I soon 
realized that the committee chair was firmly intent on doing the best possible job 
for the future of the whole college. So I gradually gave up my parochial views 
and moved to a more all-college mode. I credit this chiefly to the lofty vision of 
our committee's chair. I think others moved in the same direction too, although 
our disciplinary backgrounds tended to nudge us in certain directions despite our 
efforts to take the larger view. (Flack 1994, 27-28) 
This suggestion of mutual reinforcement — that it is easier for individuals to 
maintain an elevated perspective when they are in the company of their colleagues — 
has important implications for the structure of planning processes. It suggests that 
institutions seeking to build awareness of and respect for broad campus concerns should 
create opportunities for participation in the planning process: 
Frequently, participants in formal university planning report benefits in the form 
of increased understanding of vital administrative processes and problems, 
enhanced appreciation of departments with which they were previously 
unfamiliar, and greater personal commitment to the institution as a whole. 
Conceivably, this might be the main purpose of a planning process where the 
greatest need is for improvement of the interpersonal ambiance of the institution 
as opposed to establishing different goals and objectives. (Richardson and 
Gardner 1985, 12) 
Using participation as a means to promote development of an institutional 
viewpoint can in some ways, of course, be seen as a risky strategy. After all, if good 
leadership does not emerge and if mutual reinforcement does not occur then one is left 
with a planning process dominated by parochial interests. In such a case the process is 
likely to be at best unhelpful (in that it fails to focus on institutional needs) or at worst 
destructive (in that it engenders intra-institutional competition without providing a 
means for its constructive resolution). To avoid these risks some institutions tend to tilt 
toward a "top-down" approach to planning. If the president sees himself or herself as 
the sole trustworthy steward of "institutional" interests, then there may be a tendency 
to keep a firm hand on the helm to prevent the process from becoming fragmented and 
unproductive. 
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This form of navigation, however, can be difficult to pull off. In educational 
organizations a strong "bottom-up" bias tends to exist. Recognizing this, one observer 
suggests identifying "those components of planning that need not be participatory and 
can be centrally directed, while subtly but firmly providing top-down direction and 
articulation to those areas where participation and consensus are critical" (Norris and 
Poulton 1991, 15). This seems attractive, but may be easier said than done. It may be 
difficult to attract broad-based, committed participation in the process if the president 
seems to be exerting undue influence on the participants. 
There may, however, be ways of approaching the planning process that increase 
the chances that a participatory approach will promote an institutional perspective. 
One method is to make it clear that interest politics are an expected and appropriate 
part of the planning process. Rather than asking participants to leave their interests at 
the board room door — which many may find difficult or impossible to do — they can 
be asked to be explicit about the attitudes and perceptions they bring to the table. 
Declaring one's interests frequently makes it easier to put them in context; it is unstated 
interests that tend to have the most corrosive effect on group interactions. 
Thus, a straightforward acknowledgment that planning is in large measure a 
political process may both help clear the air and reinforce the point that the goal of 
planning is to find the best possible balance among competing interests. In this sense 
"campus politics," frequently seen as antithetical to planning, can be given its 
appropriate place within the planning process. After all, as one observer points out, 
campus politics is ... the only mechanism we have devised to adjudicate the 
ideological, educational, ethnic, gender, and other differences that exist at every 
college or university. To try to inhibit the political discussions about proposed 
major changes usually makes implementation of a plan more recalcitrant [sic] 
not less so. (Donnithorne 1991, 17) 
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Another approach is to educate the campus in ways of thinking about planning 
that reinforce the importance of institutional perspectives. Tan (1990) notes that the 
"systems" approach provides one useful model. The fundamental principle of systems 
theory is that the parts of a system only make sense in the context of the whole. 
Applied to organizations, it suggest that departments and other "subsystems" derive 
their purpose and value from the contribution they make to the larger system. "In the 
context of higher education, the systems approach would require that most 
departmental or individual matters be viewed at the institutional level, in light of all 
other pressing institutional priorities and problems" (Tan 1990, 3). To the extent that 
members of the community can be induced to adopt a systems perspective, the goal of 
subordinating unit interests to larger institutional purposes can be achieved. As Tan 
puts it. 
The challenge in a strategic planning process is to be able to persuade loosely- 
coupled subsystems to work together and to adopt a common goal reality which 
works toward the benefit of the whole institution. 
...In general, the systems approach is likely to encourage factional 
constituents to set aside their self-interests and to focus their attention on 
matters which are in the best interest of the institution as a whole. Intra- 
institutional understanding and cooperation is likely to be enhanced as a 
consequence of the process. (Tan 1990, 3) 
The systems approach, of course, competes with other conceptions of organizational 
behavior (e.g., political and collegial models) that may fit more naturally with academic 
culture and traditions. One therefore ought not to expect a wholesale conversion to 
systems theory on the part of the faculty. Explicit discussion of different organizational 
models, however, might at least lend legitimacy to administrative efforts to promote the 
institutional view. 
Whether through wise recruitment, exhortation, education, or some other means, 
it is essential to counterbalance the natural tendency toward fragmentation that exists 
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on most campuses. Failure to do so — and to do so from a point fairly early in the 
planning process — increases the likelihood that unrealistic expectations and unhelpful 
ideas will be generated. 
Ensuring Good "Fit" with Campus Culture 
Planning is an intimate activity. Approached correctly, it involves thoughtful — 
often painful — examination of threats in the environment and vulnerabilities within the 
institution. Its success is highly dependent on the personalities of the principal actors, 
especially their willingness to reveal their fears and anxieties and to expose their hopes 
and dreams. Despite its rationalistic origins and formalistic trappings, strategic 
planning may be more closely related to family counseling than it is to management 
science. 
It is therefore perhaps not surprising that a recurring theme in the planning 
literature is the need to ensure that a planning processes "fits" the culture of the 
campus. A process that seems too direct or too subtle, too mechanistic or too organic, 
excessively centralized or insufficiently organized, or that in any other respect just does 
not feel "right" is unlikely to elicit the kind of candor and soul-searching that adaptive 
thinking requires. 
To a certain extent, fit has always been a consideration in the design of planning 
processes. Winstead and Ruff (1986), commenting on their review of a half-century of 
planning literature in higher education, observed that "there is no one model for planning 
• • • that can be pulled off the shelf and used by all institutional planners in all situations" 
(17). But the emphasis on fit with culture is relatively recent, coming into common 
discussion only within the past decade or two. 
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The emerging importance of fit with culture probably has two main origins. First, 
it is intrinsically related to the concept of strategic planning as it was originally 
developed in industry. Long before strategic approaches were widely employed in 
higher education the link between organizational culture and effective planning design 
had been forged. The need for //custom-made// planning processes was well established 
in corporate strategic planning, and the lesson was incorporated into efforts to adapt 
strategic approaches to the not-for-profit sector (Steiner 1979). 
Second, the culture of higher education is particularly complex and unforgiving. 
Compared with most colleges and universities, the average corporate entity is tightly 
organized, vertically integrated, and sharply focused on a small set of well-understood 
and widely accepted organizational goals. In some respects, the academic "culture" — 
the way things are done — is more important than what gets done. With culture 
occupying such a central place in most higher education organizations, accommodating 
cultural considerations when designing a planning process becomes particularly 
important. 
The importance of fit was often revealed in case studies of colleges and 
universities engaged in planning activities which reported disappointing results from 
"canned" approaches (Schmidtlein 1990; Schmidtlein and Milton 1990). One 
experienced planner sees fit as being central to the design process: 
When college and university planning processes are properly designed, they tend 
to harmonize with the academic organizations in which they are embedded. 
When poorly designed, they undermine the decision making necessary for 
institutional adaptation and create administrative burdens, wasteful paperwork, 
and distrust among the faculty. (Dill 1993, 8) 
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The literature is replete with similar testimonials to the importance of fit. Tan 
(1990) emphasized that "strategic planning has to be situational. It has to be mission- 
oriented" (3). Moore and Langknecht (1986) urged that "approaches to planning 
compatible with the culture and distinctive organizational characteristics should be 
considered" (2). Similar sentiments may be found in Meisinger (1990) and Millett 
(1977c). 
Importantly, however, the concern with fit goes beyond attention to the general 
cultural characteristics of colleges and universities. While elements of a common 
"academic culture" may be found on almost any campus, many observers stress the 
importance of considering the unique characteristics of each institution. Farmer (1990) 
observed that "it is vitally important to know the culture specific to the institution in 
which one is working and to recognize that what will work in one organization may not 
work in another" (8). Chaffee (1984) reached a similar conclusion from her study of 
successful practice at small private colleges: 
Effective turnaround strategy needs to be unique to an institution. A productive 
strategy arises from the collective heritage and current manifestation of 
perceptions and purposes for each individual organization. The patterns of such 
phenomena are as idiosyncratic as fingerprints. What worked for the college 
down the road has no necessary correlation with what will work here. (Chaffee 
1984, 233) 
Steeples (1990) offers an example of how institutional culture can define the shape of a 
planning process. Commenting on a study of planned change at Earlham College, he 
noted that "Earlham's Quaker heritage dictated reaching decisions by consensus, 
ensuring extensive participation in prolonged deliberations about virtually all major 
issues as well as widely decentralized means of implementation" (Steeples 1990, 105). 
The importance of participation is a value shared across most colleges and universities, 
of course, but at each institution the local culture will determine the extent to which 
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participatory elements must be balanced by other concerns in the design of the planning 
process. Hardy (1988) describes how this can play out in practice: 
Since universities have different structures and cultures, it means that to a certain 
extent every institution must formulate a strategy which meets its individual 
needs. A study of retrenchment strategies in two Canadian universities found 
that cultural variations led to different retrenchment strategies. One university 
had a tradition of highly decentralized decision making in a relatively collegial 
culture; the second was more centralized and technocratic with a history of 
quantitative studies of resource allocation. Successful retrenchment in the first 
involved a strategy with high participation and ostensibly "fair" cuts. In the 
second, it required finding a methodology for making selective cuts that was 
deemed legitimate by the university community. Successful turnaround may look 
different in different institutions. (Hardy 1988, 16) 
The notion of close institutional fit finds wide endorsement in the planning 
literature. Bucklew and Smith (1986) argue that "each institution needs to develop a 
planning-budgeting process that fits its particular tradition and expectations" (83). 
Larson, Milton and Schmidtlein (1988), reporting on the results of a large-scale study of 
institutional planning, concluded that "it is unlikely that any one planning system or 
approach will suit the needs of all types of institutions..." (11-12). Flack (1994), noting 
the enormous variety of cultures among American colleges and universities, cited the 
desirability of "local, home-grown" planning processes (24). Prinvale (1989) made a 
similar finding: "in order to be successful [planning] must be organized yet adaptable to 
the unique characteristics of an institution" (2). 
Prinvale's observation is important in that it positions fit in the context of other 
factors which are important to sound planning. If strategic planning were simply a 
matter of "going with the flow" of an institution's prevailing culture, then one might 
expect little real change to occur. Presumably, existing decision-making structures on 
each campus reflect a fit with the institutional culture, yet these structures are also 
responsible for the status quo that the planning process is designed to re-examine and, 
in many cases, change. Therefore, while fit needs to be seen as a key consideration in the 
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design of a successful planning process, cultural considerations cannot drive every 
aspect of planning design. It is a question of balance: planning may be most likely to 
succeed when "the institution utilizes a proven planning model and modifies it to fit 
unique circumstances" (Jones 1990, 55). 
Understanding; Academic Culture 
Having established the desirability of designing planning processes that fit the 
culture of higher education, it is appropriate to look more closely into what that culture 
consists of. Consideration of the campus culture involves understanding how decisions 
are made, what determines legitimacy, how responsibility is apportioned between the 
faculty and the administration, how initiative is encouraged and responded to, and 
similar kinds of issues. Organizational cultures are important stabilizing mechanisms, 
and change very slowly. Planning inconsistent with institutional culture is easily 
rebuffed and rarely takes root (Schmidtlein 1990). 
Given the importance of cultural fit, institutions might benefit from a systematic 
examination of campus culture in the broader context of organizational behavior. 
Educational leaders often have little familiarity with these concepts, even though they 
are strongly related to the process of planned change in which many of those same 
leaders are engaged. Moore and Langknecht (1986), noting that many institutions have 
had frustrating planning experiences, attribute some of the difficulty to "faulty and 
incomplete understanding of colleges and universities as formal organizations" (1). 
While every campus is unique, there are some themes that have emerged from the study 
of organizational behavior within institutions of higher education in America. 
Cohen and March, in their influential analysis of presidential leadership in higher 
education, found a general cultural pattern they termed "organized anarchy." 
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The American college or university is a prototypic organized anarchy. It does not 
know what it is doing. Its goals are either vague or in dispute. Its technology is 
familiar but not understood. Its major participants wander in and out of the 
organization. These factors do not make a university a bad organization or a 
disorganized one; but they do make it a problem to describe, understand, and 
lead. (Cohen and March 1974, 2) 
Others have confirmed the diffuse character of most institutions of higher education. 
Cope (1985; 1987) argued that, as communities of largely autonomous individuals with 
weak accountability to the organization, colleges and universities present special 
planning challenges. "An academic enterprise, saturated as it is with professional 
expertise, is viewed as a loosely coupled and loosely bound assortment of people 
sharing some common reason for collective action in an environment" (Cope 1987, 53). 
Chan (1986) identified "goal ambiguity, contested goals, service orientation, high 
professionalism, and fragmented professional staffs" as prominent features of the 
academic culture (3). 
The challenge to planning is even greater, however, when one considers that 
institutional culture can be volatile. As circumstances change, a campus may come to 
think differently about what constitutes legitimate or desirable planning. For this reason 
Adler and Lane (1988) argue that the planning process must always be seen as 
situational." "It is somewhat unique in each organization and likely to change over 
time even within a single organization" (28). 
But even at a given moment in time it may be difficult to identify a single, stable 
culture. Keller suggests that the modern university is composed of "several 'nations' of 
students, of faculty, of alumni, of trustees, of public groups. Each has its territory, its 
jurisdiction, its form of government." Given this fragmentation, he sees the campus as 
"a pluralistic society with multiple cultures," in which "coexistence is more likely than 
unity" (Keller 1983a, 28). 
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Several different ways of thinking about the problem of multiple cultures have 
been suggested. Newton (1992) suggests that campuses are adept at maintaining two 
different — and sometimes incompatible — cultures at the same time. The university, he 
says, is both a corporation and a community of scholars. The corporate culture sees the 
campus as an organization, and tends to be responsive to external constituencies. 
Central planning, continuous change, and a focus on tangibles such as facilities and 
finances are the norm. The scholarly culture, on the other hand, sees the campus as "a 
near-sacred institution with a special and indispensable mission" (Newton 1992, 9-10). 
In this view the organization is held together by collegiality and persuasion, not 
direction. In the corporate culture planning is necessary, rational, comprehensive, and 
centralized. In the scholarly culture planning is intuitive, piecemeal, and decentralized. 
Both cultures make important contributions to the success of the campus. Both 
have existed for many years, and are likely to endure for many more. Both must be 
reckoned with in the design of a workable planning process. 
Newton suggests three steps that can be taken to bring the two cultures closer 
together, each of which has clear application to the design of a planning process. First, 
the campus leadership should stress the interdependence of the two cultures. Neither 
could succeed without the other, and this understanding should be reflected in a process 
that respects the constructive elements of each. Second, spheres of decision making 
should be clearly delineated. It may never be possible to reach complete agreement on a 
"division of labor" between the two approaches, but confusion simply creates conflict. 
Finally, Newton suggests finding a balance between the two approaches that fits the 
competitive situation in which the campus finds itself. Financial troubles, for example, 
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may tip the balance toward a corporate model, while a focus on improving the quality of 
teaching would tend to argue for the opposite. 
Hardy (1988; 1993) agrees that competition among different and sometimes 
contradictory ways of doing business is a fact of institutional life that must be 
accommodated in any decision-making process. She suggests that the variety of 
approaches is rooted in the loosely coupled nature of the university: 
Power is diffuse and decentralized: There are many interest groups, both inside 
and outside the organization, which are able to influence decision making. 
Rational analysis may play a role, but decisions are also characterized by 
political, collegial, and garbage-can processes which operate on quite different 
premises...." (Hardy 1988, 12) 
Were authority more closely held, one might expect that political and collegial processes 
would play less important a role in total institutional affairs. As long as colleges and 
universities are populated by largely autonomous professionals, however, the "people- 
oriented" decision-making models will provide a strong counterbalance to rational 
processes. 
Hardy's (1993) approach to dealing with the multiplicity of cultural types is first 
to identify those most commonly found and then to suggest that each institution 
operates within a dominant" cultural type. Keying the planning process to the 
dominant culture offers the planner a measure of stability in working with a given 
institution, although it does not eliminate the need to be aware of other cultural elements 
that may coexist with the dominant type. 
Hardy identifies four cultural types (collegial, technocratic, bureaucratic, 
political). While their norms and values should be discernible at any time, she suggests 
that the differences among them are most easily observed as colleges and universities 
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cope with retrenchment. Each cultural type has a characteristic response to 
retrenchment, and each also poses a challenge that must be addressed. 
"Collegial" campuses tend to be decentralized, with delegated authority, a 
strong faculty, and weak administrators. Retrenchment is usually accomplished through 
across-the-board cuts, with implementation left to the units. The challenge of the 
collegial culture is that across-the-board cuts represent a generally weak response. The 
sense of collegiality makes hard decisions harder. 
"Technocratic" campuses are characterized by strong central administrations, 
tight budget control, and strong reliance on quantitative information to support decision 
making. Retrenchment takes the form of selective cutbacks, determined centrally and 
guided by productivity and similar measures. The challenge for technocratic campuses 
is to avoid ignoring faculty values and insights in the process of planning for 
retrenchment. 
"Bureaucratic" campuses rely on clear hierarchy, line authority, and top-down 
management, and tend to have a compartmentalized and alienated faculty. 
Retrenchment may be bold and draconian, involving, for example, the elimination of an 
entire school or college. The challenge is to find ways to mobilize broad support for such 
bold — but narrowly conceived — decisions. 
"Political" campuses tend to have weak central administrators but strong, feudal 
deans and strong faculty senates. The retrenchment strategy will respect power centers 
and may have some political point to it (for example, seeking to embarrass the 
governmental body imposing the budget cut). The challenge is to maintain a focus on 
quality, and to avoid simply victimizing the weak (Hardy 1993). 
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Understanding the dominant culture of a campus, then, gives insight into the 
characteristic response one might expect to encounter in planning, especially planning 
undertaken in the context of retrenchment. Attention to cultural patterns can also 
provide a warning as to the weaknesses of the characteristic response, creating the 
opportunity to compensate in the design of the planning process. 
Some observers, while agreeing that elements of different cultural types are 
present in colleges and universities, believe that one or more types dominate across all 
institutions of higher education. Moore and Langknecht (1986) note that planners have 
typically relied on two models, the collegial and the bureaucratic. Their conception of 
these models is consistent with Hardy's: the collegial model describes a community of 
scholars in which decisions are reached through reasoned analysis and discourse, while 
the bureaucratic model describes a hierarchical organization with a strong chief executive 
and assignment of specialized roles and responsibilities. Moore and Langknecht, 
however, adopting points made by Baldridge et al. (1970), argue that both models fall 
short because institutions of higher education do not behave according to either. In 
particular, both fail to deal sufficiently with the dynamics of conflict and power, tend 
to minimize the importance of external forces, and offer incomplete explanations of 
leader behavior" (2). 
They favor the political model, which they describe as having the following 
characteristics: inactivity tends to prevail; participation is fluid; decisions tend to be 
made by "those few who persist" (Moore and Langknecht 1986, 2), with the 
consequence that small elites govern most decisions; institutions consist of competing 
interest groups; conflict is normal; and authority is limited. In such a system "decisions 
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are not simply bureaucratic orders or purely rational acts, but are often negotiated 
compromises between competing groups" (2). 
Whether one agrees with Moore and Langknecht that a political model prevails in 
most institutions, or with Hardy that different models may be dominant in different 
institutions, the self-conscious exploration of campus culture can provide one set of 
clues in the quest for a well-fitting planning process. But even within a given cultural 
model, institutions are sensitive to the context in which decision making occurs. For 
example, a "politically" oriented institution will behave differently in times of plenty 
than it will when resources are scarce. When resources are plentiful, political systems 
tend to buy peace among competing factions through the distribution of largesse; in 
times of scarcity groups seek to preserve their share of whatever resources exist. A 
valuable source of insight into the cultural behavior of institutions is therefore the 
examination of the objective conditions within which the institution is operating. 
Dill (1993), drawing on the work of Lawrence and Lorsch, touches on some first 
principles that illuminate the behavior of higher education organizations under different 
sets of circumstances. He argues that design of an appropriate planning process must 
involve consideration of differentiation (the separation of individuals into units to carry 
out organizational tasks) and integration (collaboration and coordination among units). 
Both differentiation and integration are present in any organization; the appropriate 
balance between them is "contingent on the type of task being performed and the nature 
of the environment" (Dill 1993, 9). 
In higher education's boom years, when resources were plentiful, campuses were 
characterized by high differentiation and low integration. "If the economics department 
did not collaborate with the business school, then the business school could appoint its 
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own economists" (Dill 1993, 9). In the "post-industrial" environment of the nineties, 
however, campuses must cope with scarce resources, increased competition, and chronic 
uncertainty. Where the strategies of the sixties and seventies were contingent on 
plentiful resources, the planning processes of the nineties "are contingent on competition 
and scarcity" (Dill 1993, 9). As a consequence, the principles of good organizational 
design suggest planning that emphasizes integration over differentiation. 
Integration, of course, does not come naturally to most colleges and universities. 
Dill suggests several design elements, however, that can promote integration in a 
planning process: 
1. Promoting trust and openness by clarifying the values, standards, and criteria of the 
planning process, both verbally and by example. 
2. Grouping units for planning purposes in ways that highlight interdependence and 
shared purpose (for example, asking units that share a computing environment to 
collaborate in the development of a computing strategy). 
3. Promoting reciprocal communication (communication up and down the 
organization). A bias toward centralization in hard times tends to promote top- 
down communication, but more deliberate strategies (such as careful attention to the 
need for explicit feedback to unit plans) may be necessary to promote bottom-up 
communication. 
4. Extending the planning and choice-making process into the units. While 
institutional-level issues may dominate the planning design, it is important to ensure 
that the various units also engage in a rigorous examination of their strategic 
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positions. Confronting the need for change at the unit level can make differentiated 
groups more sensitive to institutional needs. 
5. Increasing the general level of communication and information-sharing within the 
institution. Higher education's bias toward differentiation is reflected in generally 
poor information flow among units. Mechanisms that stimulate information flow 
can be useful in promoting integration (Dill 1993). 
The apparently universal tension between "administrative" or "centralized" 
decision making and "decentralized," faculty-dominated approaches figures 
prominently in the literature of planning process design. The familiar top-down/bottom 
up dichotomy is a key consideration in planning design (Norris and Poulton 1991; 
Schuster et al. 1994), but the optimum balance is a moving target highly dependent on 
the conditions in which planning occurs. Peterson (1986) suggest that "value-laden 
curricular planning may require more consensus-oriented approaches" (and hence, a 
more open process), while "a more objective financial problem may be subject to a more 
rational problem-solving approach" (Peterson 1986, 10), with "rationality" tending to 
be associated with more centralized processes. 
Schmidtlein and Milton (1988; 1990) also see the balance between faculty and 
administrative influence in the process as being highly dependent on the nature of the 
task at hand. They argue that a strong administrative role is necessary when the focus 
of planning is on changing external trends, campus-wide problems and issues that cut 
across organizational lines, and the necessity of resource reduction or redistribution. 
Faculty initiative is most needed and most successful when resources are stable or 
expanding, issues tend to fall within organizational units, and the concerns of external 
constituencies are not paramount. 
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In fitting a planning process to an institution, then, it is important to understand 
and respect the underlying culture of decision making, taking into account both the 
strengths and the weaknesses of the prevailing culture or cultures. The planning design 
should incorporate the strengths and include mechanisms to work around the 
weaknesses found in the consideration of the campus culture. It is also important to 
assess the environment in which the campus is operating, recognizing that an 
environment of scarcity suggests a need for greater integration and for a careful balance 
between administrative and faculty roles. 
Where Planning Comes Into Conflict with Culture 
The experiences of many institutions with formal planning processes have been 
frustrating and disappointing. High hopes and early promise are frequently followed by 
ambiguous outcomes and enduring cynicism. Schmidtlein and Milton (1988) suggest that 
these difficulties often follow from "incongruities and inconsistencies between the 
assumptions underlying recommended planning approaches and the operational realities 
of academic institutions." The mismatch is rooted in the fact that "many campuses 
have tried to use planning processes derived from corporate and government models 
with little consideration of conditions that may affect their applicability to academe" 
(Schmidtlein and Milton 1988, 2). 
Chan (1988) also sees the attempt to graft corporate planning approaches onto 
academic rootstock as a major obstacle to effective planning. Strategic approaches to 
planning, "rooted in the corporate management philosophy, [have] created direct 
conflicts with the collegial and normative academic culture" (19). This point is argued 
even more forcefully by Chiarelott, Reed and Russell (1991), who described their 
experience attempting to introduce strategic planning at Bowling Green State University. 
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In their case, no effort was made to soften the corporate edges of strategic planning. In 
fact, the authors observe, many institutions — including Bowling Green — "find 
themselves borrowing the metaphorical language of business" as they move to adopt 
more formal decision-making processes. At Bowling Green, this was thought to be 
appropriate since such language seemed integral to thinking and planning strategically" 
(36). The planning team therefore couched the institution's planning documents in terms 
of "products and services, market and customer needs, production capability, 
technology, methods of sale and distribution, size/growth, and return/profit" (36-37). 
The planning documents met with immediate controversy: 
The faculty's initial response to the first draft of the plan, as the [planning] team 
might have anticipated, centered upon the language rather than the substance of 
the plan. 
For the most part, their criticisms focused on the corporate language our team 
used to describe educational phenomena (teaching, learning, students). Faculty 
members were quick to point out the numerous instances throughout the 
document in which metaphors distorted or replaced the phenomena they were 
intended to describe. Of particular concern was the use of language that implied 
students are products, not persons; teaching is a service, not an art; the 
professionals we serve are customers, not professionals; and our knowledge and 
expertise are production capabilities, not distinctive qualities and characteristics. 
Images of profit and loss, and mechanistic performance directed toward the 
creation of a specific product prevented many faculty members from even 
considering the plan itself. (Chiarelott, Reed and Russell 1991, 37) 
Of interest in this example is that the discussion did not center on the process, but 
rather on the way in which the process was characterized. One might speculate that the 
difficulty lay not in any risk that a process described in this way might actually cause 
members of the faculty to think of their students as "products," but in the implication 
that what works in business might somehow be applied, without examination or 
modification, to the academic enterprise. 
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Many educational leaders no doubt harbor the secret desire that their campuses 
would behave in a more "business-like" way. Stanford University president Donald 
Kennedy, in fact, gave voice to such a view in reference to his own institution: 
There is an extraordinary emphasis on consultation and consensus, resulting in 
the reservation of final decisions to the top level and little real delegation of 
authority. Change occurs only incrementally, seldom if ever in bold steps. 
Aversion to risk is also prevalent, ... and individual initiative or innovation is 
more likely to produce criticism than praise. (Quoted in Gardner, Warner and 
Biedenweg 1990, 24) 
Generally, however, such views are not openly expressed, perhaps because they are 
likely to be seen as criticism of a culture shared by most members of the campus 
community. The response to an implicit or explicit challenge to the collegiate culture is 
likely to be, as it was at Bowling Green, a debate over the process rather than about the 
objective realities that the planners hoped to help the campus confront. 
The danger of implied criticism is very real when one is seeking to encourage 
change. The status quo has presumably been affirmed by if not created within the 
prevailing culture, and any suggestion that an institution's behavior must change carries 
with it the implied assertion that the culture must change, as well. This is an unsettling 
prospect for most members of a community, for their everyday behavior, their 
expectations of how the system works, and their ability to predict what will happen in 
the future are all rooted in their sense of a stable, shared culture. Farmer (1990) stated 
this point succinctly: "The effective leader understands that much of the resistance to 
an innovation usually arises more as a result of a perceived threat to the organization's 
culture than as a reaction to the substance of the change" (8). 
Chiarelott, Reed and Russell (1991) drew a lesson from their experience at 
Bowling Green, but it seemed to focus more on symptomatic relief than on an 
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examination of the underlying issue. Their advice to others attempting to apply a 
business model of planning to an institution of higher education: 
Examine various metaphorical models that might be used to frame the language 
of strategic planning. Rather than the corporate metaphor, consider what other 
images might be followed. Models derived from the arts, biology, literature 
medicine, politics, psychology, or some other domain of language may be more 
appropriate in educational settings. (Chiarelott, Reed and Russell 1991, 38) 
Perhaps. But one suspects that the reaction at Bowling Green had more to do with the 
threat of greater accountability, more intense scrutiny, and more explicit expectations 
embedded in the concept of strategic planning than it did with the language used to 
describe it. While the business metaphors may have served to rub salt in the wound, the 
wound itself was probably opened in the substantive clash between a culture which saw 
itself as relatively autonomous and a much different set of external expectations. It is 
not clear that the situation would have been significantly different had those new 
expectations been couched in the terms of biology or the arts, rather than of business. 
Much of the culture clash that seems to attend the introduction of strategic 
planning shares this basic character. The academic culture, whether predominantly 
collegial, political, or anarchical (organized or otherwise), is at basis a way of organizing 
activity among autonomous professionals. All decisions and all actions are the product 
Of choice, whether induced by bribery, wheedling, or more coercive approaches. 
Strategic planning, however, with its emphasis on the relationship of the whole 
institution to its environment, implies that someone must speak for the institution. 
Frustration of the kind expressed by Stanford's Kennedy reinforces the sense that 
trustees and administrators introduce strategic planning so that they can impose order 
and circumvent the foot-dragging and philosophizing that seem to pervade academic 
organizations. 
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In the context of cultural fit, it represents efforts to upset, in the name of 
planning, a set of relationships deeply embedded in the academic culture. Thus, Chan 
(1986) observes that strategic planning's 
emphasis on centralized decision making goes against the collegiate 
organizational arrangement. In most universities and colleges, participative 
decision making among professionals is the norm. A top-down approach tends 
to alienate faculty and academic units. (Chan 1986, 3) 
Hardy (1988) agrees, and notes that the response to centrally imposed decisions is likely 
to be most severe when the stakes are the highest; that is, when planning is undertaken 
to respond to real resource constraints: 
Attempts to introduce major resource reallocations, particularly those associated 
with reduced resources, will provoke a political backlash as professors try to 
block and influence decisions.... Since the imposition of decisions contravenes 
accepted behaviour, even successful change may jeopardize the loyalty and 
commitment of the staff, on which a university depends. (Hardy 1988, 12-13) 
Here, again, is the clear sense that faculty resist strategic planning not only (or even 
principally) because of the substantive changes that may result, but because a 
successful plan signals the substitution of a culture of central decision making for one 
that relies on free will and individual choice. That both conceptions are caricatures of 
reality is not the point; as is so often the case in matters of human conflict, perception is 
critical. 
Cope (1987) offers an interesting perspective on this clash of cultures. He sees 
no reason to insist that one or the other culture prevail. In fact, he suggests that the 
concept of "winning" is simply out of place here. 
Colleges and universities tend to be democratically governed/and control is thus 
neither complete nor considered desirable. As they are democracies — and given 
the complexity of whole system planning in changing environments and the 
diversity of individuals — they understand the best any institution can expect is 
to "satisfice." "Satisficing" is a useful term coined by Nobel Prize winner 
Herbert Simon to designate efforts to attain some level of satisfaction that is less 
than perfect. (Cope 1987, 63) 
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Under this view, it should neither be the goal of the president to "seize control" nor of 
the faculty to resist change at all costs. An institution would be wise to acknowledge — 
before the fireworks start — that the end result of the process is likely to be an 
accommodation to changing forces but not a fundamental transformation of the campus. 
While transformations are occasionally attempted and — even less frequently — 
needed, nearly all the planning undertaken by colleges and universities comes in 
response to environmental considerations that demand adaptation, not an abrupt 
change of course. Acknowledging this fact might contribute greatly to the likelihood that 
a planning process can be introduced without triggering a constitutional crisis on the 
campus. 
Hardy (1988) makes this point explicitly. After noting that the existence of a 
strong culture in organizations has been found generally to have an inhibiting effect on 
the search for solutions, she concludes that this 
does not appear to be a problem in universities for two reasons. First, 
universities do not need to move as fast as businesses — their environments are 
more stable, and they can change more gradually with no ill effect. Filtering out 
choices is not as detrimental as it would be in a highly competitive business 
situation. Second, ignoring certain options provides stability, which reassures 
the professoriate and helps guarantee morale and commitment, and it reduces 
conflict and contributes to the effectiveness of the institution. (Hardy 1988, 15) 
In fact. Hardy argues, a more modest and realistic sense of what is possible through 
organized planning ought to form the core of process design, especially in terms of 
accommodating the strongly held elements of the academic culture. Rather than 
beginning with a set of expectations for the planning process and then struggling to find 
ways of meeting those expectations — a struggle which often results in levels of conflict 
that brings the whole enterprise to the point of dysfunction — she suggests turning the 
conventional wisdom on its head: 
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Traditionally, the strategic planning and turnaround literature works from the 
outside in and from formulation to implementation. In other words, 
environmental analysis leads to the formulation of choice of strategy, the 
implementation of which then changes the organization in various ways. [These] 
recommendations . work in the reverse order: They suggest that administrators 
should start by thinking about their organization and its culture, an analysis of 
which will help them determine how change can be implemented. The process of 
implementation shapes the choice of strategy. (Hardy 1988, 15) 
Promoting Effective Faculty Participation 
The first three discussions in this series have addressed various elements of the 
change process. First, broadly establish the need for change; second, focus on change at 
the institutional level; third, craft a process to support change consistent with the norms 
and values of the campus. These elements are considered important because they 
address how people work within and relate to the planning process. Each suggests 
what is stated here explicitly: organizations change because people change; therefore, 
ensuring appropriate and productive involvement with the planning process is a 
prerequisite to successful planning. 
In the kinds of loosely coupled, decentralized, often contentious organizations 
common in higher education effective participation can be very difficult to manage. 
McGrath (1986) acknowledges that "strategic decision making is fundamentally a group 
process, with all the attendant political and consensual problems" (72). Despite the 
problems, there is wide agreement that the product of a planning process will be 
powerfully - perhaps definitively - influenced by the nature, scope and quality of 
participation. Farmer (1990) argues that participation is critical in generating support 
for change: 
t is essential for innovators to recognize the human dimensions of change — to 
recognize that it is people who make changes, sustain changes, and determine the 
quality of change. If those who will be affected by an intended change are able to 
participate in its planning and implementation, their commitment to Its success 
tends to increase. (Farmer 1990, 13) success 
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This theme emerges again and again in the planning literature. Winstead and Ruff 
(1986), in the context of their extensive review of the higher education planning 
literature, concluded that the success of any planning model remains the degree of 
active support by those using the model" (17). More recently, the key role of 
participation was affirmed in the work of the Pew Higher Education Research Program 
(1992b), which seeks to provoke a national debate on change in American colleges and 
universities: "There can be no real reform in higher education that does not engage the 
talents and interests of the academic body itself" (2A). 
While the human factor in planning is widely acknowledged in the literature, 
there are different perspectives on what makes participation important. Some authors 
endorse participation as a general virtue. That is, they argue that planning works best 
when it is inclusive, accessible, and democratic. In this broad sense, the planning 
process should welcome students, faculty, staff, and even external stakeholder groups 
such as alumni and community leaders. The advantages of broad participation are not 
disputed here. But the literature also suggests that all participants are not created 
equal. Given that academic organizations are fundamentally defined as voluntary 
associations of highly specialized professionals — the faculty — effective planning 
design must pay particular attention to the character of faculty participation. Moreover, 
the faculty holds a special place in the routine decision-making apparatus of the 
academy. On most campuses, faculty are considered the sole arbiters of such vital 
judgments as student grades, course content, degree requirements, and the professional 
qualifications of their peers. The faculty's informal influence in such areas as 
admissions and advising also tends to be very strong. The faculty therefore occupies a 
unique position within the organization: while the faculty may not have the power to 
command, it often does have the power to prevent. 
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Because of this special relationship, effective faculty participation is identified 
here as a condition of successful planning. This focus is not intended to devalue the 
involvement of other members of the campus community. Indeed, many of the factors 
related to effective faculty participation are also important when thinking of 
participation in its broadest sense. One must begin, however, with the faculty, and the 
following discussion reflects that fact. 
Obstacles to Participation 
It may be useful to begin this discussion on a somewhat sober note. The 
literature makes two strong assertions with respect to faculty participation: first, that it 
is essential; and second, that it is deeply problematic. McKenna (1988) cites 
participation as "the most difficult part of strategic planning. It takes time, requires 
listening, invites controversy, and needs consensus to be effective" (7). This tendency on 
the part of faculties to seek consensus before taking action was noted in the discussion 
of academic culture, above; some observers draw attention to the high costs associated 
with this kind of consensus building (Gardner, Warner, and Biedenweg 1990). 
Chiarelott, Reed and Russell (1991) suggest yet another potential liability 
associated with faculty participation. They reported that Bowling Green State 
University, in order maximize faculty involvement, utilized a highly iterative planning 
process that included, among other features, two full reviews of draft plans by all 
members of the faculty. 
The use of this structure ensured participation but resulted in a few adverse side 
affects. First, the strategy and related objectives evolved from a series of 
compromises that accommodated the diverse interests of faculty rather than 
from comprehensive strategic analysis. Second, the process for approving the 
plan became very time-consuming. By the time the plan was finally adopted, 
many faculty were questioning whether strategic planning was worth the effort. 
72 
Thus in employing a broad-based decision-making process, we traded substance 
and credibility for consensus. Had we anticipated these side effects, we might 
have been less reluctant to risk using a management-oriented approach. 
(Chiarelott, Reed and Russell 1991, 37-38) 
Moore and Langknecht (1986) caution that the downside of faculty involvement 
becomes more pronounced as the heat is turned up. They say that it is 
particularly important to understand the dynamics of participatory decision¬ 
making during times of stress. Pressures to reallocate or even retrench may cause 
campus constituencies to become provincial and self-serving. Interest groups are 
likely to be forced into defensive postures in order to protect their special 
interests. For many, participation in planning and decision-making will mean 
being in a position to defend one's turf while leaving the heavy burden of 
decision-making to the central administration. (Moore and Langknecht 1986, 4) 
Given that strategic planning is often employed precisely because an institution is under 
stress, this observation has special significance. 
There is another complication related to faculty participation that deserves 
comment. As noted earlier in the discussion of institutional focus, some observers see a 
progressive erosion of the bonds that tie the members of the academic community 
together. The "academic ratchet" described by Massy and Zemsky (1992) involves a 
loosening of institutional ties as faculty members increase their discretionary time. 
Johnson s (1988) description of what some faculty members have come to see as "an 
ideal academic state ... in which one hundred flowers are allowed to bloom" also leads 
to diminished involvement in faculty governance and a shunning of collective 
responsibilities. 
Some fault the institution — at least in part — for this trend: "The profusion of 
separate and competing agendas among faculty — which is often fueled by the disparity 
between an institution's stated goals and actual incentives — has caused the sense of 
collegial participation to erode" (Pew Higher Education Research Program 1992a, 3A). 
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More generally, however, the blame is laid at the faculty's doorstep. The jealously 
guarded autonomy which has secured academic freedom over the centuries has, at the 
close of this century, allowed faculties to drift: "The very freedom of thought and 
expression on which the faculty's independence relies too often devolves into an 
exemption from educational responsibility" (Pew Higher Education Research Program 
1992b, 2A). 
It is interesting to juxtapose these findings with the traditional faculty complaint, 
embedded in the collegial academic culture, that planning processes are too "top-down" 
in their orientation. The image one gets from these objections is of a faculty yearning to 
provide leadership to campus planning, only to be rebuffed by administrators bent on 
control and exclusion. To be sure, for all the reasons cited immediately above, some 
campus presidents might prefer a planning process free of the entanglements of faculty 
involvement. Other observers, however, see the faculty's exclusion from strategic 
decision making as self-imposed. 
Keller (1983b) believes that faculty shy away from difficult choices, preferring to 
let the administration take the heat: 
Faculty often absent themselves from sitting on committees that entail difficult 
financial adjustments or cutbacks. Many find it too painful to help decide on 
retrenchments. Faculty senates increasingly cannot raise a quorum. Faculty 
academic or financial committees are becoming somnolent instead of more active. 
Abdication is at least as serious a problem as exclusion. (Keller 1983b, 16) 
His conclusion: "To sit as a peer at the feast, one must work with peers during famine" 
(16). Strohm (1983), a vice president of the American Association of University 
Professors (AAUP) and therefore presumably a strong advocate of faculty interests, 
nonetheless questions whether faculty are capable of making the hard decisions that 
strategic planning often requires. 
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Chan (1988) agrees that faculty, while they may assert a prerogative to be 
involved in campus planning, frequently fail to follow up that claim with action. She 
notes that "although the legitimacy and right of faculty participation in institution-wide 
decision making are well established in higher education, the desire for actually shaping 
policy appears low" (20). She describes a survey of faculty at DePaul University, 
conducted in conjunction with a planning effort there. The survey found that "seventy 
percent of DePaul's full-time faculty expressed a desire to provide input into the 
strategic planning process...; however, the survey also confirmed a low level of faculty 
willingness to spend time in actual participation" (24). 
Why Participation is Indispensable 
In sum, then, faculty participation is widely seen as cumbersome, costly, time- 
consuming, and potentially debilitating to strategic decision making. Yet, most of these 
same observers, and many others, nonetheless assert that effective faculty participation 
is a prerequisite to a successful planning effort. What explains this paradox? What 
makes faculty participation so indispensable that it must be pursued regardless of the 
difficulty? 
The explanations offered in the literature tend to fall into three main groupings: 
(1) that participation is intrinsically valuable; (2) that participation imbues planning 
with a sense of legitimacy; and (3) that participation, for a variety of reasons, makes the 
planning process work better (or work at all). These three ideas will be explored in turn. 
Intrinsic Value. The "intrinsic value" view is rooted in many of the same 
considerations discussed earlier with respect to cultural "fit." If one agrees that "an 
academic enterprise, saturated as it is with professional expertise, is ... a loosely 
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coupled and loosely bound assortment of people sharing some common reason for 
collective action" (Cope 1987, 53), then one must respect that view of the enterprise 
when developing decision-making processes. If the campus represents a voluntary 
association of independent minds, then decision making should have that same 
volitional quality. This is the essence of "fit." Imposing a coercive or excessively "top- 
down" decision-making process on a university would be like trying to train one's best 
milk cow to dance. One might, with great difficulty, accomplish the goal, but the original 
point of having the cow would tend to be lost in the process. So it is with colleges and 
universities. Eventually, were one successful in enforcing a coercive mode of decision 
making, the institution would become something different: more tightly coupled, less 
rooted in free association, differently motivated in terms of collective action. 
So, one might make colleges and universities less democratic, but in the process 
they will become less like colleges and universities and more like something else. Thus, if 
one believes there is virtue to higher education's democratic character, then one would 
see the kind of participation that suits a democratic institution as being intrinsically 
valuable. 
Legitimacy. As the need for major change in higher education becomes more 
widely appreciated — and therefore as the possibility of denying or deferring tough 
decisions becomes more remote — planning processes have ceased being annoying but 
generally harmless intellectual or bureaucratic exercises and have become instead serious 
enterprises with real — and often threatening — consequences. It is not enough simply 
to design a process that can make decisions; it must also make them stick. 
...How can campuses create mechanisms that both will be reasonably effective in 
determining priorities for the future and will be credible — that is, legitimate and 
acceptable — to the campus community? The importance of this governance 
element should not be underestimated. The "best" plans and strategies are of 
little use if the campus community — especially the faculty — does not find them 
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legitimate. And they will not be regarded as legitimate — and should not be — if 
the plans and strategies, regardless of content, are faulty with respect to the 
process that gives rise to them. (Schuster et al. 1994, 7) 
Others echo this view. Faculty involvement and leadership (Schmidtlein 1990) and a 
broad participatory process capable of winning support for a shared strategic vision 
(Steeples 1988) seem to be important in building legitimacy into a planning process. 
Moreover, if one accepts that participation is intrinsically related to the 
democratic tradition in higher education, then the incorporation of opportunities for 
participation into the decision-making process legitimizes that process. The idea that 
participation lends legitimacy to strategic planning has a practical side to it in the sense 
that a legitimate process may make the faculty more likely to cooperate with the product 
(Adler and Lane 1988), but legitimacy has a value of its own, as well. Moore and 
Langknecht (1986) cite the importance of legitimacy, especially when the institution is 
under stress (as it often is when engaging in strategic planning): 
It is especially important under stressful conditions that planning processes be 
perceived as credible. Collaborative planning and decision-making are essential 
to maintaining an acceptable level of public confidence. Individuals throughout 
the campus who may be reluctant to assume real responsibility themselves, still 
have a right to know what, how, and by whom decisions will be made. (Moore 
and Langknecht 1986, 4) 
Several observers make this point in the negative; that is, they see legitimacy and 
credibility as important not only because of what their presence permits but also 
because of what is likely to occur in their absence. Flack (1994) notes that "the politics 
of involvement is essential to avoid accusations of secrecy, elitism, or sly maneuvering" 
(30). Chiarelott, Reed and Russell (1991), reporting on the design of the planning 
process at Bowling Green State University, said that the institution had rejected a "top- 
down" model "because we believed that if college administrators tried to develop a plan 
77 
without the direct participation of faculty, the plan would be immediately suspect and 
doomed to failure" (37). 
In the end, legitimacy should probably be seen as largely symbolic. Takeuchi 
(1982) reported the results of a study of the planning system at an unnamed mid- 
western university, which involved interviews with senior administrators, faculty, and 
planning staff. The study showed general agreement among these actors regarding the 
need for a participatory process. Interestingly, however, it also suggested that "the 
faculty was mostly concerned with the opportunity for significant input, at the 
appropriate time, as compared to the decisions themselves" (9). While this finding 
prooably does not indicate that the faculty were truly indifferent to the results of 
planning, it does reinforce the idea that before planning can be taken seriously by the 
faculty it must be seen as offering opportunities for participation consistent with the 
values and norms of a collegial and democratic organization. 
Pragmatic Considerations. While some observers cite intrinsic value and 
legitimacy as reasons to incorporate faculty participation into a strategic planning 
process, a larger number focus on the practical benefits of participation. It is important 
to note, however, that practical concerns are not completely divorced from the issues of 
intrinsic value and legitimacy; indeed, many conclusions as to the pragmatic effect of 
participation are directly rooted in these concepts. The pragmatic arguments, however, 
take these somewhat philosophical notions a step further. 
Tan (1990) sums up the essence of the pragmatic argument: "Because strategic 
planning works best when there is a reasonable amount of participation and acceptance, 
inputs from constituents should be sought, even if it may be difficult and time- 
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consuming to reach general consensus on certain issues" (7). There are several different 
perspectives on this question, however. 
The currency of planning is ideas. In environments as changeable and complex as 
those in which institutions are operating today the need for innovation and fresh 
approaches is extraordinarily high. Schmidtlein and Milton (1988) point out that 
different kinds of ideas come from different sources within the university. They argue 
that strategic, cross-cutting, integrating ideas tend to come from academic 
administrators whose responsibilities and perspectives promote an institutional 
viewpoint, while ideas most relevant to a given discipline tend to come from faculty. A 
comprehensive planning process, however, does not live by "strategic" ideas alone. 
Most useful plans require innovative curricular and other ideas that tend to bubble up 
most often from faculty. Securing the energetic involvement of faculty is therefore 
necessary if a planning process is to secure sufficient intellectual capital. The 
importance of access to ideas is also mentioned by Schuster et al. (1994): 
...Without a governance process that is open to the contributions of stakeholders 
particularly on-campus academics with different experiences, perspectives 
and priorities strategic decisions would be shortchanged of expert opinion 
crucial to the institution's core academic activities. (Schuster et al. 1994, 194) 
The recent interest in applying the principles of the "quality" movement to higher 
education supplies evidence to reinforce this point. "Quality" depends in part on 
engaging the attention of members of the organization closest to the action. For many 
purposes, this places faculty in the central role (Seymour 1993). From the quality 
perspective, the professional autonomy of faculty — often cited by others as an obstacle 
to effective planning — is a tremendous source of strength. 
Professors and individual academic units are relatively free of the policy¬ 
controlling constraints that are endemic in other types of organizations. Such 
treedom of course, is critical to the creative process and has not escaped the 
notice of many American corporations. Indeed, the whole notion of 
"skunkworks" popularized by 3M, Ford, and other companies, which involves 
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insulating admail group of people from the corporate infrastructure so that they 
can pursue ideas, has an uncanny similarity to the academic department 
(Seymour 1993, 32) r 
To be sure, the faculty s freedom from central control can create problems in other 
aspects of planning, but in terms of idea generation at the grass-roots level the 
relationship works very well. For this reason alone, a well-designed planning process 
would incorporate strategies to secure and sustain broad faculty involvement. 
Strohm (1983), the AAUP vice president, also takes the view that faculty should 
be involved because "faculty will bring valuable expertise to the task" (11). This is 
undoubtedly true, given the range of disciplines represented on most campuses. While 
many cite the difficulty of harnessing faculty expertise to the strategic wagon, it is 
probably undeniable that faculty insights and expert knowledge represent a vitally 
important intellectual resource for any planning process. This view is echoed by 
Prmvale (1989) in a critique of planning at an unnamed "major western research 
university." In her estimation, "broad-based participation means it is more likely all of 
the institution's available information resources will be incorporated into the planning 
process" (4). Given that strategic planning is an intellectual as well as an organizational 
endeavor, this observation should have some force. 
Participation can also be seen as a two-way street. If participation can 
contribute to a healthy flow of information from the faculty to the planning process, then 
one might also expect benefits when the flow is reversed. There is widespread support 
in the literature for the idea that faculty participation promotes greater understanding 
within the faculty of the planning process and the issues around which planning is 
organized. 
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Steeples (1990) identifies a key point in this regard: "The fact that the cycle of 
organizational change originates in the perception of a problem is crucial" (106). A 
loosely coupled, autonomous faculty may find it difficult to see and understand the 
issues confronting the institution as a whole. Participation in the planning process is 
probably the surest way to put the faculty in touch with environmental and integrative 
perspectives that are essential to perceiving planning needs in their full context. The 
faculty may not agree with the perspectives embedded in the process (which tend to be 
reflect the attitudes of administrators and planning staff) but there is a profound 
difference between informed disagreement and ignorance. The former can be resolved 
through engagement; the latter rarely is. A faculty exposed to broader issues by virtue of 
involvement is far more likely to take a constructive approach to planning than one 
which remains aloof. 
Cope's (1981) notion of "a proclivity to go to sea" (16) has relevance here. The 
analogy between the importance of a coastal population to Britain's emergence as a 
naval power and the involvement of faculty in "adaptive substructures" as an 
encouragement to strategic thinking has merit. If members of the university community 
are engaged in activities that put them into contact with the demands and expectations 
of the external environment, then they are more likely to understand and endorse the 
need for the institution to adapt to those demands. Similarly, if faculty members 
struggle with the conflicting priorities present in most planning processes then they are 
more likely to appreciate the difficulty of the decisions the institution faces and to 
accept the need for trade-offs and compromises. 
It should also not be forgotten that colleges and universities are in the learning 
business, and learning requires engagement: 
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The learning style of most people engaged in higher education makes them 
receptive to the use of information in making decisions. As a result, they require 
information in order to understand any proposed change. Time for investigation, 
questions, dialogue, reflection, application — in other words, for education — is 
essential for faculty members. .. .Self-discovery is the most effective form of 
education. (Farmer 1990, 14). 
Providing opportunities for this process of learning to take place is therefore a very 
sensible design element. Planners would do well to keep in mind, however, that 
'Teaming" is not the same as "receiving information." A planning process that rounds 
up the faculty so that the president can dispense his or her view of the truth is probably 
not going to satisfy the demand for participation. Some provision at the outset of the 
process for sharing financial projections, admissions statistics, or other relatively 
objective forms of information may be useful, but the involvement of the faculty cannot 
end there. 
Farmer (1990) offers an illustration of the usefulness of participation as a 
learning opportunity. He describes the planning process at King's College in 
Pennsylvania, in which faculty-dominated studies were organized of issues such as 
curriculum effectiveness: 
The reports that resulted served to stir dissatisfaction with the status quo and to 
raise faculty consciousness about curricular, teaching, and learning issues. The 
effect was to improve greatly the prospects for change, since those whom the 
change would affect now recognized the need for it. (Farmer 1990,14) 
In this case, at least, the process of discovery was an important aid to understanding 
and, it is argued, action. A similar approach was described earlier in the discussion of 
consensus for change. The involvement of faculty in "strategy forums" at St. Edward's 
University was described by Houghton and Jurick (1995) as critical in promoting faculty 
understanding of the need to change. They quote George Keller, brought to the campus 
to speak at their Community Day, as being impressed with the receptiveness to change 
he encountered. "Sometimes when I speak on campuses about the social and economic 
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challenges facing universities, I run into fear and defensiveness, but I saw little 
apprehension at St. Edward's" (Houghton and Jurick 1995, 48). Obviously, other 
factors were probably at work at this institution, but it seems clear that a relatively open 
process was at least consistent with a constructive environment for change. 
The virtues of participation as a means of promoting organizational learning are 
elegantly summarized by Lelong and Shirley (1984), two pioneers in the higher education 
strategic planning movement: 
The quality of decisions on important issues tends to improve — decisions are 
more goals oriented, better informed and supported by data, more rational, 
better coordinated and integrated, less naive and less political in the narrow, 
self-interested sense. Day-to-day decision making tends to be less short sighted 
and more strategically perceptive. Over time, wiser and more far-sighted 
decisions bring more lasting benefits. Administrative decisions and actions gain 
greater legitimacy and acceptance because the internal constituencies of the 
institution better understand the goals and context within which the actions are 
taken. As a result, institutional governance becomes more orderly, actually easier 
to orchestrate, and less crisis-oriented. (Lelong and Shirley 1984, 2) 
The benefits they describe go beyond understanding, of course, but they make it plain 
that it is understanding that allows the process to unfold in a constructive way. And 
while this particular description may sound a bit utopian, it nonetheless captures one 
approach to planning, rooted in participation, that is widely supported in the literature. 
Understanding may be seen as a prerequisite to acceptance of a planning 
process, but it does not necessarily cause a faculty member or any other member of the 
community to endorse the decisions that emerge from that process. The concept of 
"ownership" becomes crucial here, for it describes a state in which those affected by 
planning feel as if the outcomes "belong" to them as opposed to having been imposed on 
them. A sense of ownership does not require that planning decisions conform to the 
individual's preferences. One may feel that, after having placed all the issues on the 
table, that the greater good dictates a course of action that the individual does not 
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prefer. What is important is that each individual's views were expressed and accounted 
for in the balancing of interests that occurs within the planning process. This is best 
done in person. In the rough and tumble of institutional decision making it is reasonable 
to expect that interests will be asserted and defended by those who hold them, not by 
proxies. Therefore, almost by definition, ownership requires broad participation. The 
process must be porous enough to allow those who have something to say the chance to 
say it (and to be listened to). Without such opportunities, individuals are likely to see 
planning as coercive, and will refuse to endorse either the process or its products. 
Lelong and Shirley (1984) make this connection explicitly: 
Faculty and administrators alike should have a real sense of ownership in the 
goals which drive planning, and such ownership usually results from active 
participation in both the formulation and implementation of plans. This focused 
participation and commitment is the best means of ensuring plans do more than 
collect dust on shelves. (Lelong and Shirley 1984, 5). 
Gratch and Wood (1991) concur: "No matter how well-conceived or well-written, a 
comprehensive planning document requires the understanding and support of all levels 
of staff if it is to be effective" (12). The importance of participation to both 
understanding and ownership is also cited by Johnson and Jonas (1995): 
There are two phases necessary in the early stages of strategic planning: 
preparation and communication. The college community must be active 
participants in the development of any strategic planning process. This 
obviously promotes ownership but it also helps everyone understand the system 
while becoming acquainted with the definitions and overall procedures. 
Moreover, communication builds support and prepares the community for the 
work to come. (Johnson and Jonas 1995, 8). 
It should be noted that all these observers characterize participation as a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition. Participation may promote understanding, but then again it 
may not. Understanding may lead to ownership, or it may not. What is clearly stated, 
however, is that understanding and ownership are quite unlikely to emerge if the process 
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does not make provision for effective participation on the part of the faculty and, 
perhaps, others. 
Jones (1990) sees "ego involvement" as the mechanism by which participation 
induces understanding and a sense of ownership. Having contributed something to the 
process, a participant has a personal stake in the outcome. "Only when all of the key 
stakeholders of the institution are ego-involved in the process of strategic planning is it 
likely to be successful. ... If it does not exist and cannot be developed, then the 
institution is not prepared to launch the planning process" (Jones 1990, 53). 
This idea is taken even further by Wharton and Corak (1992) in their 
examination of strategic planning during periods of transition in institutional leadership. 
They report that a participatory planning process at one institution was able not only to 
win widespread support on the campus, but also to sustain the momentum of the plan 
even after the president with whom the process was identified moved on. 
Our experience clearly suggests that members of the organization will participate 
in changing the organizational culture when a majority feel that they have a voice 
in guiding the change, and that they will act to sustain the forward motion of 
change as long as they continue to feel ownership in the planning process. 
Indeed, our observations further suggest that organization members who have 
bought in to the process will, in fact, resist external efforts to slow or redirect 
strategic momentum, and will avoid the internal temptation to slow or delay 
institutional progress — even in the face of a vacuum created by a change in top 
leadership. (Wharton and Corak 1992, 7). 
This kind of commitment apparently has its limits, however. The authors report that, 
while momentum was sustained for a time through a period of leadership vacuum, the 
process eventually collapsed in the face of indifference or hostility on the part of a new 
president. Nonetheless, any planning process that seems to take on the characteristics 
of a mass movement, even temporarily, must be seen as exceptional, and it is clear that 
no phenomenon of this sort could occur without unusually effective participation. 
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The "pragmatic" arguments in favor of participation run in a rough progression: 
participation promotes understanding, which may lead to a sense of ownership, which 
in turn increases the likelihood that the directions and strategies emerging from the 
planning process will be put into action. This latter consideration — that participation 
promotes action — is probably the most frequently cited reason for building 
participation into the planning process. It is described here as the "implementation" 
argument for participation. 
Implementation has long been known to be a particular weakness of 
comprehensive planning processes. Meredith (1993), reporting the findings of a survey 
of planning at 133 colleges and universities, found that only 12% felt they had 
successfully met the challenge of implementing their plans. Only success in achieving 
major resource shifts showed a worse result. 
The implementation problem can be seen in part as rooted in the nature of 
academic organizations. As diffuse, open systems with multiple stakeholders they are 
unusually difficult to direct. Ideas that do not engage the constituent parts rarely go into 
effect, because the resources actually under the control of the nominal leadership are so 
limited. Brandt (1991) quotes George Wilkinson, the head of planning for the United 
Way of America, on the special challenge facing most not-for-profit organizations: "Our 
process has to be more open. To have a plan that has any hope of being implemented, 
we have to engage as many as possible of our key stakeholders in the process" (23). 
Hardy et al. (1983) see the diffuse nature of educational organizations as having 
powerful implications for strategy development. Their view that strategies often emerge 
as patterns from the actions of many individuals suggests that recruiting a widely 
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dispersed group of "volunteers" around a set of guiding ideas may be the only way to 
ensure that institutional actions are consistent with formal planning directions. "As 
soon as we relax the conventional assumptions of strategies as deliberate and 
determined centrally, it becomes evident, first, that strategies, as patterns, exist in 
universities and, second, that many actors participate in their formation in universities" 
(423). Put differently, an institution's true direction is determined by the actions taken 
by members of the community. These de facto strategies exist regardless of what the de 
jure planning process calls for. Faculty members who have not participated in the 
planning process — who have not internalized the sense of challenges and appropriate 
responses that the process is designed to develop — are unlikely to give life to the plan 
as they carry out their daily responsibilities. 
Fullan (1996) takes an even harder line on this point. In his view, the concept of 
"systemic" change (i.e., that an organization can choose a course of action and 
implement it throughout the system) is fundamentally flawed. In this view, "top-down" 
planning is not only undesirable, it is delusional. Change begins and ends with the 
people: 
"Systems" have a better track record of maintaining the status quo than they 
have of changing themselves. This is why attempting to change the system 
directly, through regulation and structural reform, does not work. It is people 
who change systems, through the development of new critical masses. Once a 
critical mass becomes a majority, we begin to see the system change. The lesson 
of systemic reform is to look for those strategies that are most likely to mobilize 
large numbers of people in new directions. (Fullan 1996, 423) 
The views of Hardy et al. and Fullan find support in research on implementation 
undertaken in the broader political science context. Richard Elmore's (1979) intriguing 
work in "backward mapping" asserts that the focus on implementation should be 
directed not at the top of the organization, but at the point closest to the intervention. 
"The notion that policymakers exercise — or ought to exercise — some kind of direct 
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and determinant control over policy implementation might be called the 'noble lie' of 
conventional public administration and policy analysis" (Elmore 1979, 603). In fact, he 
argues, policy makers are totally dependent on the actions of those organizationally 
most distant from them when it comes to executing the decisions the hierarchy produces: 
Backward mapping assumes that... the closer one is to the source of the 
problem, the greater is one's ability to influence it; and the problem-solving 
ability of complex systems depends not on hierarchical control but on 
maximizing discretion at the point where the problem is most immediate. 
(Elmore 1979, 604-605) 
"Backward mapping" thus suggests a different view of policy development. 
While general policies and directions can originate in a centralized or integrated context, 
effective implementation requires that these policies be expressed in terms of relatively 
precise actions at the lowest level in the hierarchy. In other words, implementation 
begins with the actions that must be taken "on the street" to give a policy decision life. 
The analysis then 
.. .backs up through the structure of implementing agencies, asking at each level 
two questions: What is the ability of this unit to affect the behavior that is the 
target of the policy? And what resources does this unit require in order to have 
that effect? In the final stage of analysis the analyst or policymaker describes a 
policy that directs resources at the organizational units likely to have the greatest 
effect. (Elmore 1979, 604) 
Therefore, even if one believes that systemic choices are possible, they do not 
take the form of "direction" as traditionally conceived. Strategy is dependent on the 
parts: the information needed to make planning choices originates in the academic 
departments, and can only be secured via faculty involvement of a high order. Action 
exists at the "bottom" of the organization; plans must therefore engage the commitment 
of the faculty and others. 
These analyses form a rough continuum: Elmore is most deferential to 
leadership. He sees a role for "policy makers," but recognizes that they are dependent 
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on those lower in the organization; Hardy et al. allow for the possibility of both central 
leadership and grass-roots "emergent" strategies; and Fullan sees all change as deriving 
from popular movement. All three have in common, however, the idea that 
implementation requires the participation of the members of the organization. This 
general line of reasoning — that change occurs when the members of the organization 
embrace it — is shared (albeit in more conventional terms) by Powers and Powers 
(1984), Steeples (1990), Chan (1988), Richardson and Gardner (1985), and the Pew 
Higher Education Research Program (1992a; 1992b). 
Steeples (1990) highlights the importance of participation in the areas where 
faculty have the greatest discretion. "At most institutions of higher education, a broadly 
participatory process is essential for reaching a decision to innovate significantly. This 
is especially true where cost-cutting and other forms of resource redirection affecting 
educational offerings are at issue" (104). The implication here is that it is very difficult 
to dictate the nature and directions of academic programs solely through resource 
decisions. This idea is affirmed by Chan (1988), who observes that "successful 
implementation of new strategies requires institution-wide support, particularly from 
faculty members, who carry out teaching, research, and service functions on a daily 
basis" (19). Similarly, Richardson and Gardner (1985) note that certain kinds of change 
are simply beyond the reach of administrators, and faculty action must be secured: 
"There are areas where administrators can do very little without full faculty 
involvement. For example, reduction of student attrition occurs only when faculty work 
directly with students" (12). 
If effective planning represents the marriage of institutional goals — which are 
generally the province of the trustees and senior administrators — and the daily 
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decisions of faculty and others who actually do the work, then participation which 
encourages these actors to form a common sense of strategy is vital. 
There can be no successful reform of a college or university that does not engage 
faculty as primary agents of change. One of the first steps in transforming the 
culture of an institution must be to overcome the perceived boundaries separating 
faculty from administration. A strong unifying vision of the institution's mission 
and goals must provide the basis for change, and it is critical that faculty and 
administrators work together to define that vision. An institution that cannot 
establish a common foundation of values, goals, and aspirations among its entire 
campus community will find itself paralyzed in any attempt at reform. (Pew 
Higher Education Research Program 1992 a, 6A) 
In this view, the relationship between participation and successful implementation is 
quite clear. 
If these affirmative views of the power of participation are not sufficient to make 
the point, many observers are eloquent as to the consequences of failure to allow for 
effective participation. Kashner (1990) warns that failure to provide adequate 
opportunities for participation can create a climate in which change is difficult to 
pursue: 
Faculty involvement in change is indispensable and must be assiduously 
cultivated. Without this involvement, contrived in such a fashion as to grant the 
faculty shared ownership, a campus is virtually assured that discussion of 
change will take place in a context of internal conflict. While conflict may in 
some instances be unavoidable, it is generally a good idea to pick battles 
carefully and to avoid skirmishes that can divert energy from the task of winning 
support for major proposals. (Kashner 1990, 24). 
This observation has special relevance when one considers that windows of opportunity 
for effective change can be quite narrow; conflict, on the other hand, is always in season. 
If conflict is persistent, and consequently needed changes are delayed or abandoned, 
then the opportunity cost of failing to invite participation can be far higher than the cost 
of the participation itself. 
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Even when outright conflict is avoided, more subtle forms of opposition can 
undermine even the most carefully laid plans. Consider the following observation 
relating to the importance of cooperation on the part of line managers.* 
To move the locus of strategic planning from the decision level to the action level 
requires input from academic and administrative managers who have direct 
responsibilities in implementation. Inadequate participation of these managers 
often results in resistance or withdrawal of support. (Chan 1986, 5) 
While this is undoubtedly true, much the same could be said about faculty. As noted 
above, individual faculty members control or strongly influence implementation of many 
key academic decisions. Neutrality or even benign neglect can be as devastating as 
outright opposition: bringing planning to life often requires action, not just acquiescence. 
Prinvale (1989) notes the same continuum of risk associated with failure to animate the 
academic community: "Broad-based participation is a critical factor in preventing the 
apathy, resistance, and even outright rebellion that result when decisions are imposed by 
top leadership" (4). 
Farmer (1990) makes an especially perceptive point as to why it is wise to build 
opportunities for participation into the planning process in the early stages, when the 
sense of ownership is easiest to develop. Planning is always most vulnerable at the 
implementation phase, and late in the process it may be difficult or impossible to 
marshal support for a given project or priority: 
Resistance occurs at the implementation stage for several reasons. 
Implementation maximizes disequilibrium and thus the potential for conflict. As 
c ange becomes reality, latent hostility and feelings of loss of power begin to 
surface. Likewise, unforeseen short-run negative consequences of the innovation 
ecome apparent. Passive resistance also poses problems, as members of the 
organization balk at following management's directives, refuse to apply the 
innovation properly, or act so as to prevent the full realization of the benefits 
that the change promises. (Farmer 1990, 13) 
From this perspective, it is easy to imagine a planning effort which, although failing to 
engage the faculty, nonetheless appears to move briskly through a schedule of task force 
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action and administrative review. Only when implementation must occur might it 
become clear that the absence of participation on the front end has resulted in an 
absence of faculty follow-through on the back end. 
Prinvale (1989) describes just such a situation from her case study of a "major 
western research university." She found that planning at this institution had been 
undertaken in a bad atmosphere with inadequate attention to preparing the soil. 
Very little was done to establish a constructive planning environment. ... 
Anxiety, nervousness, disdain, alienation, and anger, to varying degrees, were 
experienced by most individuals, and there was no evidence that the campus 
administrators or planners initiated any activities which might alleviate those 
emotions. (Prinvale 1989, 9) 
More important, in her view, was the absence of meaningful opportunities for 
participation in the planning process. Thus, she found, the university had "failed to 
incorporate into the planning structure one element which probably could have 
significantly neutralized the negative attitudes: broad-based participation" (11). 
Allowed to participate, Prinvale implies that the faculty would have had the 
opportunity to work through their anxiety and anger and take ownership of planning 
issues. Instead, however, the faculty were 
consistently omitted from the information loop. There was no systematic or 
formal process of communicating ... individually or collectively during the 
planning process. ... Consistently omitted from the planning process, [faculty] 
were given little incentive to develop a sense of commitment to the purposes and 
goals of the planning process. When the people who must change are 
systematically excluded from the formulation of proposals, it is unrealistic to 
expect them to make major change. (Prinvale 1989, 11-12). 
After five years, Prinvale reports, no major changes had occurred on this campus. She 
attributes this failure of planning directly to the absence of effective faculty 
participation. 
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The literature offers one final argument to support the need for effective faculty 
participation. It is fundamentally an argument that the alternative — "top-down" 
management — is no longer viable. For better or worse, this view suggests, "hierarchical 
models of decision making arguably have been rendered unworkable by a host of ... 
factors, including the emergence of the organizationally complex contemporary 
university, the professional autonomy of faculty, and ever-accelerating specialization in 
the disciplines" (Schuster et al., 14-15). The past several decades have seen a series of 
new demands for "a seat at the table" of institutional decision making. In the sixties 
and seventies students pressed for greater influence; in the seventies community 
involvement and more active board participation grew; and in the eighties faculty 
renewed their efforts to influence campus decisions, especially in the face of stagnant 
salaries and the perception that academic activities were receiving a shrinking slice of 
the resource pie. In the nineties, the reality of a general resource crunch has intensified 
all these claims. Clearly, then, in recent decades the claims on participation have grown 
more intense, first in one direction, then in another, but always toward greater 
involvement, which is to say, toward dilution of the authority and power that might 
emanate from a single source" (Schuster et al., 16-17). 
What is "Real" Participation? 
The literature is clear on the need for participation as a condition of effective 
planning, but one still must ask what constitutes effective participation. Does it involve 
the opportunity to speak? To be heard? To be listened to? Can there be satisfactory 
participation with an unsatisfactory result? Does participation apply to the origination 
of ideas, reaction to ideas, or both? 
There are, not surprisingly, some strongly held views on these subjects. Most 
observers, in calling for participatory planning, have something specific in mind. By and 
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large they are calling for "real" participation, not a pro forma opportunity for the 
faculty to be "consulted." Insistence on full and satisfying participation is really just an 
extension of the arguments detailed immediately above. If the point of participation is 
to promote understanding, establish legitimacy, and increase the likelihood that plans 
will be put into action, then participation must involve the kind of interaction that 
engages the intellect and motivates the spirit. Desultory and half-hearted efforts will 
not suffice. 
Neither will the obviously manipulative. Several observers provide vivid 
descriptions of the kinds of interactions that do not qualify as real participation. Jones 
(1990) warns that "in many institutions strategic planning is used as a cover to allow a 
handful of individuals to do as they please under the guise of shared governance and 
meaningful participation by a broad range of constituents" (53). This concern is shared 
by Prinvale (1989): 
All too often, university administrators or planners characterize planning as 
participatory when what they really mean is that they have developed 
techniques to persuade employees to accept decisions which have already been 
made. The employees have not been given genuine opportunities to participate in 
the formulating of the decisions. Therefore, when a participatory planning 
process is established, the planners must be honest about the level of 
participation of the institution's different constituencies that will be allowed. 
(Prinvale 1989, 4) 
Strohm (1983) agrees that faculty can easily be manipulated by a central 
administration with a unified strategy and control over process and information. For 
this reason he argues that faculty participation should include participation in the 
integrative aspect of planning, not just the passing of ideas in over the transom: 
Members of a faculty should not be satisfied merely to be consulted in a diffuse 
and inconclusive way. An undue fragmentation, in which many faculty members 
are set to work providing "input" for administrative decision makers and no one 
committee is charged with responsibility, might seem superficially democratic but 
is actually antithetical to effective faculty participation. (Strohm 1983, 11) 
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Participation, in Strohm's view, means involvement in the totality of the decision-making 
process. It means involvement in the identification of problems, formulation of ideas, 
and choice among alternative strategies. It does not, he makes clear, mean token 
consultation at the eleventh hour: 
Too often in the past, ... committees have been formed by a hasty round-up of 
faculty members who are led blinking from their cinder-block offices into teak- 
paneled boardrooms, told that an emergency exists, asked to approve unusual or 
extreme actions, and then sent back to explain themselves to their colleagues at 
the departmental coffee urn. (Strohm 1983, 12) 
He notes that in other areas of decision making in which faculty play a part, such as 
tenure and promotion, the faculty role is stable and well understood and faculty carry 
out their responsibilities effectively. He argues that a similar clarity and predictability 
should be brought to the faculty role in strategic planning. 
Concern over the quality and character of faculty participation has been evident 
since the very early days of strategic planning in higher education. The 1977 University 
of Pittsburgh survey of planning activity among the 56 largest research universities 
revealed strong emphasis on centralized processes with minimal faculty involvement. In 
reporting these results Freeman (1977) observed that, "although the study shows that 
most institutions have provided for some participation by members of the university 
community, such involvement has been more apparent than real" (42). It was in fact at 
about this point in history that centralized, highly rational, minimally participatory 
planning approaches began to give ground to the new "strategic" concept, with its 
explicit emphasis on open systems. 
A decade later, Shirley (1987) offered five criteria by which to evaluate the 
effectiveness of strategic planning processes. Assessment of the nature of participation 
figured prominently among them: 
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Have appropriate constituents been meaningfully involved in the planning 
process? The word "meaningfully" is essential to this criterion, as it requires 
open and honest participation by affected parties. ... Without meaningful 
involvement, it is impossible to achieve ownership of the decisions being made as 
a result of planning. Unanimity is not implied here, nor even consensus. Unless 
participation is widespread and meaningful, however, disagreements will not be 
open and straightforward. Thus, the purpose of meaningful participation is not 
to gain widespread agreement, although such convergence of views is always 
welcome. Rather, the purpose is to ensure a broad and diverse set of inputs and 
to ensure that most parties identify with the process, if not with the outcome. 
(Shirley 1987, 19) 
Shirley's emphasis on process over product is important, because one view of 
"meaningful" participation might be related to outcomes: the more closely the outcome 
conforms with one's preferences, the more "meaningful" one might consider one's 
participation. Schmidtlein (1990b) alludes to this kind of problem in discussing the 
relationship between planning undertaken at the departmental level and establishment 
of institution-wide priorities: 
Units [may] end up frustrated because their detailed planning does not appear 
to have had a visible effect on budgetary decisions. Campus officials face a 
difficult dilemma when trying at the same time to encourage unit creativity and 
initiative and to avoid unrealistic expectations and disillusionment. (Schmidtlein 
1990b, 18). 
The same can probably be said of individual participation. How can the institution 
engage the interest of many different individuals when any individual's contributions are 
likely to be lost in the process of aggregation and integration? 
Most seem to agree, however, that "meaningful" participation should be defined 
in reference to legitimacy, not interest gratification. Kashner (1990), for example, is clear 
that promoting participation need not undermine the responsibility of the campus 
leadership to weave a coherent strategy from the threads of individual and group 
interests: 
What is called for is a broadly participatory, representative, and consultative 
process that provides information for and solicits opinion from groups across the 
campus while reserving the actual leadership and decision-making tasks for 
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those ordinarily expected to act: the administration and the faculty. Recourse to 
an open process, with a proper regard for established ways of making decisions, 
can yield the consensus required for change while respecting the established 
governance arrangements. Even where extraordinary circumstances demand a 
departure from normal governance practice, it is advisable to employ a broadly 
participatory process in tandem with strong administrative leadership. (Kashner 
1990, 24) 
Kaufman and Herman (1991) agree that the key is an open process, in which each 
individual feels that he or she has had a chance to be involved. "A small group may put 
a plan together more quickly than a large group," they note, "but the product won't be 
accepted by those who weren't asked to contribute" (8). Ultimately, participation 
should be judged in terms of the degree of engagement it elicits: 
Participation ... is not enough. Meaningful participation is necessary_ 
Extending the lines of communication must be a priority so that administrators, 
faculty, staff, students and the community actively contribute to the planning 
process taking ownership of the systems. (Johnson and Jonas 1995, 3) 
Is Meaningful Participation Possible? 
As with developing a consensus for change, promoting an institutional focus, and 
ensuring "fit" between the planning process and the campus culture, it is important to 
ask whether the requirement that the planning process allow for meaningful faculty 
participation can be met. The purpose here is not to lay out a utopian vision, but to 
provide the kind of advice an institution could reasonably take were it so inclined. On 
this question the literature reveals a range of viewpoints, but a few themes stand out. 
First, a number of observers offer specific strategies that can encourage or 
increase the effectiveness of faculty participation. Communications strategies of various 
kinds figure prominently in the literature, reflecting both the centrality of ideas to 
planning and the anxieties which attend the prospect of change. Chan (1988) reported 
that a survey of the campus community conducted at DePaul University indicated a 
preference on the part of faculty for interpersonal communication over formal meetings 
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or written reports. Deans, department chairs, and faculty colleagues were all considered 
effective and reliable sources of information. An institution would be wise, therefore, to 
make it easy for academic administrators at the unit level to be informed about and 
comfortable with the planning process. 
Other suggested communication strategies have more to do with listening than 
with telling. At Iowa State University, the planning process began with a series of 
luncheon meetings with small groups faculty who were asked to suggest ideas for 
improving the university. These suggestions formed the basis for discussion at the first 
campus-wide planning retreat (Cope 1987). This approach sent several important 
messages: 1) ideas drive the planning process; 2) faculty have ideas; and 3) faculty 
ideas are worth listening to. Bradley University, facing retrenchment, also applied a 
' high touch" strategy. The president and members of the planning steering committee 
visited every academic department over a six-week period, both to explain the 
university's situation and to hear about departmental needs (Cope 1987). 
At Cornell University, administrators used survey research as a way of both 
gathering important information and creating a porous, highly participatory process. 
Hurst's (1994) account of this effort stresses the "care taken to weave the survey 
creation, distribution, analysis and reporting of findings into the strategic planning 
process. Every step of the process ... was carefully designed to maximize the legitimacy 
of the data and raise the visibility" of the process within the campus community (3). 
Efforts of this kind, correctly executed, also send a very positive message, and 
encourage faculty to participate in other ways. 
Even when events seem to be moving too fast for usual forms of faculty 
consultation and deliberation, the process can be managed to maximize openness and 
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participation. Foster (1990), reporting on planning at the University of Minnesota in the 
late 1980s, noted that external pressure from the governor had forced development of a 
campus plan quickly, without faculty involvement. The plan, however, was limited to 
general directions, with the framework to be filled in through a more consultative 
Because Commitment to Focus was a president's personal statement, it did not 
provide the details of how the university would adjust to the new direction. The 
next step was to return the process to the colleges and departments where the 
details of academic plans must be developed. The entire process — college 
plans, their review and consolidation, the formulation of the administration's 
response, and recommendations to the governing board — were designed for 
maximal openness and consultation. Given Minnesota's consultative tradition, 
the administration considered this to be essential to enlisting continued internal 
support for the initiatives that would come from the process. (Foster 1990, 29) 
While hardly ideal, this strategy demonstrates the importance of making the best of even 
a bad situation. 
Other strategies are suggested, as well. Chan (1986) stresses the importance of 
allowing enough time for consultation. Desfosses (1996) argues that the use of "cross¬ 
cutting teams" can promote participation and help to overcome insularity and turf 
issues. Tan (1990) suggests the formation of coalitions to overcome apathy and reduce 
the cost of individual participation (he does not, however, suggest how to deal with the 
coalitions once formed). Finally, Chan (1988) encourages the use of direct incentives for 
faculty participation, either in the form of personal recognition or a planning emphasis 
on improved working conditions. 
Second, many observers approach the participation question from the 
perspective of faculty governance. Here opinion is fairly sharply divided. Some argue 
that the traditional mechanisms of faculty governance should be employed in order to 
lend credibility to the planning process. Takeuchi (1982), for example, states that 
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linking planning to the regular operations of the institution "generally requires the 
development of a planning process that recognizes the institution's governance structure 
and processes (6-7). 
Others, however, argue that the demands of strategic planning overwhelm the 
capacity of traditional governance mechanisms, and that new structures must be created 
to provide opportunities for faculty involvement. George Keller (1983a) gave this debate 
new clarity and prominence in his book. Academic Strategy: The Management Revolution 
in American Higher Education: 
As education leaders become more active and need to decide more swiftly, and 
as finances and academics are being joined, the old, looping Ping-Pong game 
between the administration and the faculty is no longer adequate, especially 
since faculty senates are slowly collapsing or becoming dormant. .. .The campus 
president must move more quickly and vigorously but continue to have faculty 
advice and guidance — and have someone with whom to share the blame for 
mistakes. The professors, especially the senior ones, want to help decide their 
own and their institution's futures — but not too openly and without full 
responsibility for their decisions. Enter a new body: the Joint Big Decisions 
Committee. (Keller 1983a, 61) 
In calling for the formation of Joint Big Decisions Committees (JBDCs), Keller put a name 
to a practice that, he said, was already widely in use in higher education. He cited 
examples in place at the University of Michigan, Princeton, Northwestern, Temple, and 
Ohio University. He described the JBDC as 
usually composed of selected senior faculty members and key administrators, 
with some junior faculty, students, or trustee members sitting in at some 
institutions. The president is usually not a member. It is generally chaired by the 
chief academic officer. It has instantly become the center of power in most cases. 
(Keller 1983a, 61). 
Perhaps as a consequence of the general popularity of Keller's book, much of the 
subsequent debate over faculty participation in strategic planning took the JBDC 
question as its reference point. Even when the reference to Keller was not explicit, the 
arguments were clearly influenced by the "JBDC vs. governance" debate. 
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In an extensive examination of planning practice to date. Cope (1987) weighed in 
in support of the notion that traditional governance was not well-suited to new 
"strategic" approaches to decision making: 
In every case known to the author, the entity's chief educational officer (CEO) — 
president, dean, or chair — creates a special, temporary committee or task force 
that is usually given a specific "strategic" title, such as "The Strategic Planning 
Committee," or a generic policy title, such as "Academic Policy Committee." 
(Cope 1987, 12) 
Interestingly, Cope took the argument a step further: "Even when a standing committee 
for "big decisions" already exists, the newness of the strategic concept appears to call 
for a new group" (12). In this sense, the choice of a vehicle for faculty participation is 
important for symbolic as well as practical reasons, to signal the need for new ways of 
thinking and of doing business. 
Often, however, Keller's call for a new approach to faculty participation was 
met with arguments of various sorts in defense of faculty governance. These generally 
did not take the form of apologia for business-as-usual: the need for more nimble 
responses and more comprehensive thinking was not disputed. Rather, many observers 
felt that, principally for reasons of legitimacy and cultural fit, it was important for 
faculty governance mechanisms to rise to the challenge presented by strategic planning. 
Power and Powers (1984) directly rebutted Keller. On the one hand, they 
acknowledged much of Keller's premise: 
Some presidents believe they must make decisions too quickly to engage in 
traditional formalized interactions with faculty members through senates or 
university-wide councils. Yet they need advice from faculty members and other 
members of the university community. They also need to share the blame when 
plans go awry. (Powers and Powers 1984, 49) 
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And, while they also shared Keller's concern over the ineffectiveness of traditional 
governance, they nonetheless argued against his conclusion: 
Creation of such committees could cause further atrophy and even death of 
faculty senates or school-level governing bodies. At present, on many campuses, 
faculty interest in and support of senates is lower than it was in previous 
decades. But to aid in the demise of faculty senates would be a shame.... (49). 
They also introduced a practical objection. If successful planning requires the 
engagement of the whole campus community in problem-solving and implementation, 
then reliance on a small, elite group, meeting in secret, would be counterproductive: 
Reliance on a Great Decisions Committee could block creation of the kind of 
decision-making culture that is both the product of and a requirement for 
effective participatory management. Open decision making requires free 
information flow and confidence on the part of every member of the community 
of his or her right and duty to identify problems and possible solutions and to 
participate in choosing what to do. 
...At each step of a planning process, great reliance should be placed on 
existing institutional hierarchies and governance councils to elicit reactions to 
successive drafts of position papers. Referring all issue papers and drafts of 
proposals to legitimized, standing, advisory councils strengthens their role and 
affirms their interest in the outcomes. Bypassing these structures diminishes their 
standing by implying that they have no role in making important decisions. (50) 
It should be noted that Keller did eventually come to believe that secret deliberations 
were counterproductive, even though he apparently remained convinced that the JBDC 
approach was superior to traditional faculty governance (Schuster et al. 1994). 
Powers and Powers were joined in the following year by Richardson and Gardner 
(1985), who shared the doubts about the effectiveness of faculty governance but who 
also concluded that creating new structures for planning was not the answer: "This may 
be unnecessary and even counterproductive. .. .Introducing new committees takes 
planning responsibility away from existing groups and may result in redundancy, 
confusion, and conflict" (13). Tan (1990) agreed that effective, ongoing planning 
required broad support on the campus, which would be undermined if planning were 
102 
implemented at the expense of faculty governance. Schmidtlein and Milton (1988) drew 
the lesson from their campus site visits that "planning approaches that were integrated 
with normal campus decision processes [were] more satisfactory than those using 
broadly based committees and operating apart from traditional decision makers and 
governance bodies" (Schmidtlein and Milton 1988, 9). 
Chan (1986; 1988) reporting on the experience of DePaul University, argued that 
utilization of the existing governance structure to accommodate the participation needs 
of a strategic planning process could indeed prove reinvigorating. Moreover, she found 
that this approach was more likely to build consensus, rather than generate conflict, as 
the planning process unfolded: "The formal consultation with the faculty council as the 
only body representing faculty motivated the council to align its agenda with the 
planning agenda of the administration" (Chan 1988, 24). 
For more than a decade this debate has continued, with neither the JBDC 
approach nor traditional governance emerging as a consensus choice. Schuster et al. 
(1994), in a major study of the relationship between JBDCs (which they termed 
"Strategic Planning Councils") and faculty governance, found that 
a campus's strategic planning and governance functions exist often, perhaps 
most of the time, in a state of tension, sometimes even in outright conflict. It is 
commonly thought that an effective planning process cannot afford the luxury of 
traditional decision making and, conversely, that governance which is shared 
meaningfully is incompatible with the requirements of a no-nonsense planning 
function. (Schuster et al. 1994, 7-9) 
This tension should not be surprising, and it may not be avoidable. Ultimately, form 
follows function. As Schuster et al. note, strategic planning and governance have 
different functions and hence different forms of organization: 
In effect, many campuses have created parallel processes: one for governance, to 
attend to the normal run of institutional decision making; the other for "grand 
planning," to formulate a more visionary and global outlook for the institution. 
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its mission, and its relationship to the environment. The former process relies 
heavily on faculty and administrative involvement; the latter often entails broad- 
based constituent participation. The first focuses mostly inward on the 
organization itself, the second predominantly on the institution's place in the 
larger world. The former focuses heavily on organizational practice, the latter on 
articulating loftier mission and purpose. All of this is to say that the orientations 
— the centers of gravity — of the governance and planning processes are quite 
different. (Schuster et al. 1994, 20-21) 
Schuster et al. (1994) examined the experience of eight campuses which had employed 
Strategic Planning Councils (SPCs), some successfully and some not. They found that it 
was possible to let the SPC do its job without undermining the existing governance 
mechanisms. The successful SPCs served as a "more focused, more centralized structure 
for bringing together a variety of perspectives" but did not attempt to replace or 
circumvent governance. "Indeed," they reported, "it appeared that those bodies that 
had attempted to ignore well-established faculty or administrative decision centers ... 
lost their base of support and could not function effectively" (181). 
For Schuster et al., then, attempting to choose between the two different 
mechanisms is not productive. The relevant question is how to make the two 
mechanisms work together: "Planning and governance are indispensable components of 
strategic decision making, and the differences between them must be reconciled to take 
advantage of their respective strengths" (194). Thus, they argue for strengthening both 
planning and governance: 
Without a planning process that does what it can do best — compile data, 
project trends (resources, demographics, and so on), scan for opportunities, and 
identify options and niches — strategic decision making would not be adequately 
anchored in reality nor could it systematically assess and prioritize options for 
shaping a future. Correspondingly, without a governance process that is open to 
the contributions of stakeholders — particularly on-campus academics with 
different experiences, perspectives, and priorities — strategic decisions would be 
shortchanged of expert opinion crucial to the institution's core academic 
activities. And more critically, without a governance process that promotes 
legitimacy and acceptability through involvement, even the deftest strategic 
decisions are likely to run aground on the jagged shoals of skepticism and 
resistance. A viable partnership between planning and governance, in other 
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words, is a prerequisite for effective strategic decision making. (Schuster et al., 
194) 
They term such a happy confluence of capacity "strategic governance/' a dynamic 
interaction between the planning and governance domains that is inclusive, promotes a 
strategic outlook, emphasizes communication, and relies on leadership that "is alert to 
the complexities and nuances of the campus's different organizational cultures" (199). 
In designing the planning process, then, care must be taken to promote the kind 
of broad faculty involvement that can both allow access to faculty expertise and 
innovation and confer a sense of legitimacy to the directions emerging from the planning 
process. Mere representation "does not necessarily guarantee that stakeholders will 
perceive that they actually had a voice" (Schuster et al. 1994, 25), so opportunities for 
real involvement with meaningful feedback are important. In the end, the best results are 
likely to be achieved if the planning and governance processes are allowed to pursue 
their individual missions, but are brought together in the context of shared goals yet 
differentiated labor. 
Securing Effective Leadership. 
An institution contemplating strategic planning faces a daunting task: to build 
consensus for change among participants who may resist change bitterly; to build 
understanding of institutional needs within a community that values the discipline 
above all else; to craft an approach that pays due respect to all the conflicting purposes 
and values of a complex organization; and to engage the participation of individuals 
with other interests and a healthy skepticism about the whole enterprise. Little wonder 
so many planning efforts end in frustration and cynicism. 
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The final factor contributing to the success of a strategic planning process is one 
which brings all the others together: leadership. If there is one idea related to strategic 
planning around which a true consensus can be said to have formed, it is this: the 
success of the effort depends fundamentally on the quality and effectiveness of the 
leadership that guides it. While leadership is not everything, in its absence little of value 
is likely to happen. Schuster et al/s study of campuses in transition concluded with a 
list of planning elements deemed likely to promote what it called "strategic governance," 
a synchronization of planning and governance. "Leadership," they observed, "is 
perhaps the most crucial of the ... elements just outlined. The other elements can be in 
place, but inattentive or, worse, devious leadership will surely scuttle it all" (Schuster et 
al. 1994, 200). 
The Challenge of Leadership 
The task of leadership in the strategic planning context is obviously challenging. 
It requires extraordinary personal and intellectual qualities, a fair amount of specialized 
knowledge, and quite a bit of luck. The following description, while perhaps a bit 
overstated, nonetheless captures the sense of the contemporary change process: 
Close your eyes and engage the tape of the last time the core curriculum was 
changed at you institution. Play back the last fee increase, the last new program 
establishment effort, the last proposal to create a research and development unit, 
the last push to reach out and accommodate the needs of an underserved 
segment of society. Note the objections, rational and irrational, as your tape 
reveals administrative, faculty, student, staff, alumni, state board, legislative, 
and special-interest images. Note that strengths and reasons for pursuing the 
change cited by one constituency are judged to be weaknesses and reasons for 
not pursuing the change by another. Visualize clearly that the effects sought go 
too far for some and do not go far enough for others, while still others doubt that 
the strategy is sufficient to achieve the proposed effects. .. .Watch the 
constituencies undergo fragmentation. .. .Remember that you are certain to 
encounter lingering dissatisfaction with whatever happened from at least a 
dozen sources during the next twenty-four hours. (Parker 1986, 64) 
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This is hardly an encouraging scenario, yet thoughts of this kind must run through the 
mind of any individual seeking to exercise leadership at a college or university today. 
One of the most challenging aspects of leadership is overcoming a powerful 
impulse on the part of many institutions not to be led. More specifically, many 
individuals whose cooperation is important to the success of the planning effort want 
nothing to do with it. It therefore seems appropriate to begin this review of the 
leadership component of planning with an examination of factors that condition the 
environment in which planning occurs. 
Colleges and universities are often characterized as resistant to change, and there 
is some truth to that observation. Campuses tend to be fairly conservative 
organizations, although it must be conceded this conservatism is the basis of much of 
higher education's strength. One would therefore naturally expect a certain lack of 
enthusiasm when talk of "sweeping change" or "fundamental realignment" begins. The 
resistance often encountered in the strategic planning context, however, seems to go a bit 
deeper. Most members of the academic community are probably aware that the 
business in which they are engaged is undergoing stress. Most faculty probably 
recognize that their experience — defined by the Baby Boom and the growth of the 
research model — will not be shared by the next generation of scholars. The future may 
be better or it may be worse, but it will surely be different. 
Awareness can be liberating, but it can also be debilitating. It has been observed 
that colleges and universities today are "uncertain of how to proceed and hence 
committed to changing as little as possible" (Pew Higher Education Research Program 
1992a, 4A). While this statement may be a bit unfair, it does capture the ambivalence 
many feel about the current situation. Adler and Lane (1988) made a similar 
107 
observation nearly a decade ago: "Even though the need for multi-year planning has 
never been greater, colleges seem paralyzed by the current turbulence as well as 
organizational constraints on their ability to respond" (28). In the ensuing decade, the 
turbulence has not passed and the constraints have, if anything, multiplied. 
In fact, the continued fiscal pressure felt by most campuses simply makes the 
situation worse. Presidents feel they must move, but they are often playing in a zero- 
sum or even a diminishing-sum game. The administrative decision to pursue priorities 
in the absence of new resources intensifies the discomfort of many and can produce so 
much conflict that the advantages of achieving priorities are largely nullified by the 
negative consequences of the conflict (Richardson and Gardner 1985, 11). The campus 
cannot move, but it dare not stand still. 
Some resistance is related to fear: fear of erosion of faculty autonomy, fear of 
administrative control, fear that quantitative factors will drive decisions, pushing out 
the qualitative considerations that most faculty cherish (Freeman 1977). Much of the 
fear is simply fear of the unknown: 
The prospect of doing things differently arouses anxiety in most people, for it 
promises to replace the sense of security associated with what is familiar with 
the sense of insecurity associated with what is unfamiliar. Most social 
institutions are, by nature, conservative. Many if not most professors can be 
categorized as "hyperconservative." The corporate culture of higher education 
treasures a body of customary values and practices on our campuses. (Steeples 
In addition to fear and anxiety, there is also a reluctance to cede authority to 
increasingly activist administrators. Larson, Milton and Schmidtlein (1988) observe that 
colleges and universities increasingly are composed of "relatively autonomous, 
professionally staffed subunits that often cannot or will not carry out activities 
suggested, or even mandated, by institutional-level administrators" (3). The trend 
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toward a loosening of institutional ties in favor of allegiance to professional or personal 
priorities erodes what little authority campus administrators enjoy (Hardy et al. 1983; 
Pew Higher Education Research Program 1992b). "What is being asked of institutional 
leaders," according to one analysis, "is that they take hold of enterprises over which 
they have increasingly tenuous command" (Pew Higher Education Research Program 
1992a, 5A). 
And as control continues to dissipate, the challenge of mastering — or even 
understanding — the institution's problem-set grows. What Bennis and Nanus (1985) 
observed about modern organizations in general holds special significance for higher 
education: "The problems of organizations are increasingly complex. There are too 
many ironies, polarities, dichotomies, dualities, ambivalences, paradoxes, confusions, 
contradictions, contraries, and messes for any organization to understand and deal 
with" (8). Complexity overwhelms people, leaving them unable to act. Fullan (1996) 
describes this phenomenon in elementary and secondary education, which closely 
parallels the situation in higher education: 
Overload and fragmentation are two major barriers to education reform, and 
they are related. Overload is the continuous stream of planned and unplanned 
changes that affect the schools. Educators must contend constantly with 
multiple innovations and myriad policies, and they must deal with them all at 
once. ... Fragmentation occurs when the pressures — and even the opportunities 
— for reform work at cross purposes or seem disjointed and incoherent. 
Overload and fragmentation combine to reduce educators' motivation for 
working on reform. Together they make the situation that the schools face seem 
hopeless, and they take their toll on the most committed, who find that will 
alone is not sufficient to achieve or sustain reform. (Fullan 1996, 420) 
It is a well-established truism of group behavior that organizations tend not to 
perform well under stress. Yet educational leaders today — and the members of the 
communities they lead — face relentless stress. Cameron and Whetten (1983) note that 
colleges and universities tend to behave in counterproductive ways when they are in 
periods of decline. Under stress, institutions tend to resist collaboration, become rigid in 
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their problem-solving approaches, and adopt a willingness to mortgage the future in 
pursuit of short-term relief. All of these actions are precisely the opposite of what the 
situation calls for. 
When action is taken, it often reinforces the most negative elements present in the 
situation: 
The draconian measures often associated with strategic turnaround — layoffs, 
program closure, terminations — can send shock waves through the system. As 
one unit is "sacrificed," others, instead of feeling reassured, may feel that they 
will be next. Any challenge to tenure, the mainstay of academic freedom, will 
threaten the community as a whole. The more marketable individuals may leave 
to find less hostile surroundings, and potential recruits take jobs in other 
universities where tenure is more secure. Remaining individuals will engage in 
political infighting as they try to protect their departments and faculties — 
hardly a climate conducive to innovation and creativity. (Hardy 1988, 14) 
Faced with consequences of this sort leaders are left in a nearly impossible position: if 
they act, they may trigger precisely the kind of turmoil they are hoping to avoid; if they 
fail to act, their institutions slip further and further out of control. Many choose to wait 
and see. As one university president observed. 
it is an obvious paradox of human behavior that people become least anxious to 
rock the boat as it approaches the waterfall. At such a time, most of us in the 
academy know better than to stand up and speak too loudly of the turbulence 
ahead; indeed, a few will even try to pretend that all is well, to oil the oarlocks 
and sing loudly against the roar of the water. (Johnson 1988, 66) 
Unfortunately, that attitude foreordains the final destination of the boat. Most 
institutions need and want better leadership, and the remainder of this review examines 
what the literature offers to those who wish to act. 
Commitment from the Top 
The planning literature describes "leadership" of the planning process in many 
ways, some obvious, some subtle. There is not always agreement as to what constitutes 
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effective leadership, or how leadership should be exercised at different points in the 
process. On one point, however, there is nearly universal agreement: effective planning 
demands strong, consistent, visible commitment from the top of the organization, 
especially from the president, who provides the guiding intelligence and the 
revolutionary fervor necessary to release the energies of the institution (Keller 1983a; 
Lisensky 1988; Schmidtlein 1990; Steeples 1988; Steiner 1979). "Perhaps nowhere as 
much as in the realm of strategic planning is the president's role as bard, soothsayer, 
seer, prophet, spinner of dreams, and exhorter to action so important" (Steeples 1988, 
104). 
According to some, this kind of leadership is the core around which all the other 
elements of planning are organized: 
Strategic management writers frequently emphasize the importance of many 
aspects of the organization's culture including broad participation, shared 
organizational goals, and the importance of institutional values and traditions. 
Nevertheless these appear secondary to strong and action-oriented leadership at 
the top. (Miller 1983, 41). 
In his description of five criteria by which to evaluate the effectiveness of institutional 
planning, Shirley (1987) begins with the question of support from the top: 
Is there evidence of top management support for the planning effort? Implied in 
this criterion is real and assertive support of planning, not merely lip service. 
...The upper echelons of administrative and faculty leadership must be 
committed to decision making as a result of planning, and especially to making 
hard choices among the alternative goals, priorities, and future programs. 
Without such top-level support from the outset, the planning effort is doomed to 
failure. .. .Moreover, such support must be evidenced throughout the process, 
particularly when critical and sensitive issues are being discussed. Without such 
commitment, particularly from the president, faculty and staff alike soon believe 
that little value is placed on closure and clarity. (Shirley 1987, 19) 
These views are affirmed by many. Johnson and Jonas (1995), Bucklew and Smith 
(1986), Cope (1987), and Flack (1994) stress the need for strong and continuing 
leadership on the part of the president. Chan (1986) argues that presidential leadership 
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is particularly important "when the pace of participation and implementation is unequal 
within the university" (10-11); that is, the president must regulate the process and 
ensure that the elements of the system do not stray too far out of touch with each other. 
Farmer (1990) and Cope (1981) see a special role for the president in fostering a 
favorable climate for innovation and change. Farmer expresses this in the familiar terms 
of management theory: 
The quality of leadership ... helps fashion an institutional environment that is 
hospitable to change. A strong commitment from top campus leadership is 
indispensable; without it, change will simply not occur. It is the responsibility of 
top leadership to encourage innovation and to make it clear that it fully supports 
institutional change agents. The president and other top officers must provide 
consistent, obvious support for innovation and must establish a campuswide 
expectation that change will occur. (Farmer 1990, 11) 
Cope (1981) makes a related point, but frames it in the form of analogy. His 
review of classic analyses of Britain's rise as a global power identified several conditions 
that supported this ascension. Two of these — "permeable boundaries" and 
employment in "adaptive subcultures" — were mentioned earlier. A third is government 
policy to support the growth of products for trade. This was a highly adaptive 
function: creating products for trade requires a keen awareness of the market and a 
willingness to innovate in anticipation of future demand. Cope sees a parallel with 
adaptive planning in colleges and universities. In the contemporary case, new 
products" arise as a result of innovation to serve existing or potential markets. Such 
products might be degree programs, applied research products, or outreach efforts. In 
all cases, successful development relies on an understanding of the needs and 
expectations of others, which is a hallmark of adaptive, or strategic, planning. • 
Maintaining an atmosphere conducive to such innovation — creating a climate for 
change — is thus an important leadership function for today's college president just as it 
once was for His Majesty's Government. 
112 
Takeuchi (1982) offers an interesting perspective on the question of presidential 
commitment. His report of a survey of planning participants at an unnamed mid- 
western university includes the finding that, while respondents generally agreed in their 
views of preferred institutional characteristics and characteristics of the planning 
process, there was disagreement regarding perceptions of "top administrative support" 
for planning. "The senior administrators reported a great deal of support for planning 
... while the senior planning staff felt that the institution's senior administrators were 
'not committed to planning'" (8-9). This finding suggests both that it is easy for 
presidents to underestimate the hunger for commitment, and that it is common for some 
in the campus community to have expectations that the president may not be able to 
satisfy. Both points are useful cautions. 
The literature offers some other examples of how commitment can affect 
planning in action. Adler and Lane (1988) cite the case of a campus which had received 
awards for its planning process, and to which the authors were invited as consultants. 
Upon arrival, however, they "quickly learned that there was no real planning. The 
previous president was unable or unwilling to make planning decisions — to commit — 
especially on a timely basis" (31-32). Another case study found that "where it was clear 
that the president was intent on empowering the [strategic planning council], other 
constituencies as well took their roles seriously — even if only to serve as watchdogs" 
(Schuster et al. 1994,187). One president who has passed through the fire of a planning 
process reported that success depended on a process that was both accessible and 
decisive. "After listening to all comments, the CEO should promptly make decisions 
and state openly the basis for the decisions. Failure to do so, whether on matters of 
procedure or of substance, will reward those who want to avoid the tough questions" 
(Swain 1988, 53). 
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Wharton and Corak (1992) made a consistent finding in their study of a campus 
that underwent a transition in leadership during the planning process. While they found 
that a successful, institutionalized planning process was able to sustain itself during a 
period of leadership vacuum, it was 
but a temporary expedient; ... the successful implementation of the ongoing, 
strategic planning process demands a vested, top leadership interest for which 
there really is no substitute. Strategic planning can extend both institutional 
momentum and the commitment of an organization to change — but only up to a 
certain point. Beyond that, the absence of leadership (or the presence of 
leadership which is hostile or indifferent to strategic planning) will prove fatal, 
and the forces of institutional inertia will overwhelm the planning process. 
Strategic planning can be a talisman for the ship of state through a period of 
transition, but it cannot sustain the vessel for an entire voyage. For that a 
captain is needed. (Wharton and Corak 1992, 4) 
So, while leadership is important in creating a climate for change and stimulating 
innovation, it is also apparently essential on an ongoing basis. The flywheel must be 
started turning, but it must also be kept in motion. 
Several observers make the point that the presidential leadership function cannot 
effectively be delegated. Adler and Lane (1988) and Jones (1990) agree that the 
president is the institution's chief planner, and that this function must be carried out 
personally. 
The single greatest mistake is to place the process in the hands of staff and then 
expect the plans to be implemented throughout the institution. Credibility is 
quickly lost this way and implementation frequently becomes impossible. 
Unless the president views strategic planning as important enough to 
personally lead the process from beginning to end, it has only a small chance for 
success. Generally speaking, planning should not even begin until the president is 
firmly committed to a lead role. (Jones 1990, 52-53) 
Miller (1983) agrees, on the basis that "strategic planning is so closely tied to decision 
making that it should be a primary responsibility of the chief executive officer" (42). 
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For Keller (1994), the president must be the chief planner because only the 
president stands at the nexus of the institution and only the president has the mandate 
to take action on behalf of the institution. This view reaffirms the sense that planning is 
about change, not about options: 
The making of a college's strategy, and even more the decision to move an 
institution in a new direction, can never be formalized, or created by systematic 
planners or intellectual analysts.... Inspired organizational design ... is always a 
daring, imaginative, decisive act by shrewd, knowledgeable persons at the top, 
aided by suggestions and analyses from all sorts of colleagues. 
Strategic decisions must always be made by those who run the institution, 
who must live with the consequences of the innovations, who know the 
organization, its people, its mandates, and its strengths, quirks, softness from 
years of experience and probing. Planners can only whisper in the ears of the 
gods. (Keller 1994, 40) 
In summary, then, the literature shows widespread support for the idea that 
strategic planning must have strong presidential commitment, a commitment that must 
be demonstrated in compelling terms throughout the course of the process. It is the 
starting point for all that follows. As one observer put it at the dawn of the strategic 
planning movement. 
effective planning requires strong executive leadership and commitment. If the 
president and the principal academic leaders of the institution are indifferent 
toward planning, that attitude will be communicated quickly to the rest of the 
university. Although strong, dedicated leadership at the top is no guarantee of 
success, its absence is almost certainly a guarantee of failure. (Freeman 1977, 47) 
Or, as one president put it: "In our time, to be responsible and to have any hope of 
being effective, a university president must simply want to play the game" (Johnson 
1988, 70). 
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Building a Planning; "Culture" 
Strategic planning can be described as many things: a set of management tools, 
an organizational framework, a web of relationships. At basis, however, strategic 
planning is a habit of mind. It suggests a way of thinking about one's own institution in 
the context of the environment, and from this thinking to imagine opportunities for 
linking the strengths of the campus to the needs of society. It is about reciprocal 
relationships: how to identify them, how to form them, how to nurture them. 
Despite the enormous emphasis given to presidential leaders by most writers on 
strategic planning, many of the important relationships with which strategic planning is 
concerned involve the campus president only indirectly. While there is often symbolic 
importance attached to presidential relationships as he or she carries out the diplomatic 
functions of the job, the practical work of planning is in the hands of the campus 
community. Will a faculty member from psychology and one from biology collaborate on 
a new course introducing first-year students to the field of neuroscience and behavior? 
Will the school of nursing see an opportunity to expand its clinical offerings by pursuing 
a training grant for school nurses? Will the college of humanities connect the expertise of 
its language departments to public agencies struggling to serve an increasingly 
multilingual clientele? These and countless other examples are what strategic planning is 
about, and over this kind of decision the college president has little control. 
What the president can do, however, is try to build a culture in which many 
individuals are thinking and acting "strategically," thereby increasing the chances that 
when an opportunity presents itself the appropriate member of the community will be 
prepared to recognize it. The development of a "strategic culture" moves the work of 
planning into the institution itself, and offers the possibility of lasting change. 
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Cope (1987) calls this the kind of leadership that provides an institution with "a 
continuing capacity to plan strategically that, for that institution, results in a strategic 
framework, not just plans" (vi.). Johnson and Jonas (1995) argue that this should take 
the form of a "transformation of the institution so that as many individuals as possible 
have input into planning, take responsibility for it and feel that they are active 
participants instead of innocent bystanders" (5). Through this sort of leadership, 
Prinvale (1989) argues, "planners are more likely to gain the support of the one cohort of 
persons — the faculty — who can play an instrumental role in the achievement of the 
institution's goals" (3). Can this be done? Cope (1987) cites at least one example, 
asserting that this was accomplished at Carnegie-Mellon University by the president, 
Richard Cyert: "leadership shifted over time from the strategically oriented mind of the 
president to widespread strategic thinking among all staff. .. .Once the strategic spirit is 
instilled, the culture supports it" (27; 29). 
This is an area in which the business model of strategic planning tends to fall 
short when applied to higher education. With little hierarchy, an infinitely diffuse focus, 
weak accountability, and no "bottom line," strategic thinking imposed from above just 
doesn't fit. Brandt (1991), quoting George Wilkinson of the United Way, describes the 
challenge as it applies to not-for-profit organizations: 
Some organizations seem to be continually struggling, continually in turmoil — 
and they're very unproductive. Others, though, behave as a team; they have 
symbiotic relationships; they seem much more successful. What we want to 
understand is what makes the difference — and how to institutionalize that 
difference: how to make more organizations truly strategic. (Brandt 1991, 25) 
The challenge can be especially daunting for colleges and universities, which have 
traditionally not been "organized" at all. Adler and Lane (1988) note that colleges and 
universities are "amateur organizations. ...Academic administrators are trained 
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researchers and experienced teachers, but usually have no background in 
administration" (30). 
Although colleges and universities, because of their inherently conservative 
nature, are often thought to be hostile to strategic thinking, they are at the same time 
unusually rich in the intellectual resources planning requires. As Cope (1987) has 
observed, strategic planning "is layered and multidimensional, drawing on many 
disciplines" (1). For a community organized around the principle of intellectual 
creativity, strategic thinking should be a natural fit. 
How, then, can leadership be employed to move the campus culture away from 
its natural conservatism and toward a more strategic way of thinking that taps into its 
natural strengths? A few observers suggest that attention be paid to education on the 
techniques of strategic planning. Chiarelott, Reed and Russell (1991), reflecting on their 
own planning experience, argue that the institution should 
Educate as many constituencies as possible about the intricacies of strategic 
planning. Recognize the complexity of thinking and acting strategically in an 
organization, and foster an understanding of the importance of using relatively 
sophisticated forecasting and analytical techniques to identify and evaluate 
issues and events that can influence the organization. A clear understanding of 
what is actually required to make strategic planning work is very important. 
(Chiarelott, Reed and Russell 1991, 38). 
Similar advice comes from Gratch and Wood (1991), also reflecting on a recent 
experience: "Our experience revealed that more time should have been invested in 
training all... managers in basic principles of strategic planning" (15). An initial three- 
hour retreat on the subject, they felt, was inadequate. Interestingly, Chiarelott, Reed and 
Russell and Gratch and Wood were referring to their experience in the same planning 
process, at Bowling Green State University, although they wrote separately and for 
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different audiences. It appears that at one campus, at least, the technical argument has 
become the conventional wisdom. 
Most observers, however, do not see the difficulty of building a planning culture 
as being a function of inadequate training in planning techniques. Instead, some mention 
the way the campus community feels about change. Planning is difficult, many 
institutions have had less-than-satisfactory experiences with planning over the years. 
As Kashner (1990) points out: 
If the experiences of an institution nourish a conviction that change is impossible 
or that the members of the campus community are powerless either to effect 
change or to make a difference, then it will be crucial to contrive experiences that 
foster confidence in the ability to innovate. Small successes can build confidence 
and allay a sense of powerlessness, in the process weakening inertia. (Kashner 
1990, 25-26). 
In such a case, he argues, the change in culture must precede work on the substance of 
change. 
Others stress the need to acknowledge and confront the fear and anxiety that 
planning — or the circumstances that prompt planning — often engender. Gratch and 
Wood (1991) note that successful planning involves risk-taking, and that care must 
therefore be taken to create a safe climate in which innovation and experimentation can 
be encouraged. Tan (1990) concurs: "Fear is quite understandable given that planning 
implies change and change raises feelings of loss, job insecurity, and worse" (6). Farmer 
(1990) sees building confidence as an essential leadership task: 
Confidence building is a key task in sustaining change. It is needed to overcome 
the fear and anxiety that the prospect of change stirs in many people. It replaces 
these negative feelings with a sense of stability and of possibility that nourishes 
the capacity for self-renewal among those whose efforts are critical to sustain 
change. Confidence building works in tandem with the other roles that the 
change agent must perform. (Farmer 1990, 9). 
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He sees free and open communication as being the "first precondition" (10) for building 
trust and confidence. 
The Leader as Catalyst 
With the goal of creating a culture conducive to strategic thinking in mind, it is 
useful to explore the role of the leader within such a culture. If action is largely in the 
hands of the faculty and other members of the campus community, then the leader need 
not be the chief actor. If planning taps into the vast reservoir of expertise present at 
every campus, then the leader need not be the chief expert. Rather, the leadeHs unique 
role is that of catalyst, encouraging productive collaboration and sparking innovation. 
This involves first a willingness to listen, to report, to popularize, and to connect 
like-minded individuals one to another. It means knowing what is happening within the 
institution and throughout its environment, and making that information available in 
useful ways. Bennis and Nanus (1985), in their classic study of leaders, emphasized 
this derivative aspect of leadership: 
Historians tend to write about great leaders as if they possessed transcendent 
genius, as if they were capable of creating their visions and sense of destiny out 
of some mysterious inner resource. Perhaps some do, but on closer examination 
it usually turns out that the vision did not originate with the leader personallv 
but rather from others.... J 
In all these cases, the leader may have been the one who chose the image from 
those available at the moment, articulated it, gave it form and legitimacy and 
focused attention on it, but the leader only rarely was the one who conceived of 
the vision in the first place. Therefore, the leader must be a superb listener, 
particularly to those advocating new or different images of the emerging reality. 
Many leaders establish both formal and informal channels of communication to 
gain access to these ideas. Most leaders also spend a substantial portion of their 
time interacting with advisers, consultants, other leaders, scholars, planners and 
a wide variety of other people both inside and outside their own organizations in 
this search. Successful leaders, we have found, are great askers, and thev do pav 
attention. (Bennis and Nanus 1985, 95-96) 
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Hollowood (1981) agrees with this interactive view of leadership The president "may 
not be (and often is not) the world's greatest strategist, but he must be adept as a 
leader, interrogator, debator and conciliator" (16). 
Powers and Powers (1984) find that this image of leadership is quite consistent 
with that described in the participatory management movement, popularized by Peters 
and Waterman (1982) in their book. In Search of Excellence. Of particular relevance is the 
concept of "managing by walking [or wandering] around," or MBWA. Powers and 
Powers apply this concept directly to the strategic process in higher education, arguing 
that campus leaders should listen carefully to employees throughout the campus, and to 
"consumers, who, in the case of universities, would include not only students, but 
parents and alumni, employers, and professional organizations" (51). In this view, 
insight into problems that can be gained by a 'shop floor' perspective can enable the 
right questions to be asked by the hierarchy and governance councils" (51). 
Note the emphasis on asking the right questions. This view of leadership, which 
might be termed the "diagnostic" view, is an important aspect of catalytic leadership. 
Hardy et al. (1983) discussed an "identification" phase in the strategy process involving 
recognizing the need to make a decision and diagnosing the situation. Routine decisions, 
they said, are easily identified, "but changes to the organization or its established 
procedures ... do need identification, and this tends to happen more by individual 
initiative" (417). The catalytic leader is well positioned to play this role. McGrath 
(1986) sees a similar diagnostic function of leadership. Commenting in the context of 
the use of sophisticated "decision support systems," he notes: 
Elegant solutions are useless if they solve the wrong problem. Because most 
institutional problems are never fully diagnosed, the effectiveness of strategic 
decision making depends on a continuing and adaptive process, including & 
learning more both about difficulties encountered and about others' perceptions 
of what should be done. (McGrath 1986, 71). 
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While one would hope that such an adaptive process would be widespread on a 
campus, it should certainly be found within the campus leadership. 
Another "catalytic" function involves bringing the campus into closer touch with 
its environment. Strategic planning, after all, operates at the frontier of the organization 
and its environment. But if members of the organization remain cloistered — as often 
occurs in higher education — then strategic thinking is inhibited. Confronting reality may 
be disquieting, but most individuals do not become creative unless they are nudged out 
of their comfort zone. As Farmer (1990) puts it, "often the catalyst, faced with 
organizational inertia, complacency, and self-satisfaction, must raise the levels of both 
dissatisfaction and awareness within an institution in order to get things started" (8). 
Johnson (1988) is even more direct: 
The institutional president... must do everything possible to open the realities of 
academic life to the realities of the marketplace, the things of the mind to the 
things of the mundane, jarring as many people as possible out of the 
conventional wisdom on which both realities depend. Once such openings occur, 
the president should foster experiment — curricular experiment, organizational 
experiment, whatever — not to find solutions for given problems (although he or 
she may stumble on one), but to bring faculty and staff face-to-face with their 
common problems.... Above all, the president should seize every opportunity to 
cause trouble, to make the conventional path more trouble than the 
unconventional one, to place the retention of time-honored organization in the 
path of some newly ignited heart's desire. (Johnson 1988, 69) 
The catalytic leader can also encourage the institution to become engaged in the 
strategic process by priming the pump; that is, by offering frameworks or tentative 
constructs that invite others to join in the work of completion. Cope (1987) speaks of 
"constrained" choices, planning work undertaken within broad parameters established 
by the campus leadership. Powers and Powers (1984) encourage the use of draft 
documents as working hypotheses that can signal a willingness to hear other viewpoints. 
They see this approach as fitting very well with the academic culture: 
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In a culture accustomed to consultation, a draft statement is viewed as an open- 
ended document designed to make clearings in the wilderness and to reveal the 
form of the problem and alternative scenarios through which the problem may be 
addressed. It is never interpreted as a statement designed to preclude discussion 
or convey decisions made unilaterally by authorities on high. (Powers and 
Powers 1984, 52). 
In sum, the leader who wishes to engage the campus in strategic thinking has 
access to a number of tools useful in building a "planning culture." Most do not involve 
the use of authority, but rely rather on position, attitude, and access. The president still 
steers, but the campus rows. 
The Organization as Leader 
One of the most intriguing lines of reasoning in the literature carries the "leader as 
catalyst" idea to its logical conclusion: the organization as leader. This represents a 
complete transition of responsibility for change from the president and others in 
positions of formal authority to the members of the community. It is, in some senses, an 
idealized construct, but the ideal provides a standard against which progress can be 
measured and a context in which different courses of action can be evaluated. 
In some ways, the idea that the organization can take responsibility for its own 
strategy is consistent with the views of Hardy et al. (1983) on strategy formation: 
An organization can have a realized strategy without having an intended one (or, 
more exactly, patterns can be evident even when a priori intentions were not). 
This means that strategies can exist without the efforts of central actors, that the 
formulation of strategies need not necessarily precede their implementation, and 
that strategies themselves need not necessarily be explicit (or, for that matter, 
even consciously recognized) — in other words, they can form rather than having 
to be formed. (Hardy et al. 1983, 408) 
What is missing from this view, however, is the sense of a self-conscious strategic sense. 
It is one thing to say that residents of Vermont tend to buy cars manufactured in 
Sweden. It is something quite different to say that Vermont has a "pro-Swedish" 
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automotive policy. Individual choices remain just that unless there is some guiding 
intelligence at work. This suggests some residual — and essential — role for leadership 
even in a fully mobilized, strategically sophisticated organization. 
The self-styled reformers of the Pew Higher Education Research Program (1992a) 
seem to call for a form of the organization as leader: "There is a paramount need for 
vision — a need for faculty to lead, to assess their own circumstances, to build a strong , 
unified organization capable of making decisions on behalf of the entire institution" 
(6A). They also observe, however, that 
the situation on most campuses is quite different from this ideal. The prospect 
of restructuring connotes images of the abyss. The first impulse is to resist any 
reorganization that alters accustomed privileges. On campuses bound by 
collective bargaining agreements, the power of unions to impede is enormous. On 
campuses of all kinds, faculty retain their ability to unite in opposition to 
administrative initiatives but find it increasingly difficult to form productive 
partnerships either among themselves or with an administration seeking to begin 
a restructuring process. The result is too often that reform never proceeds 
beyond the talking stage. The prudent course, as most campuses come to agree, 
is simply to wait, making as few permanent changes as possible while hoping for 
the return of better times. (Pew Higher Education Research Program 1992a, 6A) 
Not all observers share this grim assessment. Wharton and Corak (1992) 
reported that an institutionalized strategic planning process was able to maintain 
momentum through a leadership vacuum, and only foundered when permanent, less 
supportive leadership was in place. Nonetheless, it seems clear that most campuses are 
a long way from becoming "self-correcting, perpetually learning 'organisms' [that] are 
incessantly adjusting plans, intentions, and expectations" (Cope 1981, 7-8). 
Why, then, develop the idea of the self-strategizing organization? The answer 
lies in the absence of good alternatives. Farmer (1990) asserts that "reliance on formal 
authority to overcome resistance to change tends to be self-defeating. It may intensify 
feelings of hostility and opposition" (14). Moreover, Cameron (1984) argues that the 
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growing complexity of the environment in which colleges and universities operate makes 
traditional approaches to leadership increasingly futile: 
The cognitive capacity of managers can be exceeded easily by the necessity to 
consider all the information and events present in a postindustrial environment. 
It is simply impossible for managers to initiate adaptive strategies in the same 
ways in postindustrial environments as they do now. The institutions 
themselves will have to be designed so as to enhance their ability to adapt, aside 
from the manager's specific strategies. (Cameron 1984, 134) 
However long the journey may be to develop this kind of institutional capacity, then, it 
is clearly time to embark. 
In what direction should we travel? One view of the organization as leader is to 
see leadership as the mobilization of the organization's resources, not as a substitute for 
them. The college president, rather than assuming the burden of "solving" the 
institution's problems, would resist this and seek strategies to induce the members of the 
organization to do the adaptive work needed (Heifitz 1994). Cope (1987) describes a 
psychotherapeutic model of strategic decision making: "The solution (correct behavior) 
is within the collective person (the organization); therefore, the model is a facilitator 
(therapist) helping the group (the enterprise) find the right solution (appropriate 
strategy) to her or his own strategy" (37-38). This conceptual approach is useful 
because it counters the tendency — very powerful in most organizations, especially in 
times of stress — to shut down their problem-solving capabilities and demand answers 
from those in positions of authority. As Heifitz observes. 
Habitually seeking solutions from people in authority is maladaptive. Indeed, it 
is perhaps the essence of maladaptive behavior: the use of a response 
appropriate to one situation in another where it does not apply. Authority 
relationships are critical to doing work in many routine situations and, applied 
properly, can be used invaluably in more challenging times; yet misapplied, they 
serve to avoid work. The flight to authority is particularly dangerous for at least 
two reasons: first, because the work avoidance often occurs in response to our 
biggest problems and, second, because it disables some of our most important 
personal and collective resources for accomplishing adaptive work. (Heifitz 
1994, 73) 
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Sometimes, of course, it is the flip side of this scenario that causes the problem: 
authority is defied but no one else does the work. This is the stalemate in which many 
campuses find themselves today: the leader can't do the work, but tries; the 
organization can do the work, but won't. The point of the organization as leader view is 
that the group must take the work out of the "leader's" hands because he or she does 
not have the resources to get the job done. 
A similar point is made from a slightly different angle by Fullan (1996). Rather 
than figuring out what to do "at the top" and then trying to align the system with the 
selected strategy, Fullan argues for ensuring that the system — or, more specifically, the 
people in it — grasps the nature of the problems to be solved so that effective responses 
can be mounted at the grass roots: 
Only when greater clarity and coherence are achieved in the minds of the majority of 
teachers will we have any chance of success. Therefore, the central question is what 
combination of strategies will have the best chance of achieving greater shared, 
subjective clarity on a wide scale. Put another way, clarity must be achieved on 
the receiving end more than on the delivery end.... 
All of this is to say that those at the top, as well as those at the bottom, have 
to turn systemic thinking on its head. They have to ask how we can focus our 
efforts at the bottom so that there is some chance to achieve widespread 
improvement under the conditions of nonlinearity in the "big" system. (Fullan 
1996, 421) 
How does one turn systemic thinking on its head? "It mainly involves strategies (such 
as networking and reculturing) that help develop and mobilize the conceptions, skills, 
and motivation in the minds and hearts of scores of educators" (422). 
This involves, needless to say, a different conception of leadership from that 
currently abroad in higher education. It is even further removed from the idea of 
leadership as conceived in strategic planning's industrial roots. It is, however, oddly 
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compatible with the academic culture, with its emphasis on individual responsibility, 
creativity, and learning. As Cope (1987) describes it: 
Eventually the institution as a whole, through the increased capacity of its staff 
to think strategically, builds a strategic framework of tuition, degree options, 
location, themes, as well as a culture of strategic thinking. This process is 
institutional learning. Participants learn a conceptual approach and a 
knowledge-organizing framework for focusing on a variety of variables in a given 
situation; they can generate and redesign strategic solutions. They learn what to 
focus upon and learn how to determine strategic direction consistent with 
mission, strengths, competition, and the institution's culture. (Cope 1987, 39) 
Understanding the Organization 
The transformation of colleges and universities into learning organizations with a 
deeply imbedded, strategic culture may never happen. To the extent that it does 
happen it will occur in fits and starts, here and there, one step back for every two steps 
forward. For the moment — and perhaps forever — higher educational leaders must be 
prepared to deal with the here-and-now, to promote strategic thinking in often hostile 
environments, and to pursue a long-term strategy of institutional adaptation and 
renewal. 
To work effectively during this long, twilight struggle will require many personal 
qualities and many kinds of knowledge. The planning literature strongly suggests that 
one vitally important leadership quality will be insight into how organizations operate. 
Both campuses and their environments are increasingly complex, leading to 
exponentially greater complexity in campus-environment interactions. Behavior is, 
sadly, no longer Newtonian; that is, a college president's action may result in an 
unequal reaction, in almost any direction. Under these circumstances it is important for 
change agents to understand their organizations in at least two dimensions: how they 
behave, and how they change. 
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A number of observers have applied the broader discipline of organizational 
behavior to higher education. These examinations tend to focus on a series of behavioral 
models, each purporting to represent a set of norms and characteristics present in the 
institution. A thorough grasp of these behavioral models, it is suggested, gives the 
change agent a conceptual base from which to work and lends a measure of 
predictability to contemplated interventions (Kashner 1990; Cope 1985; Hardy et al. 
1983; Moore and Langknecht 1986). 
Kashner (1990) makes the connection between culture, previously discussed, and 
behavior: 
The culture of contemporary American higher education, like that of its 
antecedents, rests on governing assumptions about the important role of 
education and the way that academic institutions should be operated; on a 
special set of values, beliefs, and norms that constrain behavior in colleges and 
universities; on a well-defined cluster of roles and statuses that offer intrinsic 
rewards for academicians; and on a set of meaningful symbols through which 
actions and loyalties are focused. Together, these elements constitute the essence 
of academic culture. Separately, each is internalized by members of the 
academic community in ways that materially affect their behavior and often 
render it hostile to change. Readying an institution to reply to conditions that 
call for change or to innovate on the institution's own initiative requires a clear 
understanding of its corporate culture and of how to modify that culture in a 
desired direction. (Kashner 1990, 20) 
Different models of organizational behavior thus provide guidance to campus leaders as 
they attempt to exploit and/or modify the norms of the prevailing culture. 
The work of Chaffee (1984) provides an excellent starting point for the 
discussion of leadership in the context of organizational behavior. She divides the 
world of strategic management into two hemispheres: 1) theories based on the idea that 
organizations are entities with goals and strategies to pursue those goals; and 2) theories 
that describe organizations as mere "networks of participants" (212) who associate so 
as to pursue their individual goals. 
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The model of strategic management founded on the first premise, here called the 
"adaptive" model, involves attuning the organization to changes in market 
demands and reorienting the organization as needed in order to maintain or 
increase the flow of resources from the market to the organization. .. .The other 
model of strategic management, here called the "interpretive" model, arises from 
the premise that an organization is a network of self-interested participants. 
According to the interpretive model, successful strategic management requires 
skillful use of all forms of communication and of the symbols used to portray the 
collective reality of participants — in short, the management of meaning. 
(Chaffee 1984, 212-213) 
Chaffee bases much of this view of strategic management on the work of Keeley (1980), 
who made the point in reference to organizations in general: 
Keeley suggests that two fundamentally different analogies have been used for 
conceptualizing organizations: the organization as an organism and the 
organization as a social contract. .. .In the widely adopted organismic analogy, 
the organization is an entity consisting of functionally differentiated roles 
through which the aims of the organization are sought. .. .In the social contract 
analogy, the organization is a compact entered into by individuals for the 
purpose of fostering their individual welfares. The organization has no identity 
apart from its members.... (Chaffee 1984, 218) 
What Chaffee terms the "adaptive" model is based on Keeley's organismic analogy; 
Chaffee's "interpretive" model is based on Keeley's social contract analogy. Chaffee 
argues that much of the early work in strategic planning and strategic management was 
rooted firmly in the adaptive model: the organization, to pursue its collective ends, 
makes rational choices among potential courses of action and coordinates the activity of 
its members to implement the chosen strategy. Over time, however, the assumption of 
organizational rationality seemed wholly or partially unfounded. The interpretive model 
— which "depicts strategy as disjointed, unintegrated, and multi-faceted" (220) — 
began to gain ground. The idea of objective reality was joined — although not replaced 
— by the idea that "reality is socially constructed" (220). In this view, "symbols and 
communication are the tools with which organizational participants create, reiterate, 
alter, circumscribe, and interpret their interactions and their sense of satisfaction" (220). 
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Which view best explains organizational behavior? To provide insight into this 
question Chaffee studied two sets of colleges that experienced severe financial distress 
in the 1970s. All the institutions were similar, with the exception that one set operated 
according to the adaptive model, while the other borrowed from both the adaptive and 
the interpretive models. Thus, the first set focused almost exclusively on creation of 
targeted degree programs and other strategies which took advantage of opportunities in 
the environment. The other set was selective in responding to opportunities and 
invested heavily in conceptual and communication systems that guided and interpreted 
any organizational change" (213). Thus, for example, while both sets of institutions 
created new degree programs, the "adaptive" colleges were driven almost entirely by 
market considerations. The other set of institutions pursued their new offerings in the 
context of institutional mission, shared values, and consultation within the campus 
community. 
Chaffee found that the predominantly adaptive institutions were far less resilient 
than those which pursued a mixed strategy. She concluded that 
turnaround management in private colleges is most effective when participants 
ink of the organization simultaneously as an organism and as a social contract 
based on this perception, strategic management will combine aspects of the 
adaptive and interpretive models of strategic management, attending both to the 
organization s exchanges with its market and to the participants' sense of 
meaning and satisfaction that is derived from their association with the 
a^Hnn1ZfW^ ^ fPProacl]es to strategy suggest conflicting courses of 
action, the clarity of results regarding interpretive strategy implies that the 
interpretive strategy should take precedence. (Chaffee 1984, 228-229) 
This finding suggests that how institutions arrive at their actions is as important as how 
they act. It reinforces the notion of cultural "fit" discussed earlier, and it puts the 
discussion of mission and shared values at the center of the planning debate. It also 
serves to demonstrate that colleges and universities are unusual kinds of organizations. 
Unlike most business organizations, colleges and universities cannot easily change their 
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nature. Businesses can drop product lines, acquire new units, and generally 
metamorphose themselves if needed. The R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, for 
example, became RJR Nabisco, a diversified holding company with a major presence in 
food and other industries via strategic acquisition. Universities, however, exist to do — 
and only to do — teaching, research and service. Efforts to branch out into 
pharmaceutical development, health care, entertainment and other areas have sometimes 
been successful, but have often induced considerable stress within the organization. 
Moreover, RJR Nabisco could choose to sell off its tobacco operations and still remain a 
successful company; it is difficult to imagine a university divesting its teaching function. 
So, in leading a college or university through a change process, Chaffee (1984) 
argues that attention to mission, tradition, and other ideas that bind the members of the 
organization together is as important as filling a market niche. Opportunity must be 
guided by a sense of what is right. For the institutional leader, this view yields some 
practical advice: 
As president, an individual needs to base decisions and actions at least as 
heavily on symbolic values as on substantive ones. Many administrators have 
observed that just one small issue or one minor managerial slipup can cause 
disproportionately large problems. Amplification of the problem is often due to 
its symbolic content. A president learns this lesson when he or she makes a 
decision believing that it represents the will of the faculty but forgetting to wait 
for the final report of the faculty ad hoc committee on the subject. .. .By 
consciously dealing with both the substantive and symbolic content of an issue, 
administrators may be able to achieve synergies and reduce dissonance within 
the organization. The result should be increased understanding among all 
participants about the goals and priorities of the organization and about the 
level of the leaders' determination to achieve stated goals and priorities 
(Chaffee 1984, 231-232) 
Chaffee is not alone in stressing the importance of the "management of meaning." 
Effective communication and clarity of purpose are seen as hallmarks of leadership by 
several observers. Cope (1987) describes "ideas and communication" as the 
'conceptual glues joining strategic formulation ... to implementation" (6). Jones (1990) 
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argues that "primary stakeholders need to have a clear idea of what is going on and 
why" (54), and Kashner (1990) finds that "there is no substitute for ... clear and 
effective communication of plans, goals, and the reasons for which these plans and goals 
are made" (28). 
But the demands of interpretive leadership go beyond clarity. "Successful 
turnaround in universities involves the maintenance of morale, motivation and 
commitment and the reduction of conflict. In general terms, it requires a culture in which 
there is a sense of shared mission" (Hardy 1988, 15). Jones (1990) agrees, and asserts 
that "where planning has been successful, there is almost always a president with a 
vision. Effective leadership means that the president, at every opportunity and in every 
forum, articulates the vision in such a way that people not only understand it but also 
identify with it" (54). 
It is not enough for the president simply to state a "vision." The interpretive 
model requires the leader to engage the campus, to appeal to existing values and to 
suggest fresh interpretations of them, to weave stories that explain and myths that 
inspire. The president must find ways to introduce doubt when the institution has 
become too complacent (Cameron 1984) and to build confidence when events seem 
overwhelming. And he or she must do this, Chaffee (1984) suggests, while maintaining a 
keen business sense and a willingness to move boldly as opportunities in the 
environment appear. 
An interesting subset of the "management of meaning" deserves brief mention. 
Many observers cite the importance of data and information — whether from 
institutional sources or as the result of environmental scanning — as leadership tools. 
Chan (1986), Lelong and Shirley (1984), Miller and Miller (1988), and Prinvale (1989) all 
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see the development and maintenance of sound information sources as a key aspect of 
leading the planning process. While this function contributes to good communication 
and clarity, it also signals that — however "political" the process may seem — the facts 
need to matter in any planning decision. Powers and Powers (1984) argue that 
"Proactive leaders are thoughtful.... They ponder the information received to 
understand its implications and call upon institutional researchers to analyze data and 
present it in forms that are illuminating and useful" (52). Flack (1994) contends that the 
management of information is critical because of the tension self-examination causes on 
a campus: "the internal analysis is usually the most anxiety-producing, contentious, 
and feeblest aspect of a strategic assessment" (26). 
Of course, information can be misused, or managed to manipulate. Hardy et al. 
(1983) note that information tends to be used differently depending on the decision¬ 
making environment: 
In the collegial situation, in which people are assumed to be working in a 
cooperative manner, analysis will be used mainly to develop understanding, to 
achieve consensus, to aid communication, and to defend legitimate interests of 
the entire group.... In the political situation, where self-interest dominates, 
analyses of all kinds are likely to proliferate, directed at persuading the 
uncommitted. Competition for resources under tight constraints also means that 
analyses are more likely to be counter-analyzed by affected groups. (Hardv et 
al. 1983, 422) 7 
Ultimately, however, it must be recognized that members of an academic 
community place a high value on facts and their thoughtful interpretation. The campus 
community is very sensitive to the uses of evidence, and the leader must therefore take 
great care to balance his or her responsibilities as the steward of institutional data with 
the need to be an advocate. Analysis can serve to enlighten, but "it also serves as a 
means of communication and attention focussing, as a means of legitimizing decisions, 
as a means of consensus-building, and perhaps most importantly as a means of 
persuasion" (Hardy et al. 1983, 423). 
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In addition to the distinction between adaptive and interpretive organizations, 
there are other theories of organizational behavior in higher education that focus on 
behavioral patterns, or models. Cope (1985) summarizes five models of organizational 
behavior commonly identified in colleges and universities: the collegial model 
(characterized by shared values, a commitment to the institution, cooperation, and little 
reliance on hierarchy); the bureaucratic model (manifesting greater attention to formal 
organizational structure, differentiated role, and standardized procedures); the political 
model (incorporating the view that conflict of goals and values is natural, and that 
decisions result from negotiated compromise); the "organized anarchy" model (after 
Cohen and March 1986; characterized by ambiguous roles, rewards and connections and 
little or no capacity for rational management); and the rational model (representing the 
view that strategic choices are logically determined and analytically driven). 
In Cope's view, all of these models are at work in higher education, and each 
must be seen as partially explanatory: "Until one or more of these models are proven 
through research to provide the best explanation of behavior in academic organizations, 
[then] interventions as significant as a strategic planning process need to draw upon all 
of them" (Cope 1985, 19). Others, however, put greater emphasis on certain of these 
models over others. Hardy et al. (1983), while acknowledging the existence of the 
rational and organized anarchy ("garbage can") models, felt that they should be seen as 
elements of the collegial and political models, not as separate constructs. 
For Hardy et al. (1983), the relevance of the collegial model lies in its recognition 
that, although different interests exist within the institution, all interests can share 
common goals for the organization. Within the framework of these shared goals the 
campus utilizes a system of governance which decentralizes decision making and 
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provides opportunities for individual academics to intervene in the process" (418). The 
opportunity for broad participation is therefore assumed, as is a strong emphasis on 
consensus as a basis for decision making. The political model becomes important when 
consensus is not possible, because different interests cannot find common ground. The 
political model thus tends to dominate when the organization is under greatest stress 
(which tends to polarize interests). The conflict of interests is resolved through various 
political processes (compromise, negotiation, etc.). Both models, however, remain 
relevant: 
.. .Neither common interest nor self-interest will dominate decision processes all 
the time, some combination is to be expected. There may be commitment to 
certain common goals, but conflict over how they should be achieved; 
alternatively, consensus can sometimes exist among individuals who wish to 
pursue different goals — Democrats do, after all, vote with Republicans on many 
issues.... In other words, except in the most polarized situations, politics and 
some form of collegiality almost inevitably co-exist. (Hardy et al. 1983, 419) 
For Moore and Langknecht (1986) the heightened levels of conflict which 
accompany the growing stress under which most colleges and universities operate argue 
for recognition of the political model as dominant. They argue that while planners have 
relied on collegial and bureaucratic models to explain behavior in academic 
organizations, both fall short in practice: institutions do not behave according to either. 
In particular, "both fail to deal sufficiently with the dynamics of conflict and power, 
tend to minimize the importance of external forces, and offer incomplete explanations of 
leader behavior" (2). They argue (after Baldridge et al. 1970) that the better model is 
political. In this view, inactivity and apathy prevail; participation tends to be fluid, 
with decisions therefore dominated by political elites; conflict is ever-present; authority 
is limited; and external interest groups exert important influence. 
These views of organizational behavior differ in emphasis, but agree in several 
important respects: 1) colleges and universities are complex, open systems which may 
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be found to operate according to multiple models of behavior; 2) one or more models 
may dominate at any given time, based on the institution's circumstances; and 3) the 
political model is always present and may dominate when the organization in under 
stress. These findings have important implications for institutional leadership. They 
strongly suggest that presidents or other change agents must be aware of different 
organizational models and the interventions appropriate to each; that they must be 
sensitive in assessing behavioral shifts among models, and flexible in adapting their 
interventions accordingly; they should evaluate changes in the institution's circumstances 
with an eye toward anticipating shifts in the behavioral pattern; and that they must be 
particularly skillful at leading within the context of the political model. 
The importance of the political model is reinforced in the findings of many other 
observers. The "political" side of institutional leadership is stressed again and again, 
although not always in a formal theoretical context. The literature is replete with 
descriptions of the political skills necessary to promote successful planning, grouped 
roughly into three categories: skill in managing groups and group interests; skill in 
managing forces external to the institution; and flexibility and discretion. 
The political model emphasizes conflict. Every campus comprises many 
communities of interest, and these interests are not always compatible. Strategic 
planning involves making choices, often under fiscal constraint. Since choices are 
inherently divisive (because they imply change that creates "winners" and "losers"), and 
because fiscal constraint tends to create more losers than winners, one should expect 
that most planning efforts will mobilize groups to act in defense of the status quo and in 
opposition to directions emerging from planning. The effectiveness with which groups 
and group interests are managed will powerfully influence the success of the planning 
process. 
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Leadership in the political context therefore involves first understanding how 
interests are arrayed on the campus, and how prospective changes will affect different 
groups. Kashner (1990) states this function in terms of the campus "culture," useful in 
this sense as a term for the network of interests and expectations at work at any 
moment: 
It is always important to be informed about which campus constituencies, which 
elements of the role and status hierarchy, and which groups of individuals most 
strongly support which elements of the campus culture. Such information is 
invaluable in considering what the politics — and the political maneuvering room 
— of a specified alteration of the campus culture might be. (Kashner 1990, 27- 
Hurst (1994) concurs, noting that "university leaders need to think about what specific 
groups hold a stake in the future of the institution, how satisfied these stakeholder 
groups are with current operations and services provided, and what they perceive to be 
the most important priorities or issues for the near future" (3). A similar point is made 
by Lelong and Shirley (1984), although in their case the emphasis is on "values" rather 
than interests. For the purposes of this discussion there is probably little practical 
difference. 
Having surveyed the political landscape, the leader must devise strategies that 
develop support for and neutralize opposition to change. Flack (1994) suggests the 
scope of the task: 
Every college and university plan must... climb the slippery slope of politics. 
erreting out and coping with the faculty senate, the academic departments the 
deans and administrative heads, the campus unions, major student groups the 
key trustees, leading alumni, the state's politicians, community leaders, and 
those media people who do education reporting constitute [a] vital element in 
successful strategic planning. Unless the major potential forces of opposition 
and damage are neutralized or won over, even the finest strategic plan can 
bounder or go nowhere. (Flack 1994, 29) 
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While it is not the purpose of the current study to explore the techniques of political 
management in detail, some suggestions appearing in the literature include the formation 
(or, where necessary, the splintering) of coalitions (Tan 1990) and the use of 
"persuasion, influence, and power" (Donnithorne 1991, 15) to resolve differences of 
opinion and values. Several observers emphasize the importance of negotiation as a 
means of reconciling differences within the campus community. Moore and Langknecht 
(1986) argue that the president must be "skilled in techniques of mediation and 
negotiation" (3), and Schmidtlein (1990b) asserts that "managing the process of 
negotiation is clearly a key element of leadership in the planning process" (15). 
The management of external interests has several dimensions. Chait (1990) 
sugSests that trustees, "situated at the boundaries of the campus and the larger society" 
(29), be brought into the planning process to assist with environmental scanning. Hardy 
(1988) argues that 
success hinges on the ability to manage external interest groups, particularly 
when external agencies are imposing funding cuts. Political turnaround involves 
attempts to pressure or persuade agencies to increase budgets, or at least to 
reduce the amount of the cutback. ... This ... creates slack, which buys time to 
implement incremental turnaround and reduces the magnitude of cutbacks to 
protect morale. (Hardy 1988, 18) 
This is undoubtedly true. On the other hand. Cope (1987) argues that an "outside 
force must be present to stimulate change. The threat of external intervention on the 
part of a governor or a board, for example, can have a stimulating effect (Foster 1990; 
Roach 1988). The leader must strike a difficult balance: keeping the wolf outside the 
door, but ensuring that the sound of snarling is nonetheless heard deep within the 
institution. 
Flexibility involves in part the simple ability to choose one's battles. Richardson 
and Gardner (1985) wisely observe that 
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the probability of achieving a particular substantive change is inversely related to 
the total number of changes planned or attempted. The single-minded pursuit of 
a limited number of priorities seems better calculated to result in the achievement 
of change than more comprehensive priorities that, because of the sheer 
magnitude of required effort, become an implicit justification for business-as- 
usual. (Richardson and Gardner 1985, 12) 
It is also important to communicate flexibility, to signal that one is willing to revise plans 
and try new approaches when appropriate. Farmer (1990) argues that "resistance will 
be ... reduced if change agents are able to empathize with those opposing change and 
thus to recognize valid objections and to relieve anxieties" (13). A novel approach 
suggested by Miller and Miller (1988) borrows from Soviet economic planning: 
Strategic plans can be flawed if they do not have a built-in and identified 
fixer. This is the English translation for a Russian individual that is prominent 
in the extensively planned Soviet system — the "tolkash." A procurement 
specialist, this individual is openly known but officially a nonperson. He or she 
adds fluidity, creativity, and success to an often left-footed planning system. 
A "fixer" in our collegiate planning process may be a senior faculty member, 
may be someone in the vice president for academic administration office, or 
elsewhere, who has specific and known roles which are designed to add ongoing 
fluidity, creativity, procedural adjustments, and evaluations to campus planning 
systems. (Miller and Miller 1988, 12) 
Whatever the method employed, maintaining a certain amount of flexibility in the 
planning process is likely to make the task of managing group conflict and its attendant 
anxieties much easier. 
All of the considerations flowing from this review of different models of 
organizational behavior are important generally to the problem of managing institutions 
of higher education. One would look for these qualities and skills in a college or 
university president regardless of the specific goals of the institution. At some basic 
level, therefore, they are relevant to a discussion of strategic planning because strategic 
planning involves, among other things, effective management of the institution. 
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But strategic planning is particularly concerned with institutional change. The 
premise of strategic thinking is that, as the institution's environment changes, the 
institution itself must adapt so as to maintain the best possible fit between external 
demands and internal capacity. An institution can be well managed — that is, the 
leadership team can be skillful at recognizing what works in a given situation — but 
unable to change that situation. On the other hand, of course, poorly managed 
institutions are unlikely to undertake significant constructive adaptation, except by 
extraordinary good fortune. This notion in its simplest form is reflected in an aphorism 
of modern management: "managers are people who do things right and leaders are 
people who do the right things" (Bennis and Nanus 1985, 21). Doing the right thing in a 
changing environment means promoting change — useful change — within the institution. 
This requires more than knowing how organizations operate; it requires knowing how 
they change. 
The literature offers several insights into the process of change in colleges and 
universities. Cameron (1984) and Cameron and Whetten (1983) examine theories of 
organizational adaptation and their application to higher education, with particular 
emphasis on life cycle theories. Cameron (1984) suggests that organizational 
adaptation theories can be arrayed on a continuum in terms of the extent to which 
managerial influence is assumed. 
"Population ecology" theories emphasize the importance of environmental 
factors, and assign little importance to managerial action. In this view, "the environment 
is viewed as such a powerful and pervasive force that it selects those organizational 
forms (or adaptations) that are to persist and other organizational forms die out" 
(Cameron 1984, 125). "Most organizations adapt, therefore, not because of intelligent 
or creative managerial action but by the random or evolutionary development of 
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characteristics that are compatible with the environment. Managerial discretion and 
influence is neither present nor relevant" (126). 
"Life cycle" approaches assume that organizations progress through sequential 
stages of development. This progress is natural; that is, it does not require managerial 
intervention. Managerial action can, however, play a role: "managers can speed up, 
slow down, or even abort this sequential development by their actions. That is, they can 
cause an organization to stay in an early stage for a long time, to move through the 
sequence very rapidly, or to go out of business before ever reaching subsequent stages" 
(Cameron 1984, 127). The sequential progression is most typical in the early history of 
organizations. Once the final stage is reached, "organizations may recycle through the 
sequence again as a result of unusual environmental events, leadership turnover, 
organizational membership changes, and so on. Managerial action can help determine 
which stage is returned to...." (127). 
Strategic choice models recognize the importance of environmental forces, but 
also argue that "a variety of strategies are available to managers that can modify the 
environment and determine the success or failure of adaptation" (Cameron 1984, 127). 
Organizations may muddle through" with incremental changes, or adaptation can 
occur in a revolutionary way that allows organizations to overcome inertia. 
"Symbolic action" models emphasize symbols, interpretations, and stories as the 
basis upon which organizations are "glued together" (Cameron 1984,130). This view 
assumes the "social construction of reality" in which "shared meanings are much more 
important than are events themselves" (130). 
The role of the manager ... is to create, manipulate, or perpetuate these meanings 
so that they are accepted in the organization and thereby influence 
organizational behavior.... Organizational adaptation comes about through the 
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use of a variety of strategies involving language, ritual, and symbolic behavior. 
(Cameron 1984, 130). 
These theories can be seen to have significant implications for institutional 
leadership. Leadership is least significant in population ecology models, which assume 
that ineffective (i.e., maladaptive) organizations will simply disappear. Life cycle and 
strategic choice models recognize a balance between environmental and managerial 
influences, but each incorporates a different managerial emphasis. Life cycle models 
assign to the manager the role of railroad yard switch manager, shunting the 
organizational train among tracks with predetermined destinations. Strategic choice 
models open up a broader range of managerial options. Leadership is most significant 
in symbolic action models, since the leader plays a key role in shaping the organization's 
view of reality. 
While at least the three latter models are relevant to a discussion of institutional 
leadership, Cameron and Whetten (1983) argue that life cycle models are especially 
useful in explaining organizational change in time of stress. They observe that an 
institution's "resiliency" is largely a function of the effectiveness with which transitions 
throughout the organizational life cycle are handled. "As institutions develop over time, 
certain crises arise that require transitions or changes to occur, and the effective 
management of those transitions is critical to institutional survival" (274). After 
reviewing ten models of organizational change, Cameron and Whetten found four life 
cycle stages widely supported in the literature: "an entrepreneurial stage (early 
innovation, niche formation, creativity), a collective stage (high cohesion, commitment), a 
formalization and control stage (stability and institutionalization), and a structure 
elaboration and adaptation stage (domain expansion and decentralization)" (282-283). At 
any stage, the organization will experience problems that can be resolved by moving to 
the next stage of development: 
142 
For example, the problem created by the entrepreneurial stage is a lack of 
coordination and cohesion. .. .The main problem created by the collectivity stage 
is a need for efficiency, coordination, and control of the production process. 
Stage 3, the formalization and control stage, presents problems of rigidity, lack 
of participation, and non-adaptability. The final stage, structure elaboration 
and adaptation, presents problems from all three of the previous stages. 
Organizations are able to maintain effectiveness in spite of these problems by 
progressing to the next stage of the life cycle. (Cameron and Whetten 1983, 283) 
The life cycle is not always sequential or terminal, however. Especially in their later 
stages of development, institutions may need to respond to a major change in 
circumstances by recycling through an earlier stage: "As the result of a merger, a 
substantial decrease in resources, a major loss of personnel, and so on, a mature 
organization may appropriately revert to an earlier stage of development. The strategies 
implemented dictate which previous stage will be returned to" (293). Thus, for example, 
an institution facing a massive budget shortfall may cycle back to stage three 
(formalization and control) to allow the administration to take emergency measures. 
The emphasis on control, however, creates problems that can only be resolved by moving 
to the next stage of development. 
Each developmental stage demands a different sort of managerial strength. In 
stage one, for example, entrepreneurial and creative success rely on far different values 
and behaviors than would be appropriate in stage three, when rational goals and 
internal processes are most highly valued. The implications for leadership are clear: 
This shift in criteria of effectiveness from one stage to another also points out the 
need to match the characteristics of top institutional administrators with the 
unique challenges facing a college or university at a particular point in its 
development history. That is, some administrators may be able to manage 
effectively in one stage of life cycle development, but not in another. (Cameron 
and Whetten 1983, 295) 
In stage one, for example, where innovation is especially important, entrepreneurial 
leaders are most effective. The entrepreneurial leader, however, would be "less effective 
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when criteria of success focus on stability, control, and efficiency" (295), as is the case 
in stage three. 
Cameron and Whetton (1983) therefore conclude that the presence of leadership 
attuned to organizational needs at different stages of development can be a critical 
factor in determining an institution's success in accomplishing adaptive change. 
Moreover, it can be an important factor in promoting institutional stability and 
continuity of leadership: 
It is important for administrators in colleges and universities to help prepare 
both themselves and their institutions for upcoming transitions. Knowing that 
different problems are encountered in each life cycle stage should help 
administrators prepare for the transitions that will almost inevitably follow. 
Administrators who refuse to acknowledge the need for change, and who 
tenaciously cling to anachronistic policies and programs applicable to earlier 
stages, will generally be replaced once the organization enters a new life cycle 
phase. The prospect of being able to avert a necessity of frequent leadership 
succession represents one of the strongest motivations for developing a greater 
understanding of the life cycles model of organizations. (Cameron and Whetten 
1983, 295-296) 
A different but compatible view of organizational change is suggested by 
Gonsalves (1991), who reports on her experience working with several colleges engaged 
in planning. She argues that the selection of individuals to be involved in the formative 
stages of planning is a key variable related to success. In her view, institutions 
experienced their greatest success when they tapped "the person most widely 
recognized as the hardest-working, most creative, and influential in each department or 
area..., as well as a few of the most forward-looking administrators" rather than the 
heads of departments, line officers, and other traditional choices (25). 
Gonsalves draws on marketing research to suggest that the diffusion of new 
ideas relies on several groups, most notably "early adopters," innovators who are at the 
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same time somewhat judicious. Early adopters are not the first to experiment with a 
new idea, but they willing to try an idea that shows promise: 
...While early adopters are interested in new ideas, products, or ways of doing 
things, they tend to explore and discuss new products or ideas fairly thoroughly. 
Early adopters accept new practices only after they weigh whether the new 
practices will hurt them socially, economically, and professionally and whether 
the new practices will benefit their organization. Early adopters are usually seen 
by others as effective persons and workers, as opinion leaders, and as worthy of 
emulation. (Gonsalves 1991, 26) 
Persons with this profile would seem to be a natural choice for inclusion on planning 
groups, since they would tend to be open to new ideas but also judicious in evaluating 
them. Gonsalves, in fact, suggests that college presidents probably have individuals of 
this sort in mind when they set about to populate a planning process. At the same time, 
however, they are under "enormous pressure to put senior people and current deans, 
vice presidents, and elected faculty officers on their strategic planning groups" (28-29). 
The suggestion is, however, that succumbing to the pressure to make planning groups 
"representative" tends to ensure that the status quo — with all its intricate power and 
turf relationships — is deeply embedded in the planning process. 
This view, like the organizational behavior and organizational change theories 
discussed above, argues for a situational or contingent approach to the leadership 
question. The leader's choice of strategy or selection of participants should be guided by 
the situation in which the organization finds itself, not by relationships formed under 
some earlier — and different — set of circumstances. These attitudes are therefore 
perfectly consistent with and supportive of the strategic approach in that they require, 
first, a clearheaded assessment of the institution's situation, and second, action aimed 
toward putting the institution into a stronger position vis-a-vis its objective 
circumstances. "Strategic" leadership of this sort may not guarantee the success of a 
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strategic planning process, but it seems much more likely to do so than would leadership 
approaches which are indifferent to the organization's circumstances. 
The Leadership Trap 
The preceding discussion has focused on what leadership in the strategic 
planning context is. As has been seen, even a highly summarized treatment yields a long 
and varied list of characteristics, qualities, skills and techniques often associated with 
effective leadership of the strategic process. The discussion would not be complete, 
however, with some mention of what leadership is not, or, at least, should not be. The 
literature offers several warnings that the would-be leader would be wise to heed. They 
are treated here under the general topic of the leadership "trap." 
This metaphor is not intended to imply the presence of some malevolent force 
lying in wait for the campus president. It does, however, suggest that such forces can 
emerge quite easily under the pressure and anxiety of a change process. It may also be 
that the fault lies in ourselves: many leaders discover, often too late, that they are 
prisoners of their own device. This discussion is intended to highlight the need to be 
aware of unforeseen risks, and to suggest two broad themes strongly related to potential 
risk. 
The first might be called the "rational" trap (Fullan 1996, 421). Partly as a 
consequence of the academic community's high regard for evidence and causation, partly 
out of hubris, we often tend to approach strategic planning as if it were a set of 
calculations rather than a web of human interactions. It is wise to remember that, 
although strategic planning has its roots in industrial models with a substantial rational 
emphasis, it was born out of frustration with the highly rationalistic models that had 
preceded it (PPBS, for example). As we saw earlier, especially in the discussions of 
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cultural fit and leadership, colleges and universities often fail to behave "rationally." 
Change does not occur in a neat stimulus-response pattern. The leader who approaches 
planning with the assumption of rationality will soon be disappointed. 
This point is made eloquently by Fullan (1996). Although his remarks refer 
specifically to the process of reform in elementary and secondary education, they seem 
completely relevant to the situation as it exists in higher education, as well. 
There is an overwhelming amount of evidence that educational change is 
inherently, endemically, and ineluctably nonlinear. This means that the most 
systematically sophisticated plan imaginable will unfold in a nonlinear, broken- 
front, back-and-forth manner. It will be fragmented. .. .No amount of sheer 
brilliance, authority, or power could possibly resolve the problem of nonlinearity 
because it is organically part and parcel of the way complex societies must 
evolve. The rational trap, then, is to take as one's central purpose the strategy of 
making the system cohere objectively. (Fullan 1996, 421) 
There are many spikes at the bottom of this pit. The assumption of rationality may 
simply result in ineffective action; that is, a planning approach built on the assumption 
of rationality may fail to yield fruit. As was discussed in Chapter One, however, the 
opportunity cost of ineffectiveness — in terms of anxiety, frustration, and erosion of 
confidence in the whole concept of planning — can be very high. Moreover, an approach 
that assumes rational or linear change processes may take an institution in directions 
that are counterproductive. The campus may find itself, as a result of its planning, 
materially worse off than if it had done nothing. 
Johnson (1988) characterizes this trap as the choice between "bureaucratic" 
planning and "entrepreneurial" planning: 
Bureaucratic planners ... depend on an assumed continuity and tend to plan in 
linear projections, always constrained by rationality. .. .Entrepreneurial planners, 
in contrast, assume discontinuity and anticipate change, although they make no 
pretense of predicting it. .. .Against change, the potentially destructive element, 
the bureaucrat attempts to build a higher sea wall; the entrepreneur looks for a 
better surfboard. (Johnson 1988, 67) 
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A point underlying the observations of both Fullan and Johnson is that planning is at 
least as much art as science. As Chaffee (1984) put it, effective planning will blend 
interpretive and adaptive perspectives and, when these perspectives conflict, fall back 
on the interpretive as more powerful and more likely to energize the problem-solving 
capacity of the campus itself. 
The second peril might be termed the "hero" trap. As Cope (1987) observes, 
"most accounts put leaders in the hero mode, attributing them with ideas and visionary 
genius and indicating they have a determining effect on the behavior of others" (6-7). 
Few college presidents, of course, would agree that they have such a "determining 
effect." As the earlier discussion of the "leader as catalyst" argued, change agents in 
colleges and universities are almost completely dependent upon the free choice of faculty 
and others to give life to the planning process. This is why, as Heifitz (1994) argues, the 
leader must be concerned with mobilizing the organization to identify and confront its 
problems, not to assume responsibility for all institutional issues in a heroic gesture. 
Nonetheless, it can be tempting for an institution to place the whole of its burden 
on the back of the president, and in that way to seek release from responsibility. 
Schmidtlein (1990) describes a case where near-bankruptcy caused a campus to defer to 
a president's "rescue plan." Others suggest that, especially in hard times, too much 
faith may be invested in the leader: 
Many faculty members acknowledge their own feeling of powerlessness and look 
upward in the organizational chart for institutional salvation. They take 
seriously the possibility of calling upon an all-knowing and all-powerful "great 
man" in the presidency who will "make the right decisions" and lead the 
university out of its troubles. More often than not, the goal they would have the 
president pursue is to persuade donors or legislators to new levels of financial 
commitment that would permit them to carry on as before and so remove by 
sheer charisma the baffling constraints exposed by retrenchment. Failing that 
the "strong" departments would ask the "great man" to make the hard decisions 
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(to eliminate the "weaker" programs) and the "weak" departments would have 
him maintain the integrity of the university by resisting the pressures of passing 
scholastic fads. The limited record of success has not perceptibly lessened the 
attractiveness of "great man" solutions to the university's problems (Alpert 
1985, 264). r 
The lure of heroism is termed a "trap" for two reasons. The first, and perhaps 
more obvious, is that vanity often makes it difficult for individuals to resist the notion 
that they are influential, even definitive, figures in the lives of their organizations. When 
the organization confers authority on an individual it tends to reinforce these impulses. 
The more serious and less obvious hinge of the trap, however, has to do with the 
complicity the organization often demonstrates in allowing the leader to take on the 
heroic mantle. As Heifitz (1994) argues, it is often easier for the group to assign 
responsibility for its problems to the leader than to undertake the hard work of problem 
solving. No individual, of course, can manage all the problems of an organization. 
Heifitz describes the result of such a transference: 
Leaders are always failing somebody. With or without authority, someone 
exercising leadership will be shouldering the pains and aspirations of a 
community and frustrating at least some people within it. Adaptive work often 
demands loss. 
...Leaders and authority figures get attacked, dismissed, silenced, and 
sometimes assassinated because they come to represent loss, real or perceived to 
those members of the community who feel that they have gotten, or might get the 
bad end of a bargain. Even if people hope for a positive-sum outcome, fear ' 
provokes defense, particularly if the stakes are high. At these times, taking 
authority itself is risky, whether or not one exercises leadership with it. One 
risks job, reputation, and perhaps life. (Heifitz 1994, 235-236) 
It may be impossible to overcome the tendency of a group to seek to transfer its 
problems to an authority figure. To some extent, the college or university president 
managing a process of strategic change must simply be prepared to operate with this as 
one of many pressures. There are two ways, however, in which it may be possible to 
increase one's chances of escaping the "hero" trap. First, one can use the planning 
process to push responsibility, as much as possible, back into the campus community. 
The earlier discussion of effective participation is important here. To the extent that 
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faculty members and others within the institution are personally engaged in the 
identification of problems and the development of solutions, it becomes far more likely 
that they will see themselves as participants in the change process. Where participation 
is highly effective, one could even imagine the participants resisting the idea that the 
president should be "calling the shots." Conversely, a highly centralized planning 
process with little or no effective faculty participation serves as an invitation for the 
campus to heap its fears and frustrations on the president until he or she collapses 
under the weight. 
Second, it is important for the leader to modulate expectations. Pronouncements 
of impending doom or predictions of cataclysmic change may get a planning process off 
to a bad start: such statements not only raise anxieties, they can also expand 
expectations of the leader to heroic proportions. While, as noted in the earlier 
discussion, establishing a consensus for change must be a priority of the planning 
process, the task should be approached in a measured way. Hardy (1988) emphasizes 
the importance of proportionality: 
The recent problems faced by higher education have given rise to claims of crisis 
from the university community. Most universities, however, do not appear to be 
in a state of crisis nor is their niche in danger of imminent collapse when 
compared with the crises experienced — and survived — in business. This is not 
to ignore that changes are occurring or that long-term adaptation is needed, but 
to point out that overdramatization may be counterproductive since it implicitly 
justifies the need for tough action associated with the business world. Such 
advice may be of little help to administrators because of its narrow focus: on 
economics at the expense of people, external factors at the expense of internal, 
and analytic skills at the expense of political. (Hardy 1988, 20-21) 
She therefore argues that it may be wiser to pursue incremental change than revolution: 
"Changes in university strategy do occur, constantly and gradually.... While strategic 
revolution may be rare in universities, we believe gradual, incremental change is 
endemic" (Hardy et al. 1983, 430). Emphasizing the opportunities for manageable, 
constructive change in departments and programs puts the work of planning into the 
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hands of the members of the community, and tempers the tendency to push 
responsibility for problems up the line of authority. It is when change is dispersed that 
it becomes possible: Universities are, paradoxically, extremely stable at the broadest 
level and in a state of perpetual change at the narrowest. One may in fact explain the 
other. Revolutions are perhaps only necessary in organizations that cannot adapt 
sufficiently at the narrowest level" (Hardy et al., 431). The leader who is wise enough to 
act on this basis may hope to escape the trap. 
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CHAPTER 3 
A CASE STUDY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
AT AMHERST, 1971-92 
Research Design 
The general theory outlined in this study — that the presence or absence of 
certain conditions may affect the success of an institution's strategic planning efforts 
— was originally formed through an inductive process that involved examination of 
numerous case studies and first-person accounts represented in the literature of planning 
in higher education. The literature also includes numerous explorations of theory related 
to planned change in higher education, often linked explicitly to case studies. All of this 
evidence seems to lend face validity to the proposition that certain conditions should be 
in place prior to the establishment of a strategic planning process. 
Determining the general usefulness of this proposition, however, requires 
additional research. Designing a research approach for this hypothesis presents 
numerous challenges. First, the specified conditions relate to phenomena that are very 
hard to perceive and measure: the extent of an organization's predisposition to change, 
for example, or the level of "commitment" demonstrated by the institution's senior 
leadership. One could imagine an elaborate research program designed to explore any 
one of the many such phenomena implicit in the five "conditions" and still fall far short 
of establishing clear causal relationships. The kind of "proof" called for involves many 
forms of subjective judgment, and the research design must accommodate that reality. 
Second, the topic is quite comprehensive. The conditions refer to an activity that 
might engage an entire institution operating multilaterally with its environment. The 
scope of relevant questions is also comprehensive, ranging from consideration of 
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prevailing community attitudes to socio-ethnographic studies (of such things as 
organizational “culture") to behavior (such as extent of participation). The research 
design must therefore reflect this comprehensive scope without becoming mired in detail. 
Third, the conditions tend to be beyond the control of the researcher. While an 
institution might choose one form of participation over another, for example, the choice 
will follow from local considerations that may not be explicitly stated or even known to 
the members of the organization. The researcher does not have the option of imposing a 
set of conditions on an institution; the institution is what it is. Moreover, the five 
conditions interact in complex ways, both among themselves and with other 
characteristics of the institution. This suggests that it would be extraordinarily difficult 
to compare one institution with another in terms of the presence or absence of one or 
more of the conditions. 
Fourth, while the theory advanced here is predictive in nature (i.e., it suggests a 
causal relationship between the conditions and planning outcomes) it is very much a 
work-in-progress. As a working hypothesis it requires the kind of research approach 
that is as much exploratory as it is explanatory. The need is for additional grounding in 
reality, but not, at this time, for "proof." 
These factors considerably narrow the range of research approaches that might 
appropriately be employed. The exploratory nature of the inquiry and the absence of 
control over the behavior of potential research subjects argue strongly against 
experimental approaches. The emphasis on the whole organization suggests that survey 
research and archival analysis, while potentially useful, would be incomplete (Yin 1994). 
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Choice of the Case Study Method 
On balance, the most appropriate method to employ in exploring this hypothesis 
seems to be the case study. Having established a set of conditions, or "best practices," 
for strategic planning, it is appropriate to examine the actual experience of one or more 
institutions through that prism. Such an inquiry would both test the relevance of the 
variables and suggest additional opportunities for research. 
Another factor arguing for the case study approach is the comprehensive nature 
of the phenomena being studied. It is difficult to imagine so broad a set of inter-related 
variables being adequately treated through experimental design, or solely through survey 
or archival methods. The case study's "unique strength is its ability to deal with a full 
variety of evidence — documents, artifacts, interviews, and observations" (Yin 1994, 8). 
This comprehensive approach is important, given the nature of the hypothesis. 
Finally, the questions being pursued here are highly related to the organizational 
context in which actions are taken. In this case, therefore, there is no benefit to a 
research approach that seeks to divorce planning factors from broader institutional 
issues. In fact, quite the opposite is true: strategic planning, it is argued here, can only 
be considered as an activity engaging the institution within its whole environment. 
On balance, then, purely experimental methods seem inappropriate and survey 
or archival approaches seem too limited. This study therefore adopts the advice that 
"case studies are the preferred strategy when 'how' or 'why' questions are being posed, 
when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a 
contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context" (Yin 1994,1). 
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Having selected this general approach, it is then necessary to specify the design 
of the case study. As suggested above, it would be exploratory in nature, examining 
relationships among the five conditions and planning behavior. It would be concerned 
with causal relationships, so it would also have an explanatory element. 
Since the goal is to examine the five conditions within a real-life context, one 
must also choose which life or lives to study. Here there are two choices: 1) a multiple 
case study of several different institutions, creating the possibility of comparative 
analysis; or 2) a single case study in which one set of experiences is explored, probably 
in greater depth than would be possible in a multiple case study (Yin 1994). Both 
approaches seem valid. The multiple case study, however, presents a number of 
practical problems. First, the kinds of insights relevant to this inquiry are extremely 
difficult to gather. One would have to create an elaborate, multi-faceted research 
program at each institution. Such an approach goes beyond what is possible in the 
context of this study. Moreover, one would probably need to pick a point-in-time to 
observe at each institution. Strategic planning tends to be organic, iterative, and 
evolutionary. Today's "failed" process may represent the ashes from which tomorrow's 
success may rise. The practical difficulty of examining multiple institutions, in their 
context, over time, would likely lead to superficial or incomplete analysis of very limited 
value. 
Single case designs, however, are not always appropriate. Yin (1994) argues that 
the single case design is useful when it represents the critical case (i.e., when the question 
under study is captured definitively in the case); when the case is unique; or when the 
case is revelatory (that is, when the case offers an unusual opportunity to explore 
phenomena which are typically closed to examination). 
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It would be difficult to argue that any single college or university represents a 
"critical" case with respect to strategic planning. At this early point in the development 
of the hypothesis it is not at all clear how one would even define the "critical" case. It 
would also be difficult to argue that any given institution represents a unique case, since 
the point of the hypothesis is to identify generalizable conditions that might have 
relevance anywhere in American higher education. It is, however, appropriate to think 
of a single case study in this context as being revelatory. A review of the literature 
makes clear that insights into institutional planning are very difficult to obtain. 
Questions relating to predisposition to change, sufficiency of participation, quality of 
leadership, and so on are often not susceptible to systematic observation. A case study 
that shed light on these kinds of considerations might therefore reveal a great deal that 
more constrained studies of multiple institutions could not. 
This notion is reinforced when one considers the range of methods that may be 
employed in a case study. In particular, the possibility of utilizing participant- 
observation opens up a realm of insight that contributes to the revelatory possibilities of 
a single-case study. While one might, of course, employ participant-observation in a 
multiple-case study, in practice this would seem to call for an extraordinary 
commitment of time and attention. 
Design of the Case Study 
Given all these considerations, the following design was chosen for this study. 
To permit a comprehensive view of events and their evolution, a single institution is . 
studied over an extended period of time (approximately twenty years), drawing on 
multiple sources of evidence. In this case, the sources of evidence strongly influence the 
choice of institution. The author has been employed at the institution — the University 
of Massachusetts at Amherst — for most of the period under study, and his 
156 
professional responsibilities have been related to planning for much of that period. He 
has therefore been a participant in many of the campus's planning efforts. He has also 
been the archivist for planning-related materials dating back to the early 1970s. For 
both reasons the author has extraordinary access to information and insights regarding 
the institution's planning activities, access which underscores the revelatory potential of 
a single-case study. The author has also had access to informal conversations and the 
available public record, including press accounts, minutes of meetings, and the like. 
The participant-observer approach has drawbacks, of course, principally related 
to potential bias. The possibility of becoming an advocate for a point of view 
represented within the process is very real. Identification with the organization and its 
goals is quite common. Time constraints may also limit the participant-observer's 
effectiveness (Yin 1994). 
While the potential for bias cannot be eliminated, it is useful to examine the 
current case to see if bias is a sufficient concern to argue against the use of participant- 
observation. To be sure, in this case the author has frequently advocated positions 
relevant to planning as part of his professional responsibilities. Moreover, the author's 
long association with the institution being studied suggests a level of identification that 
cannot be denied. These may, however, not be fatal flaws. The current study was 
motivated by the author's curiosity as to why the institution under study had 
experienced such difficulty with its planning over the years. He looked abroad for 
answers and, having developed a theory through an inductive process drawing on the 
experience of others, is now returning to the "scene of the crime." It is important to note 
in this regard that much of the observation conducted by the author pre-dated the 
development of the hypothesis. A significant proportion of the factual base supporting 
the author's observations was assembled for the purpose of assembling briefing 
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documents and similar purposes. Thus, the observations, for the most part, cannot be 
said to have been biased in favor of the hypothesis since the hypothesis had not yet 
been formed at the time of much of the observation. 
With that in mind, the advantages of an explanatory case study that draws on a 
unique set of perspectives and evidence seems worthwhile. It is intended to represent 
the first, not the last, word on the subject, and subsequent research may be able to 
address any shortcomings of the approach employed here. 
Descriptions of Planning Processes 
For this case study, all planning processes undertaken by the University of 
Massachusetts at Amherst between 1971 and 1992 were examined. The beginning date 
was chosen for several reasons: it represented a point at which the institution's size 
began to plateau after decades of rapid growth; the end of growth marked the beginning 
of resource constraint, which changed the focus of planning from expansion to 
reallocation; and it roughly coincided with the advent of formal planning throughout 
higher education (see Chapter One). The end point was chosen because it permitted 
clarity with respect to outcome: planning has continued on the campus since 1992, but 
it has involved a series of overlapping efforts which, in some sense, continues as of this 
writing. It is therefore not possible to make clear judgments regarding the outcomes of 
planning efforts that began later than about 1992. 
Within this timeframe seventeen planning processes were identified. As shown 
in Figure 3.1, planning activities occurred at three different organizational levels: (1) 
campus-based efforts; (2) activities at the university system level in which the campus 
participated; and (3) processes initiated by a statewide board, also with campus 
participation. Some of the planning efforts were primarily conceptual, some 
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Figure 3.1. Planning Processes at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, 1971-92 
organizational, and some focused on the allocation of resources. Figure 3.1 provides a 
brief summary of the nature, duration, and outcome of each planning effort. 
In the analysis which follows, each of the seventeen processes will be described 
according to the following general framework: a description of the circumstances leading 
up to the planning process, a statement of the approach employed, a summary of the 
campus response to the effort, and a description of the outcome. Where possible, these 
descriptions are keyed to source materials (publications, memoranda, press accounts, 
minutes, etc.). Some contextual material is provided from the author's personal 
knowledge and perspective. 
Graduate Program Review ("Appley Report"), October, 1971 - September, 1973 
The Graduate Program Review was conducted at the request of University 
President Robert Wood and Amherst Chancellor Oswald Tippo as a means of taking 
stock of graduate programs following the campus's years of intensive growth (Appley 
report stirs debate 1973). The review concluded that further growth in the graduate 
program would not be possible, in part because of anticipated declines in federal 
support. Therefore, it called for an overall reduction in graduate enrollment of 1,000 
students. Each graduate program was evaluated, with recommendations made for 
program growth or reduction (Appley 1973). 
The review was conducted by the Graduate School, with an advisory group of 
ten "senior" faculty members (Appley 1973). In practice, the 558-page report was 
largely the work of Graduate Dean Mortimer Appley (Appley report stirs debate 1973; 
Appley 1973). 
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The report met with considerable controversy, in terms of both its recommen¬ 
dations for specific programs and its overall thrust. Some faculty feared a reduced 
emphasis on graduate education; some saw the report as a response to pressure to make 
room for graduate programs at the new Boston campus. The report was also criticized 
because it did not address the needs of undergraduate education (Appley report stirs 
debate 1973). 
Both the Chancellor (Bromery) and the Provost (Gluckstern) distanced them¬ 
selves from the report (Appley report stirs debate 1973). It was never formally adopted 
or acted upon. 
Five Year Academic Personnel Plan, 1974-79 ('Tenure Plan"), October, 1972 - October 
1974 
"Tenure Planning" arose in response to concern on the part of the Board of 
Trustees over the "increasing proportion of tenured and senior faculty within the 
University," a trend that "threatens the capacity of the University to ... adjust to future 
needs" (Board of Trustees 1972). The Board therefore required that all tenure 
recommendations be considered within the context of long-term plans for each 
department. In the first round of planning (spring 1973) the deans were asked to submit 
five year personnel plans with the assumption of a 10% increase in faculty over that 
period (Gluckstern 1972). A second round, in the fall of 1973, utilized differential 
growth assumptions for the schools and colleges ranging from 0% to 10% (Gluckstern 
1973). A "Progress Report," issued in February 1974, specified two scenarios for 
projections: 0% and 7.5% increases (Office of the Provost 1974a). It also noted that 
"the basic focus of the planning has been to identify those programs on campus which 
should have a high priority for development during the next few years" (Office of the 
Provost 1974a, 1). The final round assumed no growth in total faculty positions, and 
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resulted in the "Five Year Academic Personnel Plan, 1974-1979" in October 1974, which 
included general statements about expected growth or decline of faculty in each school 
and college (Office of the Provost 1974b). Plans were reviewed by an ad hoc committee 
composed of members of the Faculty Senate Personnel Policy Committee, the Provost, 
three associate provosts, two deans and three department heads (Office of the Provost 
1974a). 
The tenure planning process caused uneasiness in many quarters, especially 
among junior faculty who saw it as a way of introducing caps or quotas to tenure. This 
uneasiness played a role in the 1973 campaign to organize a faculty union (the 1973 ef¬ 
fort failed, but a second effort succeeded in 1976) (Densmore 1974). 
The Plan was adopted, and presumably served as a context for tenure review 
during the period covered. It was not repeated. 
Academic Program Review Task Force ("Bischoff Committee"), March, 1974 - 
November, 1976 
The Academic Program Review process was initiated by the Provost (Gluckstern) 
to provide a basis for "short range resource allocation decisions" (Gluckstern 1974,1) in 
the face of state budget cuts and hiring freezes. Gluckstern cited the need for "some 
mechanism ... to provide a middle ground between rapid administrative action on the 
basis of available documentation, and the delay associated with protracted evaluation 
of each program by deliberative groups like the Graduate Council or the Academic 
Matters Council" (Gluckstern 1974, 1). It was first proposed that a detailed 
questionnaire be distributed to each department to develop evaluative information on 
which program evaluations might be based (Academic Program Review Task Force 
1975). The questionnaire became the subject of some discussion, and was finally 
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distributed by the acting Provost (Alfange) only as an example of the kinds of informa¬ 
tion sought; departments were free to submit whatever information they thought 
appropriate (Alfange 1976). 
Following receipt of departmental information each program was evaluated and 
placed into one of the following categories: 
• that it should "clearly" receive additional resources; 
• that it should receive additional resources as available; 
• that it was currently receiving "an appropriate level" of support; 
• that it should have reduced allocations "in a period of budgetary stringency;" 
• that it should "clearly be allocated a reduced share of University resources;" or 
• that it should be "considered for elimination" (Bischoff 1976). 
The ratings were developed by an Academic Program Review Task Force, 
composed of administrators and Faculty Senate representatives and chaired by 
Associate Provost David Bischoff. The Task Force, augmented by members of the 
Faculty Senate Program and Budget Council, evaluated and rated each program. 
Evaluations were made by subcommittees in two rounds, the first with programs 
distributed at random, the second organized by school or college. The results of both 
rounds were reported (Bischoff 1975). 
The two rounds of evaluation included in the Task Force's report disagreed in 
many cases, and the Task Force did not reconcile these differences (Bischoff 1975). By 
the time the Task Force's report was issued a new Provost, Paul Puryear, had been 
appointed, and judgment was suspended pending Puryear's decision on how to pro¬ 
ceed. 
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The Task Force report was circulated on campus, but never formally adopted or 
acted upon. 
Commission on Missions and Goals at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst 
("COMGUMA"), September, 1974 - April, 1976 
By the mid-seventies the sense that the boom years were over pervaded the 
campus. Persistent Trustee concern over tenure rates, efforts to evaluate programs and 
reallocate resources, and continued legislative rumbling about reorganization all reflected 
a widespread need to take stock of the University and assess its future prospects. This 
need was expressed formally by Chancellor Bromery when he convened a special 
commission to examine the missions and goals of the campus in the spring of 1975. The 
Commission was asked to define the role of the campus "inside the context of the 
Massachusetts Public Higher Education System, the five-college community, the state 
and the nation." In particular, it was to "consider the function of UMass/Amherst as 
an institution encompassing graduate as well as undergraduate programs, the changing 
nature of the student population ..., the special relationship of the public university and 
the larger society, and the challenge of realizing our goals in the light of growing fiscal 
constraints" (Commission on Missions and Goals 1976a, 1). 
The Commission gave voice to two concerns confronting an institution passing 
from "a period of expansion into an era of consolidation" (Commission on Missions and 
Goals 1976b, 17). First, it sought to redefine the value of the campus to the broader 
society, and "frankly departed from what has become a conventional approach to 
university life; namely, the tri-partite distinction between teaching, research, and 
service... (3). Instead, the Commission took the approach that the campus's 
"fundamental mission ... continues to be one of service — service to its students, its host 
community, the state, the region, and indeed the nation." In this conception, "it is only 
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through the many facets of teaching and research that the university serves at all" (3). 
This emphasis on service was a unifying principle in the Commission's work and was 
telegraphed in the title of its report, "Public Service Through Academic Excellence." 
Second, the Commission affirmed the unique role of the Amherst campus: "it now 
seems clear, the report stated, "that UMA should remain the state's primary center of 
advanced graduate and doctoral training" (18). "The very range, depth, and diversity 
of... this campus," it concluded, "constitutes its unique identity..., and marks the peak 
of educational opportunity available at a public institution in the Commonwealth" (23). 
Bromery was careful to build a broadly based group representing many elements 
of the campus community. Early on he asked the Faculty Senate for its advice on the 
composition of the Commission (Faculty Senate, minutes of 10 October 1974 and 14 
November 1974), and in March of 1975 called together six faculty members appointed 
by the Faculty Senate, two undergraduates appointed by the Student Government 
Association, one graduate student appointed by the Graduate Student Senate, one 
representative of the association of non-academic professional staff, two department 
heads appointed by the Chancellor, one dean appointed by the Dean's Council, and two 
appointments by the Chancellor from other areas of the campus. In addition, the 
Academic Program Review Task Force was asked to name two of its members to serve 
(Commission on Missions and Goals 1976a). 
The Commission studied mission and goal statements from other institutions, 
reviewed a number of existing campus planning and policy documents, and held a series 
of open meetings with the campus community. The document was largely shaped by the 
work of three subcommittees: one on academic standards, one on the student body and 
student life, and one on UMA's role as the flagship campus (Commission on Missions 
and Goals 1976a). 
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The process engendered some controversy before a report was even drafted. The 
undergraduate and graduate student governments protested the composition of the 
Commission and called for 50% student membership. In October of 1975, when the 
composition remained unchanged, the undergraduate members resigned (Commission on 
Missions and Goals 1976a). 
Reaction to the report itself was mixed. While many welcomed the restatement 
of the campus s leadership role in the system of public higher education, others felt that 
the emphasis on service diminished the importance of teaching and research. 
The report touched on several aspects of campus decision-making. Pointing out 
that decisions must be made if we are to avoid the political stalemate that leads to 
mediocrity/' the report recommended that campus leaders "continually consult with all 
campus constituencies, but... also retain recognized authority to act decisively" 
(Commission on Missions and Goals 1976b, 19). The report also noted the importance 
of administrative decision-making ... in continued reassessment of campus priorities in 
light of the need continually to reallocate scarce resources" (19). While these notions no 
doubt sounded ominous to some, they were stated in the abstract and therefore did not 
gore any particular ox. 
The COMGUMA report was formally submitted to the Faculty Senate on May 
13, 1976, but no action was requested or taken (Faculty Senate, minutes of 13 May 
1976). It was understood at the time that the document would not be represented as 
the point of view of the Amherst campus" (7) without formal governance approval, 
which was never sought. The document was nonetheless widely circulated and dis¬ 
cussed, and reference was made to it in some subsequent planning documents. 
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Long Range Plan — First Stage ("Puryear Plan"), January, 1977 - January, 1978 
Trustee concern over high tenure rates and their impact on budgetary flexibility 
(see "Five Year Academic Personnel Plan," October 1974) continued through the 
seventies as a worsening state economy led to a series of budget cuts for the University. 
In the winter of 1976-77 the President (Wood) requested long range plans from the 
campuses to address the allocation of resources to academic departments, with a dead¬ 
line of February 14, 1977 (Puryear 1977a). On the Amherst campus the Provost 
(Puryear) complied with the request by developing a detailed allocation plan for faculty 
positions by department which was submitted to the President's Office shortly after the 
February 14 deadline (Faculty Senate, minutes of 21 April 1977). The plan was released 
to the campus on March 24, with a request for review and reaction by April 15. Puryear 
noted that discussion of the report of the Academic Program Review Task Force was 
still ongoing, but indicated that his long range plan was developed from "a different 
analysis model" (Puryear 1977b, 1), and was not based on the Task Force's work. 
Puryear indicated that his "first stage" plan would be followed by a more detailed 
second stage" which would provide greater opportunity for campus review; he also 
indicated, however, that he did not expect the conclusions of the second stage to depart 
in any substantial way from those of the first (Puryear 1977a). 
The Plan called for the elimination of two departments — Asian Studies and 
Slavic Languages — and faculty reductions in a number of others. In general, the Plan 
reduced faculty positions in the Arts and Sciences and reallocated some of them to the 
professional schools, with the remainder reflecting an overall reduction in faculty size 
(Office of the Provost 1977). 
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The Puryear plan was largely the work of the hand and mind of the Provost. It 
did not involve any existing or new committee or working group, and was presented for 
Faculty Senate review after it had been submitted to the President's Office. Puryear 
cited "externally imposed time pressures" (Puryear 1977b, 1) in defending his action. 
The Puryear Plan provoked a storm of controversy. It was one of a series of ac¬ 
tions that led, in rapid succession, to a repudiation of the plan and the process that 
created it by the Faculty Senate (Faculty Senate, minutes of 28 April 1977); a rare 
general meeting of the faculty at which the Plan was rejected as having been "unilaterally 
devised and arbitrarily promulgated in defiance of long established and approved 
governance procedures" (Faculty Senate, minutes of general faculty meeting 3 May 1977, 
3) and at which votes of No Confidence in the Provost and the President were approved 
(Faculty Senate, minutes of general faculty meeting 3 May 1977); and consultation 
between the Faculty Senate Rules Committee and Trustees resulting in suspension of the 
existing plan and development of new planning guidelines (Faculty Senate, minutes of 19 
May 1977). 
Puryear's reallocation plan had two purposes: to guide budget allocations and 
to provide a framework for tenure decisions. On April 25, 1977, the Chancellor 
(Bromery) ordered an independent review of planning-driven tenure decisions (Bromery 
1977), and by May 3 tenure decisions had been decoupled from the long range plan 
(Faculty Senate, minutes of 3 May 1977). As to budget allocations, Trustee revision of 
the planning timeline pushed action into the fall of 1978, by which time state funding 
had recovered sufficiently to permit pressing faculty needs in high-demand departments 
to be met by allocation of new funds. The Puryear Plan was never acted upon. Puryear, 
following additional controversy in the fall of 1977, was dismissed in January of 1978. 
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Planning for the 1980s ("Chancellor's Working Group"), May, 1980 - December, 1982 
The departure of President Robert Wood and Provost Paul Puryear in 1978 
marked the beginning of a transition period in the senior leadership of the University. In 
March of 1978 Chancellor Bromery — who was a candidate for university president — 
announced that he would be resigning as Chancellor effective June 1979 regardless of the 
outcome of the presidential search (Faculty Senate, minutes of 30 March 1978). The 
departure of all the principal figures associated with the planning efforts of the late 
seventies led to a lull in planning activity which, given the acrimony the processes had 
engendered, caused little complaint on the campus. 
The appointment of Henry Koffler as Chancellor in 1979 and Loren Baritz as 
Provost in 1980 set the stage for a new approach to planning. In May, 1980, Koffler 
announced a major new planning effort described in a document entitled "Planning for 
the 1980s." The Koffler planning process did not respond to a particular budget or 
other crisis, but addressed the general need to confront the end of the growth years and 
shifting public and legislative priorities (Office of the Chancellor 1980). In particular, it 
emerged at a time when higher education reorganization plans were under consideration 
in the legislature, prompted in large measure by the sense that the public system was too 
Urge given projected demographic shifts in the state (in the summer of 1980, in fact, the 
legislature created a strong statewide governing board with a clear cost-cutting man¬ 
date). "I need scarcely stress," Koffler said in introducing his planning process, "that if 
we do not take prompt steps to plan our own institutional future, we can expect others 
to do the job for us" (Koffler 1980, 2). 
Koffler's process required all academic and administrative units to submit 
descriptive "status reports" and forward-looking "planning proposals." the 
'proposals" were structured around four resource scenarios: 2% annual increases, level 
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funding, 1.5 /o annual decreases, and 3% annual decreases. These reports and proposals 
weie to be submitted to the Deans, who in turn would create school/college plans for 
submission to the Chancellor. A "Chancellor's Working Group," composed of senior 
administrators and faculty and student representatives, would advise the Chancellor in 
developing a campus plan from the various elements (Office of the Chancellor 1980). 
Koffler stressed that his proposal reflected the lessons of history: "the history of 
the Amherst campus in the past decade has displayed a complete acceptance of the 
need for ... planning coupled with a failure to attain consensus on the criteria and 
methods to be used" (Office of the Chancellor 1980, 2). He called for an "organic 
interactive process (3) which would provide for debate and revision at all levels. At the 
same time, he proposed a schedule for planning that left little room for consensus- 
building: departmental planning proposals were due six weeks into the fall semester; 
the Chancellor's working group was given only three weeks to evaluate school/college 
documents; only 25 days were allotted for governance review of the draft campus plan 
(Office of the Chancellor 1980). 
In practice, both the principle of open debate and the timeline slipped. Once the 
various planning proposals had been submitted, the Chancellor's Working Group began 
meeting confidentially on a weekly basis to review them and draft a campus plan. After 
more than 300 hours of such meetings, the Working Group completed a draft of a partial 
campus plan (dealing exclusively with academic affairs) in March of 1982 (Chancellor's 
Working Group 1982c). 
The Chancellor's Working Group draft constituted an evaluation of each aca¬ 
demic program with a recommendation for growth, stasis, reduction or elimination. An 
appendix to the report specified the number of faculty positions to be gained or lost by 
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each department over a five-year period (Chancellor's Working Group 1982b). Although 
the draft was not officially released, it circulated swiftly and widely on campus. 
Because it was based on a zero-growth assumption, and because it attempted to move 
resources into high-demand professional schools (Management and Engineering), many 
units were slated for reduction. Opposition was immediate and forceful, ranging from 
criticism of the closed process to challenges to the criteria and data utilized in rating 
programs to protests against the plan's "harsh treatment" of the humanities. After 
several weeks of controversy the Faculty Senate voted on May 20,1982 to recommend 
that the draft be withdrawn, and that an ad hoc Faculty Senate Committee for Planning 
work with the administration to develop a new plan by fall 1982 (Faculty Senate, 
minutes of 20 May 1982). 
By the time the Faculty Senate considered the Chancellor's Working Group Long 
Range Plan Chancellor Koffler had resigned his position to assume the presidency of 
Arizona State University. The Senate's action, combined with the agreement of the 
acting Chancellor (Loren Baritz) to lead the development of a replacement document, re¬ 
sulted in the abandonment of the Chancellor's Working Group draft. The Working 
Group (principally through its chair, Richard Noland) completed its original charge by 
submitting a draft plan for the non-academic part of the campus in December of 1982, 
but that document was never adopted or acted upon (Chancellor's Working Group 
1982a). 
Long Range Plan for Academic Affairs ("Baritz Plan"), May - October, 1982 
On May 1, 1982, Provost Loren Baritz became acting Chancellor and 
immediately set about revising the Koffler-era long range plan for academic affairs. 
Development of a new plan was critical for two reasons. First, the long string of 
unsuccessful and even contentious planning efforts had left the campus wondering 
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whether any organized planning effort could succeed. As the head of the organization 
representing non-academic professional staff put it when reporting on reaction from his 
membership to the Baritz plan, “response was woefully limited, perhaps because the 
number of long-range plans submitted to the campus community over the last two years 
has worn down even the most dedicated of alarmists" (Taupier 1983, 1). The creation 
of a new statewide Board of Regents of Higher Education had also raised the stakes for 
campus planning. As Baritz pointed out, “the question cannot be whether we want a 
plan, but whether we can afford not to have one. Decisions, after all, are going to be 
made. The question, therefore, boils down to this: does the campus community want a 
planned design of our own making, or does it prefer to have others do this for us or to 
us?“ (Office of the Provost 1982, i). Second, Baritz was a candidate for the permanent 
chancellor's job, and his plan could be expected to be an important campaign document. 
By August of 1982 Baritz had drafted an entirely new plan for academic affairs 
that made no reference to the abandoned CWG draft. His approach stood in sharp 
contrast with previous efforts. Baritz made no effort to evaluate programs or allocate 
future resources among them (Office of the Provost 1982). Rather, he asserted that the 
plan should develop “campus understanding and consensus about the overall direction 
within which individual budget decisions can be made" (i). These decisions would be 
made, not within the plan, but “as a result of dialogues between departments and 
Deans, Deans and the Provost" (51). The Baritz formulation thus took much of the 
pressure off the long range planning process: the plan would set the stage, but actual 
allocation decisions would be made — within the context of the plan — in annual 
budgets. 
Baritz quickly assured the campus — and the ad hoc Faculty Senate group 
appointed to assist him — that his plan would avoid the divisive programmatic as- 
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sessments which had sparked dissent in previous efforts. He therefore had a relatively 
free hand, and drafted a broad and essentially personal statement restating the 
campus's mission, assessing its then-current circumstances, and outlining the directions 
in which it should move. 
This statement emphasized the campus's unique role in graduate education and 
research and reaffirmed the centrality of the arts and sciences as "the indispensable core 
of learning for well-educated people" (Office of the Provost 1982, 2). Both points 
reassured important elements of the campus that had been alienated by previous 
planning efforts. While Baritz spoke of the need to reallocate resources, he did not pro¬ 
pose any specific reallocations. And where previous plans had assumed level or 
reduced future resources, Baritz said that his plan, "using better logic, assumes that 
because we cannot know future budgets we will not assume any specific funding level" 
(3). Baritz also used the plan as a platform to advance several controversial curricular 
reforms: a writing program, a cognitive reasoning center, and a sweeping general 
education plan (Office of the Provost 1982). 
The Baritz Plan did not create any immediate winners or losers among 
departments and its release in August therefore did not serve as a flash point for re¬ 
newed controversy over allocation of resources. Moreover, by the time it was taken up 
for debate in the Faculty Senate in October, the plan's long-term impact had been cast 
into doubt by the appointment of a new Chancellor, Joseph Duffey. Baritz returned to 
his duties as Provost, but announced his resignation from that post shortly thereafter. 
The Baritz Plan still provoked controversy in terms of its incorporation of 
curricular changes. The general education proposal, in particular, was still very much a 
topic of debate on campus. 
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The Faculty Senate, having in a sense commissioned the Baritz Plan, sought to 
take positive action on it. On October 7, 1982, after some debate the Senate 
recommended approval of the plan, but only with two qualifications: first, that the 
document should be considered more a set of guidelines than ... a specific plan;// and 
second, "that any changes in academic programs mentioned in the document be re¬ 
viewed separately by the appropriate Senate councils and committees before they are 
implemented" (Faculty Senate, minutes of 7 October 1982, 3). In addition, the three 
appendices having to do with the University Writing Program, the cognitive reasoning 
center, and the general education requirements were stripped from the plan prior to 
Senate approval (Faculty Senate, minutes of 7 October 1982). 
Long Range Plan ("Regents7 Plan") — First Phase, c. September, 1982 - c. October, 1986 
All the planning efforts since the Graduate Program Review at the opening of the 
1970s had originated within the University, either to cope with shrinking resources or to 
respond to Trustee concerns over resource flexibility. In 1982, however, the impetus for 
planning took a step away from the University proper. It was in that year that the 
Board of Regents of Higher Education exercised its statutory authority to "prepare a 
five year master plan for public higher education" (Board of Regents 1982,1) and to 
request planning documents from each of the public campuses. 
The Regents had been created in 1980 when, frustrated with a higher education 
system they considered overgrown and unresponsive, the Governor and legislative 
leaders created a powerful statewide governing board through a late-night amendment 
to the state budget. When the Regents issued guidelines for their planning process in 
1982 the campus had nothing to show for its years of planning effort except the Baritz 
plan. The Baritz document was flawed in several ways: it addressed only the academic 
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sector of the campus; it had been approved by the Faculty Senate only in the abstract; 
and it was the highly personal statement of a person who no longer held a position of 
leadership on the campus. The new Chancellor, Joseph Duffey, sought to remedy the 
first problem by expanding the Baritz document into a campus-wide plan. He first 
asked the Koffler-appointed Chancellor's Working Group (embodied for the most part 
by its chair. Prof. Richard Noland) to complete its charge by drafting a plan for the 
administrative side of the campus. This draft was completed in December, 1982, but, 
after an administrative review, was abandoned. Duffey then asked one of his 
assistants, Bryan Harvey, to draft a new administrative plan which was integrated with 
the Baritz plan and circulated on the campus in March of 1983 (Office of the Chancellor 
1983). During the summer the University President's Office issued guidelines to allow 
for the development of a unified University system plan for submission to the Regents, 
and the Baritz/Harvey document was substantially reworked. The final product 
appeared as the Amherst campus chapter of the University plan, "Opportunities for 
Quality," submitted in the fall of 1983 (Office of the President 1983). 
The Regents' planning process raised considerable anxiety on the campus. The 
Regents had already imposed a highly controversial set of system-wide admissions 
standards, and many feared that the planning process would continue a trend toward 
curtailed campus autonomy. It was also not clear whether, or to what extent, the new 
planning process would drive resource allocation. 
Chancellor Duffey secured the tacit agreement of the Faculty Senate that the 
Regents' timeline did not permit governance review of the campus plan, which was 
developed entirely as an administrative task. The final product, however, was a fairly 
general statement of goals that did not stray near program evaluation, resource 
allocation, or other proven points of controversy. 
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The guidelines called for a statement of mission, the identification of "campus 
priorities," and a discussion of "management strategies" designed to address the 
various priorities. The Amherst campus's plan identified four priorities: graduate 
education and research, undergraduate education, physical plant, and public service. 
The discussions tended to focus on campus needs and concerns which should be ad¬ 
dressed in the future (Office of the President 1983). 
The long range plan was designed to avoid rather than provoke controversy, and 
it sparked little reaction of any kind on the campus. Three of the "campus priorities" 
restated the familiar tripartite mission of the University, and the other simply 
recognized the enormous deferred maintenance that had developed during years of tight 
budgets. It soon became apparent that the Regents would follow an incremental 
budgeting approach, so the planning documents were not seen as important in terms of 
funding. The annual updates to the plan in 1984, 1985, and 1986 were completed by 
the administration and without formal governance review, although they were subjected 
to varying degrees of review by the Campus Planning Council. 
The documents took the form of progress reports in the original priority areas. 
Deans and vice chancellors were asked to submit items for inclusion (new programs, 
recent accomplishments, etc.) and these were compiled and organized according to the 
structure of the plan. 
The initial five year plan received "qualified acceptance" (Mitchell 1984) from 
the Regents, and the 1984, 1985 and 1986 updates were accepted without qualification. 
For 1987 the Regents called for a new round of planning to result in a new five year plan 
(see Long Range Plan — Second Phase). 
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Strategic Planning ("Shirley/NCHEMS Model"), c. September, 1983 - November, 1984 
The pressures to engage in organized planning grew as the 1980s unfolded. 
Although state funding had recovered somewhat from the crisis of the mid-seventies, the 
years of rapid growth in the state budget appeared to be over. Without new state 
dollars for program development and improvement, reallocation of existing resources 
became increasingly important. In addition, the introduction of the Regents' planning 
and budgeting processes made new demands on the campus. 
Partly in response to these pressures, in 1983 Chancellor Duffey sought to 
rebuild the campus's institutional research capacity and provide support for planning 
efforts. He hired Robert DeLauretis to organize a new Office of Institutional Research 
and Planning in the summer of 1983 (Duffey 1983), and in October of that year Bryan 
Harvey moved from the Chancellor's Office to OIRP to assist in organizing the campus's 
planning efforts. DeLauretis and Harvey proposed that the campus move toward a 
comprehensive strategic planning process which would integrate mission and goal 
development, identification of threats and opportunities in the campus's environment, 
assessment of internal strengths and weaknesses, and development of specific strategies 
in enrollment management, resource development, and other key areas. They relied 
heavily on strategic planning approaches developed by the National Center for Higher 
Education Management Systems (NCHEMS), and especially on the work of Dr. Robert 
Shirley, who consulted extensively for NCHEMS (Office of Institutional Research and 
Planning 1984). 
The first stage of the strategic planning proposal called for the appointment of 
three broadly based groups: an Environmental Assessment Task Force, an Internal 
Assessment Task Force, and a Planning Council to oversee the entire process. These 
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groups were to develop a framework for planning at the campus level which would form 
the basis for individual departmental and school/college plans (Duffey 1984b). 
The idea of strategic planning was explored in a "pre-planning" process during 
the winter of 1983-84. Dr. Shirley visited the campus in December and conducted a 
day-long seminar on planning attended by the Chancellor, vice chancellors, deans, senior 
staff, and representatives of the Faculty Senate, graduate and undergraduate student 
governments, the professional association, and campus collective bargaining units 
(DeLauretis 1983). During the spring and summer a "Planning Guide" was prepared, 
laying out a framework and sequence of events for the campus planning process (Office 
of Institutional Research and Planning 1984). Individuals and organizations were asked 
to suggest names for the various planning groups (Duffey 1984b), and by October 1984 
Chancellor Duffey was ready to appoint the Planning Council and the two task forces 
and begin the process. Plans were made to bring Shirley back to campus to help kick off 
the new process (DeLauretis 1984). 
Reaction to the Shirley model on the part of seminar participants was generally 
positive (DeLauretis 1983), although considerable skepticism surrounded the prospects 
of applying so formal and comprehensive an approach to the campus. The arrival in 
September of the new Provost, Richard O'Brien, tipped the scales away from the 
NCHEMS model. O'Brien preferred a less ambitious approach with fewer participants, 
and encouraged the Chancellor to rethink his decision prior to the appointment of the 
various groups. 
By the fall of 1984 the Regents' planning process seemed somewhat less 
threatening than originally anticipated, and state budget prospects were encouraging 
enough to support the hope that major reallocations would not be needed in the near 
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future. The Chancellor weighed the benefits and risks of an explicit and broadly 
participative process and concluded that a different approach to planning was needed. 
Duffey followed O'Brien's advice and abandoned the strategic planning approach in 
favor of a more limited Campus Planning Council which would advise the Chancellor 
and Provost on general planning issues (Duffey 1984a). 
Campus Planning Council ("O'Brien Model"), November, 1984 - May, 1991 
The abandonment of the strategic planning model left the campus in need of 
some other process. In November of 1984 Chancellor Duffey asked Provost and 
Executive Vice Chancellor Richard O'Brien to chair a new Campus Planning Council, 
composed of five representatives of the Faculty Senate, one dean selected by the 
Chancellor, one graduate and one undergraduate student selected by the respective 
student governments, one representative of the professional association, one 
representative of the classified staff collective bargaining units, and the Director of 
Institutional Research and Planning, ex officio (Duffey 1984a). 
The Planning Council was charged with "considering overall goals for the campus 
and the general planning process" (Duffey 1984a, 2). It did not oversee a planning 
process, but rather tended to serve as a sounding board for ideas generated within the 
administration and as an informal review mechanism for planning documents (such as 
the long range plans prepared for the Board of Regents). The great majority of the 
Council's work was dedicated to the development of "papers" or policy reviews 
suggested by the Provost. Between 1986 and 1990 the Council issued four of these 
papers. The first, "Changing Demographics at the Undergraduate Level," reviewed 
demographic trends and the makeup of the student body (Campus Planning Council 
1987a); the second, "The Graduate Character of the University of Massachusetts at 
Amherst," proposed an expansion of the graduate sector of the campus (Campus 
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Planning Council 1987b); the third was a mission statement for the campus, the first 
revision since COMGUMA a decade earlier (Campus Planning Council 1989); and the 
fourth was “A Prospectus for the Nineties," a four-point proposal intended to set a 
course for the campus following several years of cuts in state support (Office of the 
Provost 1990b).. 
The composition of the Council varied with its tasks. The initial group was 
expanded to include additional senior administrators, and was expanded further still 
when it assumed the duties of a steering committee for the accreditation self-study 
(O'Brien 1988). 
For much of its existence the Planning Council dealt more with policy than with 
planning. The first two papers, in fact, were developed in large part to argue for specific 
changes in Trustee policy. The undergraduate paper had as one of its central 
recommendations the lifting of the fifteen percent cap on out-of-state undergraduate 
enrollment, a change long sought by the campus (Campus Planning Council 1987a). 
Similarly, the graduate paper argued for elimination of the requirement that graduate 
students make up no more than fourteen percent of total enrollment (Campus Planning 
Council 1987b). The mission statement had a broader cast, and argued for greater 
emphasis on graduate studies and research and greater leadership therein on the part of 
the "flagship" campus (Campus Planning Council 1989). The "Prospectus" built on the 
mission statement and served as a complementary statement of goals. Issued in the 
throes of a budget crisis in 1990, it called for the campus to "get back on track" (Office 
of the Provost 1990b, 6) by restoring state funding, enrollment, and faculty strength to 
1988 levels. It further proposed that the campus "complete the transformation to a 
major research and teaching university" (7), in part by developing several new programs 
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and institutes, and it proposed steps to achieve a multicultural campus and expand the 
campus's public service role. 
The Council conducted its business so as to avoid the kind of controversy which 
had arisen from past planning efforts. Each policy paper was circulated widely in draft 
form, comments were received and incorporated, and the final product presented to the 
Faculty Senate. This was often a slow process (the "Prospectus" was 18 months in the 
making) (Rules Committee 1991) but it ensured that the documents had few rough edges 
at the end. Since the first two documents were geared principally to the outside world 
in pursuit of widely accepted campus goals, they met with a generally favorable 
reception among faculty and others. The mission statement was also generally agreeable 
to the campus, although it became stalled at the Trustee level (in part over sensitivity to 
the use of the term "flagship") (O'Brien 1989b). 
The "Prospectus" had little success with any audience. Issued midway through 
the budget crisis, its call for a return to the status quo ante seemed unrealistic and 
untimely. Moreover, it was issued at about the same time as the Governor filed 
legislation to implement the recommendations of the Saxon Commission, which called 
for creation of a five-campus University with greater autonomy (Saxon 1989). Many felt 
that planning for the nineties should await final action on that bill. 
The first two proposals were approved by the Faculty Senate, and the Trustees 
subsequently lifted the limits on out-of-state and graduate enrollment. The mission 
statement was endorsed by the Senate, but underwent several rounds of debate before 
being approved by the Trustees in March 1989 (Campus Planning Council 1989). The 
Prospectus" was circulated for comment to nine different councils and committees of 
the Faculty Senate, and endorsed by none (Rules Committee 1991). The Rules 
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Committee, in its summary of responses, noted that "the Prospectus has been rendered 
obsolete by the political events and economic disintegration of the Commonwealth" (2). 
On May 16, 1991 the Senate voted to forward these responses to O'Brien (Faculty 
Senate, minutes of 16 May 1991). No further action was taken on the "Prospectus," 
and no further meetings of the Planning Council took place. 
The Reallocation of Faculty Retirement Positions ("Reallocation 1985") c Tulv 1985 - 
December, 1985 -~ u 
Although the Campus Planning Council created by Chancellor Duffey and 
Provost O'Brien in early 1985 did not operate within the context of a formal planning 
process, other planning activities of various kinds were initiated. The most important of 
these took the form of a proposed reallocation of faculty positions yielded through 
retirement. Because of the campus's enormous growth during the sixties many of the 
faculty hired at that time were expected to retire over a relatively short period of time. 
The Provost's Office estimated that nearly 200 faculty positions would become vacant 
due to retirement between 1985 and 1990 (Office of the Provost 1985b). O'Brien saw in 
these retirements a relatively painless way of shifting resources among the schools and 
colleges. Because no incumbent would be affected he expected opposition, if not 
completely to disappear, at least to be less strident than had been the case in some 
earlier attempts at reallocation. 
The long range plan submitted to the Regents in 1983 had set the stage for this 
reallocation. It stated that 
fssuesSi°nS C°nCerning -• faculfy ^locations ... will include at least the following 
1 • the potential for program excellence 
2. the quality of faculty achievements 
3. the quality of student applicants 
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4. the centrality of the program to the campus mission 
5. the program's service to non-majors 
6. student demand for enrollment in the program 
7. the quality of resources — library, facilities, equipment — available or needed 
for the program 
8. the demand for graduates of the program 
9. the number and relative quality of similar programs in the region and in the 
state's system of public higher education 
10. the cost of the program. (Office of the President 1983, 42). 
The Provost, with the aid of a staff working group, proposed a set of 
reallocations within this context, and presented it to the Faculty Senate Academic 
Priorities Council for review and comment (Academic Priorities Council 1985). 
The staff group — led by the Provost — that developed the reallocation 
proposal examined data of various sorts related to the issues detailed in the long range 
plan, but did not develop a consistent or explicit methodology for rating programs. In 
the end, the assessments were based in part on the judgments of those involved. 
It quickly became clear that, because many of the vacancies would occur in areas 
targeted for growth or stability, relatively few positions would be available for transfer 
from one unit to another. This limitation was not overly onerous: the reallocation 
exercise was not intended to reshape the face of the campus, but rather to permit some 
modest adjustments to reflect changing needs. 
In September of 1985 the Provost issued his proposal, which called for transfer 
of only 18 positions over a five year period. Most of the positions were to come from 
Humanities and Fine Arts, with Social and Behavioral Sciences and Natural Sciences 
and Mathematics as the principal beneficiaries (Office of the Provost 1985b). 
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The Academic Priorities Council reviewed the proposal and issued a report 
which "applaud[ed] the Provost for bringing the faculty back into the planning process" 
(Academic Priorities Council 1985, 1). The Council had many concerns about the real- 
location, however, especially with respect to the nature and application of the 
evaluation criteria. The Council determined that "the ten criteria were not applied 
uniformly in determining reallocation" (3), and that teaching productivity, scholarly 
productivity and external ratings had driven most of the recommendations. The Council 
questioned many of the judgments reached in the proposal and argued in a few cases for 
a change in the reallocations. Despite a certain amount of grumbling and uneasiness, 
however, the view was widely held that the scope of the reallocation was so modest 
that a major dispute would be inappropriate (Academic Priorities Council 1985). 
On December 5, 1985 the Council's report was presented to the Faculty Senate. 
It called for three actions: 1) that the Senate endorse the Council's recommendations; 2) 
that the reallocation planning process continue on a yearly basis; and 3) that the schools 
and colleges submit "specific plans for their needs" and that "these plans be reviewed" 
(Academic Priorities Council 1985, 6) by the Council. After relatively little debate all 
three motions passed (Faculty Senate, minutes of 5 December 1985). 
O'Brien reviewed the Council's report and issued his "final" statement on 
December 17, 1985. He accepted a few changes, argued against the rest, and issued the 
revised reallocation plan (Office of the Provost 1985a). The plan guided the handling of 
retirements for the next five years. 
Long Range Plan ("Regents' Plan") — Second Phase, c. October, 1986 - November, 1989 
The first phase of planning conducted by the Regents had addressed the five 
year period 1983-87. As the first five year cycle was nearing completion, the Regents 
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recast the planning process with an eye to developing a new five year plan for each 
campus. Campuses were asked to prepare an "Assessment of Current Status" (Stage I 
planning document), a Delineation of Strategic Decisions" (Stage II document) and 
plans for implementation of the strategic decisions outlined in Stage II. This latter 
"Stage III document was also expected to relate the planning and budget processes. 
Stages I and II were originally scheduled for completion in May 1987, with submission of 
Stage III documents scheduled for June 1988 (Board of Regents 1987). 
The new approach was intended to move beyond the progress reports of the first 
planning effort, and induce the campuses to focus on key challenges in enrollment, 
program array, and other areas. Especially in Stage II, campuses were asked to develop 
"a basic sense of direction, of what kind of institution each campus wants to be" (Board 
of Regents 1987, 2). 
The new phase of Regents' planning was approached on campus as a 
continuation of the first. The planning documents were still produced administratively, 
and still had the character of progress reports on established aspects of the campus's 
mission. No program evaluations were attempted and, despite the Regents' stated goal, 
the only explicit connections made between "strategic decisions" and resource allocation 
involved the identification of programs targeted for expansion or development, with a 
statement of the resources needed to move ahead. These plans made it clear that, by 
and large, these resources would have to come in the form of new state dollars (Office of 
the Chancellor 1989). 
While the Regents' planning process was going on the campus was also preparing 
for its ten-year accreditation visit by the New England Association of Schools and 
Colleges (NEASC). The campus sought and received permission to delay its Stage III 
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document until the accreditation self-study and visiting committee report were available, 
and these documents were incorporated into the final campus plan. The campus 
submitted its Stage III document on March 13, 1989 (O'Brien 1989a). 
The second phase of Regents' planning drew much the same reaction as the first. 
On the campus, the documents were seen as general enough to raise no immediate 
questions about specific programs. The Stage III document, having been merged with the 
accreditation self-study, benefited from the familiar and open process leading up to the 
arrival of the visiting committee. All three documents adhered to the form prescribed by 
the Regents process, and received a generally favorable response from Regents' staff. 
All three documents were approved by the Regents. The conclusion of Stage III 
also marked the end of the formal Regents' planning process, for several reasons. First, 
the Regents — responding in part to complaints about the burden of complying with 
their process — adopted a less formal approach: "the generally high quality of the 
campus plans ... reveals that mature and effective on-going planning processes now 
exist. This year, therefore, we will not issue comprehensive guidelines..." (Rees 1989). 
Second, by the fall of 1989 a state fiscal crisis and consequent budget cuts and 
reversions were in full swing. "Planning" was suspended while campuses scrambled to 
balance their budgets. The budget cuts continued, and in 1991 the Regents were 
abolished in the reorganization that created a new, five campus University of 
Massachusetts system. 
Mje Commission on the Future of the University ("Saxon Commission"), March. 1988 - 
During the decade of the eighties the University system experienced growing 
tension and dissatisfaction with the Board of Regents of Higher Education. The 1980 
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reorganization legislation that created the Regents had left the UMass system — with its 
single Board of Trustees — intact, but much governing authority was transferred from 
the Trustees to the Regents. The University was part of a system which included the 
state and community colleges and two free-standing universities in Lowell and 
Dartmouth. Many within the University felt that doctoral education, research and other 
university-level concerns were not adequately understood or attended to by the Regents. 
In addition, the tendency over time of the Regents to deal directly with the three UMass 
campuses frustrated University President David Knapp and members of the Board of 
Trustees (Saxon. 1989). 
In March of 1988, at the suggestion of President Knapp, the Trustees appointed 
a blue-ribbon Commission on the Future of the University "to examine and make 
recommendations on the future role of the University of Massachusetts in the 
Commonwealth, its governance and financing" (Knowles 1988,1). The Commission was 
chaired by David S. Saxon, then Chairman of the Corporation at MIT and President 
Emeritus of the University of California. The membership of the Commission included 
the lieutenant governor, the house and senate majority leaders, a member of Congress, 
five current or former college and university presidents, several prominent leaders of the 
state's business community, and representatives of the Regents and the Trustees (Saxon 
1989). 
The Commission examined governance structures and financial practices in other 
states, met with students, faculty and staff at the university campuses, and sniffed the 
political wind in Massachusetts. It quickly became clear that the Commission supported 
a greater measure of autonomy for the University, but opinions differed over how to 
achieve it. Some, including David Saxon, favored creation of a strong university sector 
with a single governing board for the three UMass campuses and the universities at 
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Lowell and Dartmouth. Others worried that such a direct confrontation with the Board 
of Regents would doom politically any hope of change. With the encouragement of the 
political leaders who served on the group, however, the Commission issued a report in 
March 1989 that called for a commitment to build a "world-class" public university in 
Massachusetts. To achieve that goal, the Commission recommended creation of a five- 
campus University under a strong Board of Trustees, replacement of the Regents with a 
statewide coordinating board, and appropriation of a single lump sum state budget to 
the University instead of campus line items (Saxon 1989). 
The Regents were quick to respond. Within a few days of the release of the 
Saxon Commission report the Regents' Chancellor, Franklyn Jenifer, published his own 
reorganization proposal which created administrative "sectors" for the community col¬ 
leges, state colleges and universities within his office. The UMass Trustees embraced the 
Saxon report, but found no immediate prospects for its adoption by the state. Governor 
Michael Dukakis, never known for his support of the public university, was back in the 
state following his loss to George Bush in the 1988 presidential election and had already 
announced that he would not seek re-election as Governor. Many observers believed 
that no changes in the structure of higher education were likely until the 1990 
gubernatorial election determined who would be leading the state after Dukakis. 
Reaction to the plan was mixed on the five university campuses. Each, in its 
own way, feared a loss of autonomy should a strong board and President be created, 
but each also saw the potential for greater influence through a united front. The 
Amherst campus, in particular, feared that the needs of the younger, less-developed 
campuses would take priority in a new system. 
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With the election of William Weld as Governor in 1990 the Trustees renewed 
their efforts to implement the Saxon report. They were aided by two factors. First, the 
new Governor had a strong economic development agenda and responded favorably to 
the idea that the state's public university should move ahead to join the state's world- 
class private institutions. Second, dissatisfaction with the Regents had been growing in 
the legislature for some time, and many felt that it was time for a change in the 
governance of the system. 
Governor Weld filed legislation implementing the major features of the Saxon 
report and, with the support of the House Speaker and Senate Majority Leader (both of 
whom had served on the Commission) secured passage in the spring of 1991. 
The Reallocation of Faculty Retirement Positions ("Reallocation 1989"), c. Tuly, 1988 - 
May, 1989 
The original retirement reallocation plan covered the five-year period 1985-89. 
As FY1990 approached Provost O'Brien assembled a staff group to examine retirement 
estimates for the next five-year period and recommend an allocation plan for them. In 
part because the campus was heading toward the downward slope of its natural 
retirement curve, and in part because of early retirement incentives in the mid-eighties, 
the projected number of faculty retirements dropped from 186 in the first period to 96 in 
the second (Office of the Provost 1989). 
In an effort to respond to some of the misgivings which had been expressed 
during the first reallocation effort, the Provost and his staff attempted to develop a 
broad range of evaluative data. After some months of effort the group settled on twelve 
"reallocation factors:" undergraduate and graduate teaching ratios, excess demand for 
courses, improvement in research funding, proportion of faculty not publishing, alumni 
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satisfaction with courses in their major, number and size of course sections, 
undergraduate and graduate advising loads, GRE scores of entering graduate students, 
facility salary costs per unit of instruction, and minority student persistence (Office of 
the Provost 1988). Some were familiar, some created for the occasion; some were 
weighted heavily, some served as grace notes. O'Brien pointed out that "some of these 
measures are crude, and we have absolutely no pretense to a refined theory of realloca¬ 
tion (1). In consequence, schools and colleges were given only general ratings in each 
area. 
The description and analysis of these factors resulted in a 71-page document 
that was circulated to the deans in December 1988 for their review and comment (Office 
of the Provost 1988). They raised concerns about the quality and usefulness of several 
measures, and O'Brien revised the analysis by removing all but the teaching-oriented 
factors: teaching ratios, advising loads, excess course demand, and number and size of 
course sections. Concerns were also raised about the ratings applied to each unit, and 
these were removed from the revised document. The resulting 18-page report was 
submitted to the Academic Priorities Council for review on January 18,1989 (Office of 
the Provost 1989). 
With a pool of only about 100 vacancies the possibilities for reallocation were 
quite limited. The debate over the reallocation factors left the analysis very much 
oriented toward teaching, and O'Brien concluded that the reallocation would be most 
effective if it simply addressed imbalances in teaching loads. He acknowledged that 
this approach failed to account for needs associated with other aspects of the campus's 
mission, but pointed out that other resources (notably, research overhead) were avail¬ 
able to address imbalances in research and scholarship (Office of the Provost 1989). 
This reallocation," the report concluded, "should, therefore, not be interpreted as 
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teaching is all that matters. Rather, it is a modest correction for some very serious 
imbalances in teaching effort which are hard to correct in any other way" (2). 
When all was said and done only 10 positions were proposed for reallocation, at 
a rate of two per year. Positions moved from Food and Natural Resources and 
Education to Social and Behavioral Sciences, Humanities and Fine Arts, and 
Management (Office of the Provost 1989). 
The Academic Priorities Council received the second, truncated report. It did not 
include actual ratings for the units, nor did it include an explicit statement of how the 
\ arious factors were used in reaching the proposed reallocation. The Council observed 
that the proposal "did not provide sufficient data or the guidance ... necessary to 
evaluate thoroughly and effectively the decisions made about academic priorities. There 
was essentially no narrative linking the lists of statistics to the ... reallocations" 
(Academic Priorities Council 1989, 4). In addition, the Council concluded that the 
stated factors "do not appear to be the sole basis for the proposed reallocations and in¬ 
deed appear to some members ... to have been ignored in some instances" (4). 
The Council also expressed concerns about the proposal's narrow focus, the need 
to distinguish between levels of teaching, the need for faculty input into evaluation 
issues, and the importance of recognizing service activities and efforts to improve 
cultural diversity. Despite these misgivings, the Council recommended Faculty Senate 
endorsement of the plan (Academic Priorities Council 1989). As in the case of the 1985 
reallocation, the favorable recommendation came "in the context of the [the Council's] 
reservations and concerns..., recognizing that the reallocations are modest ones (5). 
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The Faculty Senate took up the matter at its meeting of May 4, 1989. After 
assurances from the Provost that he would consult with the Senate on the question of 
measuring scholarly activity, the Senate voted to "endorse the Provost's Plan ... with the 
reservations expressed by the Academic Priorities Council..." (Faculty Senate, minutes 
of 4 May 1989). 
The plan was never implemented. Continuing cuts in state appropriations to the 
campus made it necessary to use all savings from faculty retirements to help balance the 
budget. Replacement hiring fell to near zero, and the positions targeted for reallocation 
remained vacant. 
The Reallocation of Faculty Retirement Positions ("Reallocation 1990") Mav 1990 - 
November, 1990 -uu- 
One year after the second five-year retirement reallocation plan was adopted in 
1989 Provost O Bnen convened a new group — composed of administrators, deans, and 
Faculty Senate representatives and chaired by Associate Provost Patricia Crosson — to 
review and update the five-year plan. The new process was intended to continue to 
improve the systems used to evaluate the match between departmental needs and the 
allocation of faculty resources. The Reallocation Committee spent the summer of 1990 
gathering data on instructional and scholarly productivity of departments and 
discussing the appropriate balance of factors to inform a reallocation (Reallocation 
Committee 1990). 
In July a new round of state budget cuts was announced involving a four percent 
reduction ($6 million) for the campus. It was decided that $3 million was to come from 
Academic Affairs, and in August O'Brien met with the Reallocation Committee and 
presented it with a new mandate: to recommend programs which should be considered 
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for termination. The Committee did not agree to recommend specific programs for 
termination, but did agree to develop an analysis of departmental productivity that 
could be useful in making such decisions (Reallocation Committee 1990). 
At the end of August the Committee submitted its report to O'Brien. It 
evaluated all academic departments in terms of instructional and scholarly productivity, 
and also made judgments with respect to the centrality of programs to the campus's 
mission. The Committee's approach was consistent with guidelines adopted by the 
Faculty Senate in May of 1990 regarding the termination of academic departments 
(which had been prompted by a proposal at the dean's level to terminate the 
department of Food Engineering) (Academic Priorities Council 1990). In September 
Chancellor Duffey and Provost O'Brien asked for and received Faculty Senate support 
for program termination and reduction as part of the campus's response to continuing 
budget cuts (Faculty Senate, minutes of 27 September, 1990). In October they issued a 
list of ten programs slated for reduction and four for termination. Because termination 
involved non-renewal of faculty contracts, the list of terminations was submitted to the 
faculty collective bargaining unit (MSP) for advice, as required in the faculty contract. 
Both terminations and reductions were submitted to the Senate for advice (Faculty 
Senate, minutes of 11 October 1990). 
The Reallocation Committee's report provided data from a number of sources 
and focused on several different aspects of departmental "productivity." Most of the 
measures addressed instructional productivity, with some attention given to scholarly 
output and centrality. O'Brien led a group of five administrators in reviewing the data. 
They began by identifying units with low instructional productivity and then looked for 
other factors (high scholarly output, centrality to mission) which might "compensate" 
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for low teaching loads. Programs lacking such compensatory considerations were slated 
for reduction or termination (Office of the Provost 1990a). 
The swiftness and scope of the budget cuts experienced in 1990 dominated 
conversation on the campus. It was clear to all that drastic steps were required to 
balance the budget, and the previously unthinkable — elimination of programs — 
suddenly seemed almost inevitable. Despite a spirited debate, the Faculty Senate 
quickly endorsed the concept of program reductions and terminations as one of the op 
tions to be considered by the administration (Faculty Senate, minutes of 27 September 
1990). 
Consensus did not extend, however, to methodology. Although the Senate 
adopted procedures to be followed in the case of terminations (followed by similar pro¬ 
cedures for program reductions) these procedures still required administrative judgment. 
The emphasis on instruction was challenged as being destructive of the campus's 
research mission. Throughout the process the data employed were criticized as in- 
complete, inaccurate, outdated, or irrelevant. The selection of departments to be 
terminated or reduced was tied generally to the Reallocation Committee's data, but no 
explicit statement of the relationship of the decisions to the data was made, and no 
public examination of the data occurred. 
Both the MSP and the Faculty Senate review processes were lengthy. The admin¬ 
istration's plan for balancing the budget did not require immediate action, since one-time 
savings were used to provide a year's flexibility in implementing the programmatic cuts. 
Over the months deans and departments proposed alternative cost-saving measures, 
questioned the data and the judgments drawn therefrom, and introduced additional in¬ 
formation intended to counter the decision to terminate or reduce. The Provost agreed 
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to 3 numbtr of counter proposals, and in the end few of the targeted programs expe¬ 
rienced the full effect of the original proposal. 
The Allocation of Budget Savings to Schools and Colleges ("Reallocation 1991") Mav 
1991 - May, 1992 —*-L-^ 
The state s fiscal crisis and consequent cuts in state support for higher education 
continued in the spring of 1991. The state budget for FY1992 seemed certain to include 
additional state cuts on the order of $10 million, and work began to find a new budget¬ 
balancing strategy. As part of that effort the Faculty Senate Academic Priorities 
Council, Research Council and Program and Budget Council jointly prepared a special 
report entitled A University at Risk," which was submitted to the Senate on May 23, 
1991 (Academic Priorities Council et al. 1991). The report summarized the effects of 
three years of cuts in state appropriations and observed that "it is widely believed that 
the faculty exodus which has begun, will accelerate in the year ahead, and that the loss 
of gifted scholars will have long lasting negative consequences" (1). The report also 
stated that the University faced two alternatives: to "'roll over and play dead/" or to 
develop and embrace a clearer and crisper definition of its mission ... and adopt a 
method to cope with the crisis" (1). 
The report recommended that cuts to the academic sector be made selectively 
after an assessment of each unit in terms of teaching, research and "centrality." The 
group of leading research departments ("Group A"), the leading teaching departments 
( Group B") and the departments most central to the institution ("Group C") would be 
protected" from the effects of any reductions needed to close the budget gap 
(Academic Priorities Council et al. 1991). 
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In June a draft document entitled "The Basis of Allocations of Budget Savings to 
Schools and Colleges, was circulated to the deans by Provost O'Brien. It built on the 
recommendations of A University at Risk," populated the "A," "B," and "C" groups 
and established the levels of "protection" (80% for groups "A" and "B," 50% for group 
"C") (°ffice of the Prov°st 1991). Although the allocation of cuts to schools and 
colleges was based on a departmental analysis, the deans were free to meet their budget 
targets according to their own judgment. They therefore requested, and O'Brien agreed, 
that the final list submitted for advice to the Academic Priorities Council would not 
identify which departments made up the three groups. 
Recognition of three variables in evaluating programs — research, teaching and 
centrality — was intended in part to respond to criticism of the 1990 reallocation, which 
had been seen by many as excessively instruction-driven. The 1991 process also 
differed from that of a year earlier in that cuts were allocated at the school/college level. 
The 1990 terminations and reductions had focused on specific departments, giving the 
deans no formal role in managing the cuts within their schools and colleges. In practice, 
however, many of the deans negotiated alternatives to the terminations and reductions. 
The 1991 process recognized that possibility and gave a larger role to the deans. 
Reaction to the tripartite evaluation process was generally positive. Criticism of 
the data supporting the ratings was heard from some quarters, but the measures used — 
especially for instruction — were by then becoming reasonably well understood and 
respected. 
The failure of the final report to identify the classification of programs was 
protested by the Academic Priorities Council, which criticized the "absence of a 
rationale" for the final list (Booth 1991). The APC acknowledged the deans' concern 
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that publication of the three lists would cause dissension, especially in those cases 
where the actual allocation of cuts differed from the initial calculation. After some 
negotiation the Provost (now Glen Gordon, following Richard O'Brien's appointment as 
interim Chancellor) agreed to provide complete information to a "select subgroup" of the 
APC (Gordon 1991). 
With the assurance of its select subgroup that the allocations had been arrived at 
as represented by the Provost, the APC endorsed the final set of school/college cuts in 
July 1991. The deans met their targets and the academic affairs budget was balanced 
for FY1992. 
Several departments pursued questions about their classification during the 
ensuing months, and some corrections and adjustments to the data were made. None of 
these changes, however, affected the final ratings. A final set of data tables was issued 
in May, 1992. 
Planning to Plan ("Five-Campus Planning"), February, 1992 - June, 1992 
When the five-campus University of Massachusetts was created on September 1, 
1991, the new Board of Trustees and the interim President, E.K. Fretwell, moved quickly 
to chart a course. Task forces, with membership drawn from the central office and all 
five campuses, were created to coordinate policy and practice in the areas of academic 
and student affairs, budgeting, financial management, human resources, and information 
systems. A Five-Campus Institutional Research Group was formed to develop common 
definitions and measures in enrollment, personnel, finances and other areas. With the 
state budget process unfolding, the Board created a Public Policy Working Group to 
identify and respond to important legislative issues. The Working Group was chaired 
by Trustee Vice Chair Robert Karam, and included several Trustees, the interim 
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President, the Vice President for Management and Fiscal Affairs, Chancellors, and 
governmental relations and planning staff from the five campuses. The Group was also 
joined by consultants from the public strategies group at the law firm Hale & Doar and 
from the higher education management group at Coopers & Lybrand (Public Policy 
Working Group 1992). 
The ongoing discussion of the budget and other legislative priorities led the 
Working Group to seek a broader context for public policy issues. A five-campus 
planning group was created in February 1992 to develop a University planning proposal 
for consideration by the Trustees. The group was composed of representatives of the 
President's Office and the campuses, including Bryan Harvey and Jim Leheny from 
Amherst. The planning group worked on a short timeline to prepare a document for the 
June meeting of the Board of Trustees. Its report, "Planning to Plan: A Proposal for 
Trustee Action," was submitted on May 19,1992. It reviewed the accomplishments of 
the first year of the new University, identified strategic questions pertaining to access, 
innovation, economic development and other key issues, discussed the key challenges 
facing the new system, and proposed a planning process focused on 2-year, 5-year and 
20-year planning horizons. The proposal included recommended steps to "jump-start" 
the process, including development of a staffing plan, continuation of a five-campus 
planning group, and capacity building in institutional research and assessment (Public 
Policy Working Group 1992). 
The planning group chose to call its report "Planning to Plan" because it focused 
on issues requiring resolution before a useful strategic planning process could begin. A 
system-wide "vision" statement had been drafted by Coopers & Lybrand (Board of 
Trustees 1992), but workable mission statements for the campuses had not yet been 
developed. The President's Office had been reduced to minimal staffing in the period 
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leading up the reorganization, and the planning group therefore highlighted the need to 
build staff capacity in several areas. The planning group also confronted the need to 
secure stable leadership for the University. With a new Board of Trustees and an 
interim President the University had not assembled a leadership team with a common 
purpose, and the planning proposal was therefore limited to organizational and 
structural questions, not matters of substance. 
The planning group also confronted its own internal dynamics. Since its 
members represented different campuses with different missions and aspirations, the 
proposed process created a framework with room for different approaches to planning 
on each of the campuses (Public Policy Working Group 1992). 
The first steps proposed by the planning group offered opportunities to organize 
the new system's thinking, but did not impose a set of specific goals or performance 
measures. For that reason the campuses found it possible to accept its general 
principles and wait for more explicit action over time. The Public Policy Working Group 
saw the report as a useful first step and forwarded it to the Board of Trustees for 
action. 
At its June, 1992 meeting the Board of Trustees accepted the proposal in 
principle, but deferred action on its specific recommendations until a new President was 
appointed. 
Analyses of Planning Processes 
The purpose of this case study is to explore the extent to which the five 
"conditions" detailed in Chapter Two relate to the planning efforts undertaken at 
UMass Amherst between 1971 and 1992. The first step in this analysis is an 
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examination of the planning efforts themselves. The five conditions are held to be 
related to strategic, or adaptive, planning. It is important to determine whether the 
various efforts at UMass Amherst have this "strategic" character, or whether they 
represent other kinds of activities for which the conditions would have no special 
relevance. 
To do so, it is necessary to establish some criteria by which to evaluate whether a 
planning effort is "strategic" or not. The literature offers many perspectives on strategic 
planning, but a few characteristics seem to recur as one examines the various 
descriptions and definitions offered. 
First, strategic planning is about change, the process of "incessantly adjusting 
plans, intentions, and expectations" (Cope 1981, 2). This may seem obvious, but it is 
worth careful thought. It is quite possible (and, as Chapter Two reveals, quite common) 
for institutions to invest significant time, effort and analysis in processes that do little or 
nothing to change the institution. They may, in fact, have the effect of reinforcing the 
status quo. Since strategic action is defined as adaptive, processes not designed to 
result in adaptation should not be viewed as strategic. The question of intent is 
important: a process which intends to promote change may fail to do so, but this is 
appropriately viewed as an unsuccessful — but perhaps still strategic — effort. On the 
other hand, a process undertaken to hold at bay external meddling or internal discontent 
is deliberately non-adaptive in purpose, and should not be seen as strategic. 
Second, strategic planning is about the institution. Again, this may seem 
obvious, but this definition excludes several types of activity. Planning which simply 
allows departments to follow their noses is not strategic, nor is planning which 
subordinates the institution's interests to those of some other entity (such as a university 
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system). A multi-campus entity can engage in strategic thinking, but this does not 
replace the need for each institution to form its own view of its place in the world. 
Third, strategic planning is about the environment, "direction finding for the 
whole enterprise in relation to the ecosystem" (Cope 1987, 3). Planning which does not 
make reference to the forces at work in the institution's environment — the forces to 
which the institution must adapt — cannot be said to be adaptive. This need not be the 
planning process's sole concern, but it must be present in some important way. 
With these three rough criteria in mind, then, it is appropriate to examine each 
effort undertaken at UMass Amherst to determine whether it ought to be viewed as 
strategically oriented, and hence capable of casting light on the usefulness of the five 
"conditions" for successful strategic planning. Table 3.1 shows, for each of the 
seventeen processes, whether it encompassed planned change, focused on the 
institution, and addressed environmental factors; comments on these judgments; and 
indicates whether, as a result of this evaluation, the process should be considered 
"strategic." 
Based on this analysis, nine of the seventeen processes reviewed are judged to 
have a "strategic" character. Even a cursory examination of the summary provided in 
Table 3.1 makes it clear that most of the campus's strategic efforts failed to accomplish 
their stated purpose, and the few successes tended to be relatively modest in scale. Of 
the nine "strategic" processes, four resulted in no action, one was abandoned, two 
reached a successful conclusion but were then modified or superseded, and only two 
were implemented fully. 
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Table 3.1. Evaluation of Planning Processes at UMass Amherst, 1971-92 
Considered the environment? 
Took an institutional focus? 
Involved a change process? Was this process “strategic”? 
Graduate Program Review (“Appley 
Report”) 
Yes Yes Yes The focus was substantially internal, 
but programs were reviewed in terms 
of demand, etc. 
Yes 
Five Year Academic Personnel Plan 
(“Tenure Plan”) 
Not 
clear 
Not 
clear 
Not 
clear 
Neither the basis of change, the 
institutional context, nor the impact 
of environmental factors was clear. 
No 
Academic Program Review Task 
Force (“Bischoff Committee”) 
Yes Yes Yes The chief environmental factor was 
reduced state funding. 
Yes 
Commission on Missions and Goals 
at the University of Massachusetts at 
Amherst (“COMGUMA”) 
No Yes Yes While perhaps seen as a precursor to 
change, this effort was not itself 
change-oriented. 
No 
Long Range Plan — First Stage 
(“Puryear Plan”) 
Yes Yes Yes The chief environmental factor was 
reduced state funding. 
Yes 
Planning for the 1980s (“Chancellor’s 
Working Group”) 
Yes Yes Yes 
: v -V 'V 
This was the campus’s first self- 
conscious “strategic planning” effort. 
Yes 
Long Range Plan for Academic 
Affairs (“Baritz Plan”) 
Not 
clear 
No Not 
clear 
The plan was primarily a political 
statement which addressed only 
some elements of campus. 
No 
Long Range Plan (“Regents’ Plan”) — 
First Phase 
No Yes Not 
clear 
This was viewed on the campus 
largely as a reporting exercise. 
No 
Strategic Planning (“Shirley/NCHEMS 
Model”) 
Yes Yes Yes This effort followed a classic 
strategic planning design. 
Yes 
Campus Planning Council (“O’Brien 
Model”) 
At 
times 
No At 
times 
This was an ongoing policy review 
rather than a planning process. 
No 
Reallocation of Faculty Retirement 
Positions (“Reallocation 1985”) 
Yes Yes Yes Modest in scope, with only limited 
environmental considerations, it 
nonetheless had strategic focus. 
Yes 
Long Range Plan (“Regents’ Plan”) — 
Second Phase 
No Yes Not 
clear 
This was viewed on the campus 
largely as a reporting exercise. 
No 
Commission on the Future of the 
University (“Saxon Commission”) 
Yes No Yes The focus of planning was the UMass 
system, not the campus. 
No 
Reallocation of Faculty Retirement 
Positions (“Reallocation 1989”) 
Yes Yes Yes Modest in scope, with only limited 
environmental considerations, it 
nonetheless had strategic focus. 
Yes 
Reallocation of Faculty Retirement 
Positions (“Reallocation 1990”) 
Yes Yes Yes Modest in scope, with only limited 
environmental considerations, it 
nonetheless had strategic focus. 
Yes 
Allocation of Budget Savings to 
Schools and Colleges (“Reallocation 
1991”) 
Yes Yes Yes This included significant 
consideration of environmental 
factors. 
Yes 
Planning to Plan (“Five-Campus 
Planning”) 
No No Yes This was a “pre-planning” analysis, 
largely focused at the system level. 
No 
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What went wrong? Why has it proved so difficult for the Amherst campus to 
organize, execute, and implement planning over such a long period of time? These are 
important questions for several reasons. First, each "failure" represents a lost 
opportunity to implement changes that could help the campus adapt and grow. The 
cost of two decades of such losses must be very high. Second, each attempt draws on 
the store of energy, commitment, and goodwill present on the campus. It asks the 
members of the campus community to invest something of themselves in the hope that 
the collective effort will make life better for each. One should not go to the well too 
often: "Suppose that a new president is appointed and announces the beginning of a 
major strategic planning process.... If this is the third time in 10 or 15 years that a new 
entity has been created, a large segment of the faculty and staff is apt to become both 
skeptical and apathetic...." (Schuster et al. 1994, 188). What is the effect if it is the 
fourth or fifth time in ten years, as has sometimes been the case at UMass Amherst? 
To gain some insight into the UMass experience, each of the nine relevant 
planning processes was examined in light of the five "conditions" that seem to support 
successful planning. Examining the campus's extensive planning history in a systematic 
way makes it be possible to identify some of the underlying causes of its disappointing 
experience and also points toward ways of increasing the chances of success in the 
future. 
For this analysis the following conventions were applied: 
1. Consensus for change. For this variable "consensus" was interpreted as a 
widely shared motivation to act. It was not enough for campus leaders or others simply 
to assert that change was required; the mood for change had to be pervasive. 
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2. Focus on institutional needs. This condition was met when the planning 
process was organized around issues affecting the fate of the campus as a whole, as 
distinguished from the concerns of individual departments or colleges. It was not 
necessary for the process to focus exclusively on campus-level issues (many processes 
devoted considerable attention to unit planning, as well) but it had to be clear that the 
product was not simply the aggregation of departmental plans. 
3. "Fit" with campus culture. In terms of campus culture, Hardy's (1993) 
analysis was informative. In the author's view the dominant culture of the Amherst 
campus is "collegial": decentralized, with considerable delegation of authority, strong 
faculty prerogatives, and a relatively weak central administration. While the Amherst 
campus — like most large universities — also displays elements of Hardy's other 
cultural types (particularly the "political"), the closest match seemed to be with the 
"collegial" type. In terms of culture, then, a process was said to "fit" the campus if it 
relied on initiatives "bubbling up" from the departments and colleges; if it respected 
traditional faculty governance processes; and if it took an iterative, rather than a linear, 
form. 
4. Faculty Participation. Here the test was fairly simple: did the planning 
process engage a broad segment of the faculty? Participation did not have to be 
universal, but it had to extend beyond members of existing faculty committees and other 
"usual suspects." Simple compliance with administrative directives (such as producing 
a departmental status report) did not constitute participation; the point here was to 
seek evidence of actual engagement. 
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5. Leadership. Judgments about leadership are extraordinarily subjective, and 
the evidence of leadership cannot always be found in the documentary record. 
Nonetheless, an effort was made to determine whether the senior leadership of the 
campus was actively and consistently engaged with the planning process and acted to 
share responsibility for planning with the campus community. 
The results of this analysis are summarized in Table 3.2 (p. 207). In addition to 
judgments with respect to the five conditions, the nine processes are also described in 
terms of their outcomes, the timeframe or planning horizon envisaged, and the scope of 
the effort. 
Graduate Program Review ("Appley Report'') 
The scope of this review was comprehensive, in that it evaluated all graduate 
programs on the campus. It focused on the long term, seeking to set targets for graduate 
enrollment over a period of some years. 
The impetus for the plan seemed to be entirely administrative, driven by a desire 
to rationalize the campus's graduate offerings after years of heady growth. There is no 
evidence that the campus as a community felt a need to undertake the effort. Indeed, 
one gets the sense that the faculty did not understand why the administration felt it 
needed to "cause trouble" in this way. The focus of planning seemed to be on the 
balance of programs across the institution as a whole. In terms of cultural fit, the review 
fell short: top-down, directive, and apparently divorced from governance. 
Participation seems to have been completely missing from this effort, with only 
the Graduate Dean and a small advisory group involved. While the impetus for 
planning originated with the president and the chancellor, the process seems to have 
205 
been left to sort itself out with little involvement from the campus leadership. The 
review was never adopted or acted upon. 
Academic Program Review Task Force ("Bischoff Committee") 
This process was launched in response to concern over state budget cuts and 
hiring freezes, and a certain level of apprehension was abroad on the campus. It is not 
clear, however, that a consensus for fundamental change existed. The comprehensive 
scope of the review — all academic departments — paralleled its broad institutional 
focus and long-term timeframe. 
The review fit the campus culture fairly well. It was undertaken by a committee 
of senior administrators and faculty members, augmented by members of the Faculty 
Senate Program and Budget Council. It employed an iterative process with results 
widely disseminated. 
The "committee of elders" approach, while comfortable, did not engage the 
faculty as a whole. No opportunities for general participation seem to have been 
offered. Leadership was clearly a problem: by the time the task force's report was 
issued the initiating provost had departed, his successor had come and gone, and 
another replacement had arrived. The process produced a report but it disappeared 
without a trace. 
Long Range Plan — First Stage ("Puryear Plan") 
Another comprehensive review of academic departments, the Puryear plan 
responded to trustee and presidential concern over tenure rates and long-term budgetary 
imbalances. As with the 1974 effort, a fairly widespread sense of apprehension existed 
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on the campus. Again, however, it is not clear that this manifested itself in a mandate 
for sweeping change. 
An essentially solitary effort, the Puryear plan did not fit the campus culture. In 
fact, its top-down, no-consultation approach made it difficult for the ideas themselves 
to be heard. Participation was not invited in the plan's development, and only three 
weeks were allowed for campus comment and review. Leadership support quickly 
eroded for the plan and the planner, and Puryear lost his job soon thereafter. No action 
was taken on the plan. 
Planning for the 1980s ("Chancellor's Working Group") 
Yet another comprehensive, long-term review of departments from an 
institutional perspective, this process arose not in response to a budget crisis but out of 
a genuine desire on the part of the chancellor to plan (stimulated, perhaps, by a 
threatened reorganization of public higher education). His sense of urgency, however, 
was not necessarily shared on the campus. 
The process began with some promise of collegiality and participation, but 
quickly devolved to a small committee shrouded in secrecy. The Puryear experience had 
intensified the campus's antipathy toward "secret" processes, so this shift was 
unfortunate. The chancellor's leadership was strong at the outset, but he became more 
detached as the process wore on and controversy grew. He resigned before the plan was 
considered by the Faculty Senate, and no action was ever taken. 
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Strategic Planning ("Shirley/NCHEMS Model") 
This was a strategic planning process of classic form, shaped by one of the 
leading authorities on the subject. It was organized from a comprehensive, institutional 
perspective with a long horizon. 
Like "Planning for the 1980s," however, it responded to the concerns of 
administrators, not a felt need for change on the part of the campus. In terms of 
substance, the planning design was collegial and iterative; its unfamiliar form, however, 
and especially its "business-like" feel, did not find a comfortable fit with the campus 
culture. It's design called for extensive, ongoing faculty involvement. 
The development of the process was driven principally by the campus planning 
staff, and the commitment of the campus leadership was never strong. When a new 
provost with a predisposition against comprehensive planning was appointed, the 
process was abandoned. 
The Reallocation of Faculty Retirement Positions ("Reallocation 1985") 
This effort took a long view from an institutional perspective, but was narrowly 
focused on the reallocation of faculty positions which were to become vacant through 
attrition. While no real consensus for change existed on the campus, the relatively small 
scale and painless approach of the effort prevented it from seeming threatening. While 
the proposed reallocation was crafted by a staff committee, the involvement of the 
Faculty Senate Academic Priorities Council in the plan's review (following a series of 
planning efforts in which governance bodies had been shut out) made for a fairly 
congenial cultural fit. 
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There was no real opportunity for faculty participation beyond governance 
review. The provost carefully guided the process at every step, and accommodated 
some of the concerns raised during the review process. The very modest scale of the 
proposed changes (18 faculty positions over five years) blunted the criticism that did 
exist, and the reallocation plan was put into effect. 
The Reallocation of Faculty Retirement Positions ("Reallocation 1989") 
This process was to repeat the five-year allocation of retirement vacancies first 
undertaken in 1985, but, because of demographic shifts and early retirement programs, 
on an even more modest scale. This time, however, the closed process and a perceived 
"quantitative" emphasis induced some cultural discomfort. 
The absence of opportunities for faculty involvement became an issue, and the 
plan's successful adoption was clearly possible only because of its very small impact 
(ten faculty positions over five years), and because of the persistent leadership of the 
provost. The plan was never implemented because state budget cuts forced the campus 
to leave positions vacant when faculty retired. 
The Reallocation of Faculty Retirement Positions ("Reallocation 1990") 
This was an attempt to return to the long-term reallocation of retirement 
positions after the interruption of the 1989 budget cuts. Very quickly, however, a fresh 
round of budget cuts forced a redirection of the process toward programmatic reduction 
and elimination to close an immediate budget gap. The budget cuts did produce a 
certain level of support for change, but only within the narrow confines of the need to 
balance the budget. There was no widespread support for a fundamental rethinking of 
programs and services. 
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While the situation was decidedly uncomfortable, a careful attention to elaborate 
governance procedures for program elimination produced a tolerable cultural fit 
(although a raging controversy regarding methodology was never resolved). There were 
no opportunities for broad faculty participation. The provost remained engaged through 
a long and difficult process, but in the end negotiated away much of what the process 
had produced. 
The Allocation of Budget Savings to Schools and Colleges ("Reallocation 1991") 
Continuing budget cuts forced the abandonment of the attrition reallocation 
strategy in favor of an explicit differential budget-cutting process. The focus remained 
at the institutional level, but the timeframe became essentially immediate. 
The ongoing drama of the budget cuts lent, a sense of urgency to the process, but 
again only within the scope of the immediate crisis. There was no appetite to make 
changes beyond those needed to balance the books. The new process — a small staff 
committee and limited governance review — provided for no broad-based faculty 
participation. Interestingly, while the cultural fit was consequently poor, faculty did not 
demand to be allowed to participate in the ugly work of dispensing budget cuts. 
The campus leadership remained engaged throughout the process. The proposed 
differential budget cuts were adopted and implemented. 
Findings 
Table 3.2 shows, for each of the nine planning efforts, the outcome, the scope of 
planning, and the presence (+) or absence (-) of each of the five conditions. 
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Specific Findings 
Some illuminating insights may be found in the examination of this information. 
First, in more than twenty years of planning, the Amherst campus never undertook a 
"strategic" planning effort with a clear consensus for change. Throughout this period 
campus leaders made frequent exhortations regarding the need for change, but there is 
Table 3.2. Summary of Planning Processes, Outcomes, and Conditions 
Leadership 
Faculty Participation 
“Fit” with Culture 
Focus on Institutional Needs 
Consensus for Change 
Outcome Scope 
Graduate Program Review (“Appley Report”) 
No action 
Compre¬ 
hensive 
Academic Program Review Task Force 
(“Bischoff Committee”) No action 
Compre¬ 
hensive 
Long Range Plan — First Stage (“Puryear 
Plan”) No action 
Compre¬ 
hensive 
Planning for the 1980s (“Chancellor’s 
Working Group”) No action 
Compre¬ 
hensive 
Strategic Planning (“Shirley/NCHEMS 
Model”) No action 
Compre¬ 
hensive 
Reallocation of Faculty Retirement Positions 
(“Reallocation 1985”) 
Imple¬ 
mented Limited 
Reallocation of Faculty Retirement Positions 
(“Reallocation 1989”) 
Super¬ 
seded Limited 
Reallocation of Faculty Retirement Positions 
(“Reallocation 1990”) Modified Limited 
Allocation of Budget Savings to Schools and 
Colleges (“Reallocation 1991”) 
Imple¬ 
mented Limited 
- + - - - 
- + + - - 
- + - - 
- + - - - 
- + ? + - 
- + + - + 
- + - - + 
± + + - + 
± + - - + 
no evidence that these assertions were shared in more than an intellectual sense by the 
general campus community. When planning processes reached the point at which 
decisions — usually hard decisions — were to be made, the absence of a mandate for 
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change eroded whatever support planning had secured and led, time and again, to 
distancing behavior on the part of the campus leadership. 
When an institution seeks to redirect its activities in an environment of scarcity, 
conflict is inevitable. Yet, the failure to secure broad-based support for change afforded 
all parties — the campus community and the campus leadership — the luxury of 
walking away from the process when conflict arose. By leaving the door open for easy 
withdrawal from the process there was little incentive for participants — especially 
those who perceived they had something to lose — to commit to either the process or its 
outcomes. Without such commitment, little significant change is possible. 
The campus also never undertook a planning process during this period which 
incorporated broad-based faculty participation and involvement. Moreover, in all but 
one case the lack of faculty involvement was a feature of the planning design, not a 
consequence of poor execution. The view that faculty involvement should be formalistic 
and restricted, rather than engaging and open, seems to have pervaded the campus 
throughout this long period. It is interesting to observe that the only exception to this 
general trend — the Strategic Planning Process of 1983 — had a design that originated in 
thinking outside the campus. 
The persistent determination to avoid broad-based faculty involvement certainly 
robbed these planning efforts of faculty expertise and innovation. Perhaps more 
important, however, it reinforced the sense that planning was "someone else's" 
responsibility and could be taken or left. Without a sense of ownership on the part of 
the general faculty the outcomes of the process were easily — and frequently — rejected. 
No planning committee or council, however prestigious, could lend to a process the 
legitimacy needed to make hard decisions acceptable. 
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Another significant finding is that the campus never implemented a plan during 
this period of more than limited scope. Only two of the nine processes reviewed can be 
viewed as unqualified successes, and they produced decisions that operated at the very 
margins of the institutional resource base. The first, the original faculty retirement 
reallocation in 1985, only affected the allocation of 18 faculty positions. The second, 
the "allocation of budget savings" in 1991, merely nudged inevitable budget cuts for 
schools and colleges a few percentage points higher or lower than the level an "across- 
the-board" approach would have required. Moreover, the planning decisions 
represented an explicitly short-term strategy, and did not seek to guide resource 
decisions over the long haul. While the differential cuts were certainly significant — 
especially to those who suffered most — and while the campus's determination to 
introduce an element of selectivity in a very difficult resource environment was positive, 
the net effect of the planning process was quite modest, with little "strategic" impact. 
Both of these efforts illustrate the importance of a mandate for change and the 
legitimacy that derives from broad faculty participation. The 1985 reallocation had 
neither any urgency attached to it nor any ownership on the part of the faculty. Its 
potential scope was therefore sharply limited from the outset (it is interesting to note 
that grudging faculty senate support for the reallocation plan was possible only because 
of its modest scope). Without a clear consensus for fundamental change, the 1991 
allocation plan could not hope to extend its mandate beyond the obvious, immediate 
need to balance the campus budget. Even the campus's planning "successes," then, 
were inherently self-limiting. If "success" is defined as significant, strategic impact, 
then the campus failed utterly to meet that mark over a period of more than two 
decades. 
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Although all seven of the "comprehensive" planning processes attempted during 
this period (those taking a broad view of campus resources) were initiated by the 
campus leadership, in each case that leadership failed at some point in the process. It 
seems that the higher the stakes, the more important the need for consensus for change 
and extensive faculty involvement. Without a solid mandate and a sense of legitimacy, 
leadership quickly became untenable. Campus leaders, beginning with the best of 
intentions and a strong personal commitment, soon found that they did not have either 
the political capital or the authority necessary to continue the process on their own 
initiative. They tended to withdraw from the process as the level of conflict rose in 
order to preserve their capacity to manage the campus. 
This pattern repeated in part because the leadership seemed generally unwilling 
to rethink the planning design when the process ran into trouble. Processes tended to be 
launched with the rudder tied in place, and mid-course corrections were rarely 
attempted despite clear signals from the campus that support was eroding. 
Interestingly, the best "designed" process had the weakest level of commitment 
from the campus leadership. The Strategic Planning Process of 1983, which alone of the 
nine held the prospect of broad faculty involvement, was never actually embraced by 
campus leaders. The evidence suggests three explanations. First, the 1983 process 
suffered from a "not invented here" attitude. The new national interest in strategic 
planning approaches was seen as faddish by many, and a certain amount of hesitancy 
was probably to be expected. Second, the strategic planning movement in higher 
education was still in its infancy in the early eighties. Few academic administrators had 
direct experience with the concepts and practice of strategic planning, and it is quite 
possible that the base of knowledge needed to make practical judgments about planning 
design did not exist. Third, the NCHEMS model may not have been attractive precisely 
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because of its emphasis on broad faculty participation. As the eight home-grown 
processes clearly indicate, the campus had a strong preference for closed-system 
approaches. The prospect of engaging the campus community, with all of its attendant 
disorder and anxiety, may not have seemed attractive to the campus leadership. 
It is significant that designing a process with good cultural "fit" does not seem to 
be an unattainable goal. The kind of collegial, iterative approach favored by the campus 
culture emerged several times throughout this period. In fact, reverting to cultural norms 
seemed to be the chief strategy employed by the campus leadership to promote 
credibility for planning. It is possible that fit was not a determining factor for success at 
UMass Amherst during this period because the difficulties resulting from other factors 
— lack of consensus for change, limited faculty participation, and weak leadership — 
overwhelmed the impact of cultural fit. Had these other conditions been more favorable 
then perhaps the impact of fit would have been clearer. 
Despite its other problems, the campus was consistently successful at 
maintaining an effective focus in its planning efforts. In all cases, the planning processes 
addressed important issues affecting the well-being of the whole organization within its 
environment. This suggests that the campus's disappointing planning experience does 
not result from a failure of perspective. The campus — at least the campus leadership 
— seems to have understood well the challenges it faced. Its diagnoses of the problems 
toward which planning should be directed were generally timely and insightful. 
Knowing what was needed, however, did not seem to help the campus know 
what to do. This is partly an expression of the familiar tension between planning as a 
rational process and planning as a political process. Planning often tends to be 
approached as an intellectual challenge, with a stated problem, development of 
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alternatives, and identification of the optimum solution. This aspect of planning is 
unquestionably important. Equally important, however, is the capacity to build support 
for the changes necessary to put a solution in place. This capacity relies on a strong 
understanding of organizational behavior and the political process. It is in these areas 
that the campus seems to have fallen short. 
More troubling is the observation that the campus tended to make the same 
mistakes over and over. The decade from 1971 to 1981 was remarkable in that it saw 
four consecutive attempts to impose a centralized, comprehensive planning process 
without a clear consensus for change and without faculty involvement or ownership. 
Each failed completely to accomplish its goals. 
One suspects that, as each new process was developed, each previous failure 
was seen as the result of poor execution, poor leadership, bad luck, or anything but bad 
design. With better execution, more skillful leadership, or better luck, the thinking 
appears to have gone, the original design could be successful. In retrospect this does not 
seem likely. The failure to focus more clearly on design factors may have been a function 
of inexperience or unfamiliarity with organizational design principles, or it may simply 
have reflected a powerful and unexamined (or unchallenged) cultural bias. In any event, 
the tendency to see earlier failures as aberrations rather than as a consistent pattern 
seems to have short-circuited the critically important process of organizational learning. 
In fairness, it should be said that the fourth effort in this sequence — Planning for 
the 1980s — did begin with an effort to learn from the lessons of the past. Its design 
called for a somewhat more open process (at least in a formalistic sense) than had been 
employed in previous efforts, and in launching the process the chancellor made the 
following telling comment: "the history of the Amherst campus in the past decade has 
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displayed a complete understanding of the need for ... planning coupled with a failure to 
attain consensus on the criteria and methods to be used" (Office of the Chancellor 
1980). It was hoped that Planning for the 1980s would break that pattern, but the 
process eventually fell into self-absorption and disconnectedness. It should also be said 
that the Strategic Planning Process of 1983 represented a self-conscious effort — at least 
on the part of the campus planning staff — to change the rules of the game. The failure 
of the campus leadership to engage fully in that process, however, suggests that the 
lessons of the previous decade had not taken root. 
The UMass experience manifests several interesting ironies. First, 
"comprehensive" planning (i.e., planning directed at the breadth of the campus resource 
base) was only attempted in "good" times, even though the consensus for change was 
strongest (but by no means strong) in "bad" times. In "bad" times, however (when the 
need for change was undeniable, as in the case of a mid-year budget cut), the campus 
ceded just enough authority to the unsatisfactory, closed system that it had come to 
know as "planning" to meet the crisis. This authorization seems never to have been 
intended as an endorsement of the prevailing planning approach, but was rather a 
concession to the crisis. Once the crisis abated, the willingness to cooperate 
disappeared with it. 
This propensity toward self-regulation may be a necessary survival mechanism 
for the campus. Failure to act in the face of crisis is clearly self-destructive, but so is 
encouraging a planning approach that experience teaches cannot produce a good 
outcome. When one thinks about it, the campus has been very skillful in walking a 
knife's edge between two quite undesirable alternatives during years of financial turmoil. 
217 
Second, good leadership existed only when the scope of planning was quite 
limited. It is interesting to observe that effective leadership was never present in the 
relativ cly ambitious planning efforts, but was always present when the stakes were 
relatively low. As suggested earlier, comprehensive planning quickly generates conflict. 
Without a clear mandate for change and some degree of faculty ownership, campus 
leaders do not have the resources to manage the conflict. Leadership, however well- 
intentioned, tends to collapse under the weight of this unmanageable conflict. 
When the scope of change is limited, however, conflict is easier to manage and 
campus leaders may find it easier to stick with the process to its conclusion. In this 
sense, good leadership is a product of good planning design, rather than the reverse. 
Or, more precisely, good leadership in the design phase results in conditions which 
permit good leadership in the execution phase. 
Summary Findings 
The most obvious obstacle to effective planning at UMass Amherst has been the 
persistent inability of the campus to reach agreement on the need to do things 
differently. "Waiting for better times" has always been a more desirable strategy than 
reexamining the efficiency and effectiveness of what the campus does, even though 
twenty years of waiting never resulted in better times. 
Perhaps equally important, however, is the persistent detachment of the faculty 
from the various planning processes that have been launched. Plainly put, it is 
impossible to build a credible and legitimate planning process without real and extensive 
faculty participation. Since legitimacy is a prerequisite to effective implementation 
(except, it appears, in the cases of true crisis and relatively minor changes), the Amherst 
campus's failure in this area is of real concern. Because this analysis takes a design 
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perspective, the detachment of faculty has been attributed to a failure of design: that is, 
the failure of the planning process to incorporate meaningful, ongoing opportunities for 
faculty participation and involvement. It is of course true that one could provide for 
such opportunities only to find that the faculty do not take advantage of them. It may 
well be that a belief on the part of campus leaders that faculty will not engage in the 
hard work and difficult choices of planning has prevented them from making faculty 
participation a key element of planning design. After all, why create a condition that 
cannot be met? Logically, however, the design step must come first. If one believes — 
as this analysis asserts — that the innovation and legitimacy necessary to permit 
successful planning require broad faculty involvement, then involvement must be an 
expectation of the process. 
These factors may be linked. An open process, with an expectation of faculty 
involvement, can help build consensus for change on the campus. First, demanding the 
substantive involvement of the campus signals a sense of seriousness and import. The 
reverse is also true: if a planning process does not seem to require the contributions of 
the faculty, then, one might ask, how important can the challenge to the campus really 
be? Second, even on the most cynical of campuses, one can expect that some number of 
faculty will answer the call and join in the process. If these pioneers are treated with 
seriousness and respect — if the campus leadership invests time and commitment 
working with them — an additional signal will be sent that the administration feels the 
challenge is sufficiently real as to justify its own close attention and involvement. The 
more evident the personal involvement of the president, the stronger the message. 
Interestingly, a message of this kind may have its greatest impact if it marks a departure 
from past practice. A campus accustomed to benign neglect on the part of its leadership 
will hardly miss the point if the president drops everything to engage with faculty 
around the planning agenda. Finally, as faculty members who do become involved work 
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with the evidence that most planning processes provide in abundance — be it financial 
projections, admissions trends, or data on student satisfaction — the challenge facing 
the campus will take form and substance. If the situation is truly bad it will probably be 
hard to deny. A group of well-informed faculty members will probably be more 
persuasive in communicating the need for change than any president can hope to be 
through exhortation. 
The other key lesson to be learned from the experience of the Amherst campus 
can be found in the modest successes associated with planning processes of limited 
scope. When the need was clear, the campus was capable of coming together to handle 
some smaller planning tasks. It was the design dysfunction related to faculty 
involvement that prevented those efforts from developing into something more. If, as 
suggested above, a reinforcing pattern of faculty involvement can be built into the design 
of the plan, then the "self-limiting" aspect of these processes might be avoided. 
Viewed broadly, this case reveals support for the idea that planning success is 
related to the factors embedded in the five "conditions." Evidence is strongest with 
respect to the need to form consensus for change, to promote faculty participation, and 
to secure effective leadership. Consensus for change was never formed, and its absence 
seemed to undercut every attempt at planning. Committed leadership, while often 
present at the outset, always retreated under fire. Retreat took the form either of 
curtailing the scope of planning or abandoning the process altogether. Effective, broad- 
based faculty participation was not present, and the evidence strongly suggests that its 
absence contributed to the failure of both consensus for change and committed 
leadership. 
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The evidence is also strong with respect to the importance of cultural fit. Top- 
down, closed processes that did not fit the collegial campus culture tended to become 
contentious, thereby eroding the commitment of the top leadership. 
The evidence is less clear with respect to institutional focus. Institutional focus 
was consistently present, but, because planning usually involved only administrators, it 
is not possible to know whether that focus would have been maintained had broader 
participation from the units been secured. There is nothing in the case study to suggest, 
however, that institutional focus is not important to the success of a planning process. 
This exploratory case study, then, supports four, and fails to refute the other, of 
the five conditions for successful planning drawn from the planning literature. It is 
therefore appropriate to consider how these conditions might be applied by campuses 
contemplating strategic planning (Chapter Four) and to suggest areas in which future 
research might lead to greater understanding. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ASSESSING READINESS TO PLAN 
In Chapter Two, support was found in the literature for five ''conditions7' that 
seem to be important to the success of strategic planning in colleges and universities. A 
case study of one institution's planning efforts over a period of more than two decades, 
described in Chapter Three, lent additional support, although it also suggested a number 
of questions for future investigation that will be noted in Chapter Five. 
The Use of the Five Conditions as a Diagnostic Tool 
The purpose of these conditions is to help institutions understand their 
"readiness" to plan; that is, to provide a basis for an institution to 1) estimate the 
likelihood that a planning process, if begun, will have a fair chance of success, and 2) 
offer some guidance as to the steps the institution might take to increase its chances of 
success. It is therefore appropriate to develop the five conditions as a diagnostic tool, 
not just as a theoretical construct. The "diagnostic" aspect of the five conditions is the 
focus of this chapter. 
It is important to state again that these conditions are not intended to be 
exclusive. Many factors contribute to the success or failure of a planning process, and 
the five conditions capture only some of the issues a campus should consider as it 
prepares to plan. Neither should these conditions be seen as comprehensive. They 
pertain to the environment in which planning will occur, not to the execution of the 
planning process itself. Thus, for example, the conditions are silent on such vital 
implementation issues as the alignment of budgeting with planning and the techniques of 
data gathering and analysis. Even if one assumes that the five conditions have merit — 
a hypothesis that has received only the most tentative support — then an institution 
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might apply them, find itself "ready" to plan, and then experience one or more problems 
related to implementation that result in an unsatisfactory planning experience. Sadly, 
the opportunities for failure seem currently to outnumber the opportunities for success. 
Having said that, the discussion now turns to the conditions themselves. How 
should they be used in a diagnostic sense? In answering that question it is useful to 
begin with the manner in which they are structured. In general, the conditions are stated 
as follows: before embarking on planning, an institution would be wise to ensure that 
X is in place, where "X" represents one of the five conditions. In the simplest terms, 
then, an institution contemplating planning might say: Is "X" in place on my campus? If 
the answer to that question is unqualifiedly positive, then one would mark the condition 
"satisfied" and move on to consideration of the next. Any other answer, however, 
demands additional work. If the answer is "no," or "somewhat," or "maybe," or "I 
can't tell," then subsidiary questions may be in order to provide greater clarity or to 
reveal the kinds of action necessary to bring the campus closer to a position of 
"readiness." 
Moreover, the five conditions are not simple states of being that one has either 
attained or not attained. Some have to do with capacities or qualities that must be 
present during, not before, the planning process. For example, the condition relating to 
effective faculty participation has both present and future dimensions. As stated, it 
seems to apply to the future: will the planning process incorporate sufficient 
opportunities for effective faculty participation? As a condition of planning, however, 
it takes a somewhat different form, rooted in the present: does the campus have in place 
the will, base of experience, and quality of leadership that make a participatory 
planning process plausible? If not, where should action be directed in order to be able to 
answer in the affirmative? 
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A review of the five conditions in this light reveals a mix of present and future 
orientations. Asking whether the campus demonstrates a consensus for change is almost 
entirely present-oriented. One might also ask a future-oriented question — how robust 
is that consensus, and how likely is to persist? — but it would clearly be a secondary 
consideration. Asking about focus on institutional issues has both present and future 
elements. On the one hand, an institution is unlikely to develop a sudden interest in 
global perspectives, so it is important to inquire as to the current state of thinking on the 
campus. On the other hand, beginning a planning process can in itself encourage broad 
thinking, so one must consider how attitudes might shift if the process is well designed 
and skillfully deployed. The condition pertaining to cultural "fit" also has distinct 
present and future elements. One must ask first how well understood the campus 
culture is. One also needs to know, however, what the commitment will be to 
accommodating that culture in planning design and execution. The condition pertaining 
to faculty participation has already been shown to have both present and future 
elements. The final condition, securing effective leadership, is largely, but not 
exclusively, present-oriented. It is certainly vital to know whether the current campus 
leadership possesses the skills, perspectives and attitudes necessary to guide a 
successful planning process. As with consensus for change, however, one might also be 
wise to consider the durability of effective leadership under the often adverse conditions 
of a strategic planning process. The future becomes very important, of course, if a 
change is leadership is possible or expected. 
The remainder of this chapter will visit each condition in turn, stating it in terms 
of the questions an institution ought to ask as it thinks about its prospects for planning. 
Each main question will be accompanied by a number of corollary or subsidiary 
questions that develop a particular idea or offer alternative perspectives. Where 
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appropriate, commentary will suggest useful ways of interpreting the answers one might 
give to these questions. In total, these questions should sharpen and deepen an 
institution's understanding of where it stands in terms of factors related to successful 
planning; they should suggest courses of action that can strengthen the campus's 
position; and they should help to condition campus thinking about the planning process. 
This last consideration is important. Campus's engage in planning for many 
reasons, often beyond their control. They may feel compelled to act quickly. Under 
such circumstances the temptation may be to plunge ahead, do the best that one can, 
and hope to fill in any missing pieces on the fly. That is usually a mistake. It is far 
better to take a moment to ask the right questions even if time is not available for 
ameliorative action. It should be possible for a knowledgeable person to answer the 
questions posed in this chapter in no more than an hour or two. While acting on the 
responses might involve a considerable investment of time, just knowing where problems 
are likely to occur can be of enormous benefit to the campus leadership. In addition, 
sharing the perspectives that emerge from the process of answering the questions can be 
an important educational tool for the campus as a whole. An institution may be forced 
to begin a planning process with little time to prepare, but discussing the strengths and 
weaknesses of the starting position can help moderate expectations and demonstrate 
good faith. 
Building Consensus for Change 
Is there a sense, widely shared throughout the institution, that change is needed? 
Is there sufficient dissatisfaction with the status quo that members of the community are 
predisposed to take action to improve the situation? 
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A negative or ambiguous answer to this question is a sign of trouble. There are so 
many reasons not to upset current relationships and the current distribution of resources 
that it takes considerable momentum to carry an institution through to the point at 
which action occurs. Some subsidiary questions are helpful here. To the extent that a 
need for change is felt, is it fairly uniformly distributed on the campus, or are there 
pockets of enthusiasm and resistance? The answer to this question may identify 
populations to which special attention should be paid. In particular, is the need for 
change principally associated with the central administration, while the faculty and 
others at the grass roots are indifferent or worse? If this is the case, then the campus is 
still a long way from being ready to plan. A felt need for change is most likely to exist 
among the top leadership and others operating at the borders of the institution. Opinion 
within that group, however strongly held, does not constitute "consensus." Similarly, if 
there is a strong perceived need for change within the campus generally, but not among 
the top leadership, then the institution would be wise to further explore the situation. 
What factors have caused people on the campus to consider changing their 
situation? External forces? Fiscal crisis? Enrollment changes? Dissatisfaction with 
performance? If outside pressure or an immediate crisis are driving attitudes, is support 
for change likely to be short-lived? Will the community revert to business-as-usual once 
the budget is balanced, or if the statewide board is reorganized? To what extent are the 
institution's problems seen as fundamental, and to what extent fleeting or superficial? 
All of these questions shed light on the nature of the motivation to change, not just its 
presence or absence. Problems that are viewed as temporary provide a poor basis for a 
strategic planning process. The danger is that the campus will focus its energy on getting 
rid of or waiting out the "problem" (e.g., the troublesome governor, the economic 
recession, the demographic downturn) rather than on addressing more fundamental 
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factors (e.g., why the governor is causing trouble, what makes the campus so vulnerable 
to economic recession, why it has become so dependent on a narrow enrollment base). 
A related subsidiary question: is the sentiment for change directed at people? In 
particular, does it reflect dissatisfaction with the current campus leadership? If so, then 
the prospects for successful strategic planning may not be good. First, a focus on 
individuals suggests that the campus may not clearly perceive the sources of its 
discontent. While some leaders are better than others, most of the factors that a campus 
would want to address in a strategic planning process are more fundamental and extend 
over a longer term than the personality of the current president. It is important for a 
campus to understand its objective position irrespective of current leadership, and then 
to assess leadership in that light. Second, a president who is seen as "the problem" may 
not have the resources to manage an effective strategic planning process. There is a risk 
that a planning process, if begun, will become the captive of factions. 
( 
Even if there is widespread dissatisfaction on the campus, do the members of the 
community have a sense of confidence that they can do anything about it? Are the 
possibilities for change undercut by anxiety and fear? Does the campus feel like a "safe 
place" for change? These ideas will be explored more specifically under the topic of 
leadership, but in the context of the existence of a consensus for change it is important 
to be aware of the campus mood in this regard. One might conclude, for example, that a 
strong consensus for change exists, but also recognize that it is accompanied by high 
levels of anger and anxiety. In such a case, one might say that the first condition has 
been satisfied contingent on the presence of leadership capable of presenting strategic 
planning as an outlet for that anxiety. 
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If the answers to the above questions suggest that the campus is not sufficiently 
motivated to confront the difficult decisions associated with change, the one might pose 
another set to help suggest next steps. First, to what extent are members of the campus 
community aware of the conditions that suggest a need for change? Is there a general 
understanding of the campus's fiscal situation? Is the campus attuned to its 
competitive position? Have there been any systematic efforts to scan the environment 
and report findings back to the general community? Often, the president or other 
leaders have a very clearly defined sense of the institution's problems, but this sense 
may not be shared by others on campus. It may therefore be worth exploring methods of 
educating others within the institution, so that all members of the community are 
working from a common set of facts. Opportunities for disagreement will still exist, of 
course, but it may emerge that disagreement has more to do with how to respond to 
problems than whether problems require action. 
A related question involves contact with the campus's environment. Do 
significant numbers of members of the campus community, especially faculty, have 
regular contact with the institution's external constituencies? Do faculty members who 
have this kind of contact have opportunities to share their perspectives broadly on the 
campus? If there is little contact with external constituencies, then the institution might 
want to consider incentives or mechanisms to encourage this kind of contact. Faculty 
members who are in regular contact with important elements of the campus's 
environment should be encouraged to share their perspectives. 
Finally, regardless of the general state of awareness or motivation on the campus, 
are there individuals who are particularly passionate or articulate about the need for 
change? Can they be recruited for "pre-planning" activities such as service on 
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environmental scanning groups, preparation of fact sheets and position papers, or 
assessment of such things as financial trends, market demand, or demographic shifts? 
With answers to these questions in hand, the institution should have a 
reasonably good sense of the extent to which a planning process will be able to tap into 
a predisposition for change on the campus. If it is determined that more work needs to 
be done to develop a climate for change, then answers to some of the subsidiary 
questions will suggest strategies that might be useful, or to encourage the campus to 
develop alternative strategies. If it is found that there is a relatively weak propensity to 
change, but — for whatever reason — a planning process must be undertaken anyway, 
then the institution will be aware that the planning process itself must incorporate 
features designed to raise awareness of the campus's condition and environment, and 
that this work must precede work on solutions. 
Focusing on Institutional Needs 
Is the campus currently accustomed to thinking about a set of common issues or 
themes that cut across the concerns of departments, schools and colleges, and other 
units? Are there existing mechanisms — such as annual budget guidelines or a "state of 
the campus" address — that promote a view of the whole organization? Does the 
institution have a clear, compelling, and familiar mission statement? Whether captured 
in a formal mission statement or not, does the institution have a strong "sense of self" 
based on its historical roots, market, affiliation, or some other factor? Positive 
responses to these questions should be seen as encouraging. If a campus already has the 
habit of thinking about the whole organization, then it will be easier to maintain that 
perspective once a planning process begins. One should examine these responses 
carefully, however, for they may also reveal issues that may have to be addressed in the 
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planning process. An institution with too clear an identity, for example, may find it 
hard to think about alternative futures. 
It is also important to look beyond the college catalog or other official versions of 
reality. The question is not whether the campus has a mission statement, but whether it 
is widely understood, accepted, and seen as a legitimate guide to action. Similarly, it is 
not enough for the campus budget office to issue an annual pronouncement of spending 
priorities. The question is whether members of the campus community understand how 
revenue streams relate to campus activities, how budgeting categories fit with mission, or 
whether departments feel that their resource requests have been given fair consideration. 
A focus on institutional issues need not, and should not, be seen as diminishing 
the importance of individual and departmental hopes and dreams. Once the planning 
process is underway, the various units on the campus will be asked both to contribute to 
the formation of campus-wide goals and directions and to propose ways in which the 
department can respond to institutional priorities. The question is whether departments 
feel confident that they fit within the larger picture, that they will have a place — or at 
least the opportunity to make their case — when campus-wide plans are formulated. 
The following questions may cast light on this. Are resource allocation processes 
unusually contentious? Does a rationale accompany budgetary decisions? Are there 
deeply held feelings that favoritism or some other form of bias drives resource 
allocation? If units feel that they are not listened to in existing decision-making 
structures, then they may well resist participating in a campus-wide process that 
threatens to further disadvantage them in a game with potentially high stakes. The 
"dispossessed" can be counted upon to focus on their own agendas, even when the 
process demands a broader view. 
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Another set of questions focuses on the relationship of individuals to the 
institution. What is the general state of institutional "citizenship"? Are there 
widespread opportunities for involvement at a campus-wide level (such as institutional 
tenure review committees, facilities planning committees, search committees for deans 
and vice presidents, etc.)? Are the opportunities of this kind that do exist utilizing a 
diverse group of faculty, or do the same faces appear again and again? Is institutional 
service of this kind respected and rewarded, or is it seen as a burden to be avoided? 
How well does the existing faculty governance system work? Are contemporary 
issues of broad interest debated? Are meetings well attended? Is membership diverse? 
Are elections contested? Is the faculty senate or council seen as a source of useful 
information? 
The greater the number of faculty members with previous exposure to institution¬ 
wide thinking, the more likely it is that the campus will feel comfortable taking on the 
challenge of strategic planning. The better the experience they have had, the easier it will 
be to recruit participants for campus-wide task forces and other planning groups. The 
fewer and less productive the existing opportunities for broad thinking, the greater the 
burden on the planning process itself to develop ways of appealing to the campus's 
nobler instincts. 
It may even be useful to inquire into the relationship between individuals and 
units. How strongly do faculty members identify with their departmental colleagues? 
Are there regular, well-attended meetings of departmental faculty? Do faculty members 
spend significant amounts of time in their campus offices, or do they visit campus 
primarily to teach and conduct obligatory office hours? How many members of the 
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faculty actually live in the vicinity of the campus? If the bonds which connect faculty 
members to their departmental colleagues on the same campus are frayed, then one 
should expect to encounter difficulty when asking for commitment to the larger cause. 
Having asked these questions, it should be possible to judge whether the campus 
is ready to take a comprehensive look at its place in the world and develop institutional 
directions within which unit planning can occur. This is a vital consideration, because a 
weak institutional view invites planning which uncritically aggregates unit aspirations, 
providing no basis for choosing among different alternatives. If the answers to these 
questions reveal weak "institutional" thinking, then it might be wise to consider some 
pre-planning activities that build that capacity. If planning proceeds nonetheless, then it 
should be assumed that more of the burden of integrating and synthesizing the diverse 
aspirations of the campus community will fall to the senior leadership, thus 
complicating the requirements for effective leadership. 
Ensuring; Good "Fit" with Campus Culture 
How well is the campus culture understood? Do members of the campus 
community share a strong sense of "how we do things"? Is a sense of the campus 
culture fairly uniform across the institution, or do different elements of the campus 
perceive things differently? These are fundamental questions, because a clear 
understanding of the campus culture is prerequisite to shaping a planning process 
consistent with it. In asking these questions it is important not to confuse a "strong" 
culture with a desirable or even a functional one. A campus might have an inchoate, 
directionless, "organized anarchy" culture which would make strategic planning very 
difficult. Nonetheless, if that is the organization's mindset, then that must mark the 
starting point for the planning process. Note that the culture defines where the process 
begins, not where it ends. It is to be hoped that the process of planning will improve the 
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campus's ability to think about problems and their solution and strengthen the 
willingness and ability of members of the campus community to work together. In such a 
case the planning process might actually induce some shift in the prevailing campus 
culture. If it feels alien from the start, however, it will generate resistance and hostility. 
A process that does not fit will, in all likelihood, fail to put down roots. 
If there are multiple cultural models at work, is it clear which traits are dominant 
under what conditions? For example, if the institution manifests characteristics of both 
the collegial and the political models, is it possible to predict when one would tend to 
push the other out (e.g., does the political model dominate when resources are tight)? 
This consideration is important because the strategic planning process tends to put 
difficult questions on the table. Such questions can cause anxiety levels to rise. If the 
campus behaves "collegially" when things are going well but "politically" when under 
stress, then the planning process should probably be designed to fit most closely with 
the political model. 
An important set of questions explores the attitude of the campus leadership 
toward the prevailing culture. Are the president and other senior administrators 
comfortable with the existing campus culture? Do they see it as a useful environment 
within which to do business? Alternatively, does the campus leadership chafe against 
the existing culture. Does it wish it permitted faster, or more definitive, or less parochial 
action? Does the leadership resist doing business in a manner consistent with the norms 
of the prevailing culture? 
It is one thing to know; it is something else to act on the basis of knowledge. So, 
while the first set of questions focuses on knowledge (is the culture understood?) the 
second set focuses on action (how does the leadership behave?). Most colleges and 
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universities manifest cultures which are blends of the collegial, the political, or the 
anarchic. None of these models tends to make decisions quickly or easily. A campus 
president, faced with the need to take definitive action, may quail at the prospect of 
launching a planning process that seems to perpetuate all the worst features of the 
existing campus decision-making process. One suspects, in fact, that some campus 
leaders are drawn to the idea of strategic planning precisely because it seems to offer a 
way around the campus culture. 
Acting on that basis would be a serious mistake. As indicated above, the 
process must start from a point within the "comfort zone" of the existing culture. This 
does not mean that the planning process must duplicate the culture; it must, however, 
not be seen as a rejection or criticism of it. Thus, a campus dominated by feudal 
political interests will probably not embrace a planning process based on, for example, a 
highly bureaucratic model. It may, however, be possible to introduce a better balance of 
cultural attributes as the process unfolds. But if the "political" campus is handed a 
planning process in which there is no clear role for the major power brokers, then one can 
anticipate that the considerable influence those individuals wield will be devoted to 
thwarting, not advancing, planning. 
These questions could be informative for the campus as a whole, but they are 
directed principally at the campus leadership, which will take the lead in crafting the 
planning process. With answers in hand, it should be possible to ensure that the process 
fits campus expectations and values well enough to give it a fair start. Moreover, these 
questions ask the campus leadership to examine its own attitudes. That bit of self- 
knowledge may help prevent early design errors that could undermine the success of the 
whole process. 
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Promoting Effective Faculty Participation 
Does the campus have a tradition of effective faculty involvement? Are faculty 
members routinely involved in institutional decision making? Does the campus culture 
include an expectation that faculty will be consulted in matters of importance to the 
institution? Most colleges and universities would respond affirmatively to at least the 
last of these three questions. The idea of self-governing institutions in which the faculty 
make collective decisions on matters of academic importance is still strong, despite the 
growth of professional" management and the increasing complexity of institutional 
decision making. 
The second of the two questions posed above may be slightly more problematic. 
'The faculty" is certainly involved in core academic decisions such as tenure and 
promotion, course development, and degree requirements. Much of this responsibility, 
however, is discharged through faculty senates and similar bodies or departmental 
personnel and curriculum committees. While most faculty members tend to circulate 
through the membership of the departmental committees, at many campuses it is quite 
possible to spend a career without investing time in the formal governance process. The 
individual faculty member, then, may have only limited experience participating in the 
campus decision-making process. 
As to the first of the three questions, the answer may vary. If governance has 
become spotty and ritualistic, then one might find the tradition but not the effectiveness. 
On the other hand, strong faculty leadership in the development and governance of new 
multidisciplinary efforts, for example, might be seen as evidence of a renewed 
commitment to faculty participation in institutional affairs. 
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This set of questions is important because it is difficult to create informed, 
enlightened faculty involvement where it has not existed before. Asking a faculty to take 
ownership of a planning process presupposes, to a certain extent, that faculty feel they 
own the institution as it stands. One can be committed to providing opportunities for 
participation, but it is still important to be sure that faculty will take advantage of those 
opportunities. The questions regarding campus governance detailed in the discussion of 
institutional focus are also relevant here. Is there a robust governance function that 
demonstrates broad faculty interest and commitment? 
Even if participation has been strong, one should also inquire as to whether it has 
been fruitful. Has the campus had good experiences with faculty participation? Do 
faculty generally feel that they have been listened to? On the basis of previous 
experience, would they be willing to volunteer to become involved? 
In this context an important distinction must be made. Even the most 
participatory campus asks its faculty members to make relatively painless decisions. 
While a contentious tenure case or a troubling academic program review can always 
come along, most decision making involving faculty does not call for extraordinary 
courage or selflessness. Under normal conditions the "hard" decisions relating to 
resource allocation and program discontinuation tend to be made by administrators. 
Even when faculty stake a claim to such decisions, they will often express an opinion 
only on the process and not the substance. A strategic planning process, however, can 
raise the kinds of questions that make people uncomfortable or worse. Moreover, these 
tend to be important, often pivotal questions that cannot be evaded without 
undermining the effectiveness of the process. So, when asking about the character of 
faculty involvement, it might be wise to add a question or two related to involvement in 
hard decisions. Do departmental and college personnel committees pass through nearly 
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all tenure cases, leaving it to deans and other administrators to question a weak case? 
When programs must be curtailed, have faculty demonstrated a willingness to 
participate in the substance of the decisions? 
If the answers to all of the above questions suggest a weak experience with 
faculty involvement, then the campus leadership would be wise to explore incentives for 
participation in the planning process, at least until it becomes clear that participation is 
rewarding and fruitful. If participation has been widespread but routine, then perhaps 
special care should be taken to acclimate the campus to the kinds of decisions the 
planning process might entail, especially if planning is being undertaken in an 
environment of financial scarcity. It would probably not be productive to recruit faculty 
members unaccustomed to contentious resource decisions and thrust them into the midst 
of discussions with serious resource implications. 
How are "big" decisions normally made on the campus? Is the formal 
governance process invoked in such cases? Is there a "Joint Big Decisions Committee" 
(JBDC) or the equivalent? How does the JBDC relate to the governance structure? Are 
other kinds of ad hoc (i.e., non-governance) committees seen as legitimate? Is there an 
expectation that problems will be presented to governance for consideration, or is it 
acceptable for the administration to bring potential solutions for consultation? These 
questions are important because the campus leadership must make an early decision 
regarding the relationship between planning and governance. If the faculty will insist 
that planning be conducted through the governance process, then that issue should be 
confronted before the process begins. If it is acceptable to develop proposals through a 
JBDC or ad hoc faculty committees, then it would be wise to clarify how governance 
review will occur. Will only the final "plan" be brought for review? What about task 
force reports and other forms of input that shape the plan? 
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A final set of questions addresses the willingness of the campus leadership to 
engage in a participatory planning process. Is there evidence that senior administrators 
(and, perhaps, the board) are open to faculty contributions? Has there been a history of 
positive interactions between faculty and the administration? Is the campus leadership 
willing to empower participants in the planning process to tackle the tough questions, or 
will participation be limited to environmental scanning, brainstorming and other "input" 
functions, leaving the process of choice and strategy to the administration? 
One of the main purposes of faculty participation is to build ownership for the 
decisions emerging from the planning process. If the faculty participants are kept at 
arm's length from the important decisions, however, the process is more likely to yield 
cynicism or indifference. This does not suggest that the campus leadership should cede 
its authority and responsibility to a faculty committee. It does mean, however, that 
faculty should be allowed to engage the real issues driving planning decisions even if 
only in an advisory capacity. 
Having answered all these questions, the institution should have a realistic sense 
of the role faculty are willing to play, and of the administration's willingness to engage in 
a broadly participatory process. What is most important is to establish a common 
understanding of the faculty role in the planning process before it begins. If the faculty 
feel overtaxed or underutilized, pestered or ignored, then negative feelings are likely to 
ripple through the whole process. If, on the other hand, agreement can be reached as to 
how planning ideas will be originated, developed, and reviewed, then the opportunities 
for disappointment and conflict can be minimized. 
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Securing Effective Leadership 
In general, how well prepared does the institution seem to be with respect to the 
first four conditions? Taking into account the responses to all the questions previously 
asked, would one feel confident or apprehensive about launching a strategic planning 
process? In particular, does the institution demonstrate a widespread consensus for 
change and a willingness to focus on issues of importance to the institution as a whole? 
It may seem curious that the first questions posed with respect to leadership are 
not about leadership per se. In assessing the sufficiency of institution's leadership, 
however, it must be recognized that the scope and nature of the leadership challenge 
varies as a function of the state of "readiness" in other areas. A campus which 
demonstrates consensus for change, strong understanding of and commitment to 
institutional issues, a stable and functional campus culture, and a tradition of effective 
faculty involvement has reason to believe that it may be ready for the challenges of 
strategic planning. Strong and effective leadership would certainly round out this 
profile, but it might be possible to be a bit more forgiving in terms of leadership if a 
strong base exists in the other conditions. Conversely, an institution showing weakness 
in one or more of the first four conditions should be much more careful in assessing its 
leadership capacity. Without a strong base leadership becomes the critical factor, 
because the campus leadership must compensate for weaknesses evident elsewhere. 
This relationship applies generally across all of the first four conditions, but is 
especially important with respect to consensus for change and focus on institutional 
issues. If a campus does not feel motivated to change, then the leadership will find itself 
fighting a constant head wind as it attempts to make the case for new ways of doing 
business. If campus discourse focuses exclusively or predominantly on narrow, 
parochial issues, then the leadership will have extraordinary difficulty weaving together 
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a coherent plan for the campus. These tasks are difficult even when the campus is 
predisposed to help; in the face of indifference or resistance even the most gifted 
leadership may fall short. 
Is the campus currently considered "well led"? Is this point of view widely 
shared, especially among rank and file faculty? Is there a general feeling of trust and 
confidence in the ability of the leadership team to identify and respond to challenges 
facing the institution? The questions are important because they refer to the "base" on 
which a planning process can be built. A campus may be willing to follow trusted 
leadership into unknown terrain, but if attitudes toward the existing decision-making 
structure are ambiguous or worse there may be little enthusiasm for more exotic, far- 
reaching planning processes. 
Similarly, is there a sense that the current campus leadership is explicit about 
what needs to be done, confronts problems openly, and is willing to explain the reasons 
for its actions? Strategic planning requires a candid, campus-wide appraisal of the 
institution's strengths and weaknesses. While most individuals and departments are 
willing to talk about what they do well, discussion of vulnerabilities comes very much 
harder. This discussion becomes impossible if members of the campus community 
believe that their candor will be used against them. Open and explicit leadership, 
however, can encourage candor and increase the chances that the campus will see a 
strategic planning process as a constructive step in which they should invest. 
Does the current campus leadership engage the talents and energy of the 
campus? Does it challenge individuals and units to take risks? Does it empower others 
in the organization to try new approaches? Does the leadership seek to be catalytic 
rather than directive? The view taken in this study is that strategic planning works best 
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— and perhaps works at all — when it moves responsibility for action out into the 
organization. Just as top-down, centralized approaches to problem solving are unlikely 
to mobilize the intellectual resources of the campus, top-down efforts to create change 
are unlikely to win the commitment necessary for effective implementation. The best 
way to determine whether the campus leadership will approach planning in an 
empowering, catalytic way is to consider its track record in the day-to-day management 
of the institution. 
The questions posed thus far refer to the current leadership's style and 
approach, on the assumption that one can extrapolate from present performance to 
form a sense of leadership behavior in the strategic planning context. Another set of 
questions, however, refers to specific skills and attributes that are seen as important to 
successful leadership of a strategic planning process. 
Does the current leadership demonstrate an understanding of organizational 
behavior, and alternative organizational models that might provide guidance in choosing 
appropriate interventions? Does the current leadership team have experience with 
institutions in periods of transition? Is there reason to believe, from past experience, 
that the current leadership is skillful at assessing an institution's stage of development 
and helping it make a positive transition to the next? 
While it may not be necessary for the campus president to be an organizational 
behavior specialist, a working knowledge of alternative models would provide a frame 
of reference that could be quite valuable. Some individuals possess an intuitive grasp of 
organizational dynamics, often grounded in years of experience. Others need a formal 
analytic framework within which to assess the institution's position and weigh 
alternative courses of action. In either case, leadership that is knowledgeable of and 
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comfortable with the behavior of organizations in transition will have a clear advantage 
when organizing a planning process. 
Is the current campus leadership familiar with the theory and technique of 
strategic planning? Again, it is not a matter of the president being an expert in planning, 
but rather whether the president has access to the resources needed to mount a well- 
grounded effort. The design of the process is not likely to "bubble up" from the 
departments (or, if it does, it should be examined with a critical eye). It is generally up 
to the president to create the framework within which formal planning occurs, even if 
there is governance review of the proposal. There are many sources of expertise 
available: faculty members in higher education or management, professional 
organizations, other members of the senior administration, the campus planning staff, 
consultants of all descriptions. From some combination of these or other sources the 
president must secure the advice he or she needs to block out a workable timetable and 
plan of action. Without the willingness and ability to gather such advice the president is 
likely to put in motion a process that may not fit the needs of the institution. 
Is the president an effective communicator? Does he or she have the ability to 
explain complex phenomena in easily understood terms? Does he or she have a 
command of language — of metaphor, parable, and myth — that can create vivid 
images in the minds of the members of the campus community? Given all the demands 
placed upon faculty and others whose participation is important, half the challenge of 
leading a planning process is cutting through the clutter and getting the attention of the 
campus. A dry recitation of environmental trends is simply not as effective as a call to 
action rooted in the language of shared values and aspirations. This is not to say that 
one must ring the bell in the campus clock tower; hyperbole is not necessarily compelling, 
and may simply make the president and the process seem melodramatic. But, all other 
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things being equal, well-stated ideas garner more attention than poorly stated ones. 
Above all, the message must clearly come from the heart. 
Is the president an effective user of information and analysis? Is he or she 
comfortable sorting through evidence in search of salient facts? Is he or she experienced 
with the uses of institutional research or evidence yielded through environmental 
scanning? Is the president equipped to set in motion whatever research is necessary to 
inform the planning process? As with some of the previous qualities, it is not suggested 
that the president must be a professional policy analyst. It is highly likely, however, 
that a serious planning effort will require — in addition to judgment and opinion a 
considerable base of factual material. This may take the form of projections of revenue, 
enrollment, or employment; comparisons of the institution with other colleges and 
universities in any number of dimensions; cost estimates of proposals and counter¬ 
proposals; surveys of satisfaction or opinion, on campus or off; and countless other 
possibilities. The planning process should be driven by insight, not by data, yet the 
surest way to confuse the two is to let information overwhelm the critical faculties of the 
planning participants. The use of information in the process must be disciplined, and it 
is up to the president to set the broad parameters regarding what information is needed, 
how it is to be obtained, and who is to interpret it. A president with weak skills in this 
area must secure good advice, or run the risk of adding further confusion to an already 
complex task. 
Finally, does the current leadership have superior political skills? Is he or she 
adept at managing conflict among different groups? Is he or she practiced in the skills of 
negotiation and compromise? If one thing is certain, it is that discussion of change will 
engender conflict. The president must be equipped both to provoke and to moderate 
that conflict. The provocation is necessary because one goal of planning is to force a re- 
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examination of cherished beliefs and attitudes that may no longer fit the facts. The 
moderation is necessary because, once it is clear that power, turf, and/or resources are 
at stake, forces will be set in motion that, left unchecked, could cause the planning 
process or the institution itself to spin out of control. 
In some respects, political skills are in a class by themselves. While skills related 
to planning methodology, communication, and analysis can, to a certain extent, be 
borrowed, or responsibility for those functions delegated, it is the president who must 
apply his or her authority and prestige to the task of balancing the many competing 
demands that the planning process will set in motion. One can imagine embarking on 
strategic planning if the president does not have a silver tongue or an auditor's eye. It is 
harder to see how a president without fairly sophisticated political skills will be able to 
carry a planning process through to a successful conclusion. 
So, with the answers to these questions in hand, it should be possible to judge 
the extent to which the institution has access to the kind of leadership likely to be 
needed as the planning process is approached and then unfolds. It should also be clear 
in which areas the president and others on the senior leadership team will need 
assistance of one kind or another. If a reasonably well-balanced profile of the necessary 
attributes of leadership is revealed in the answers to these questions, then one might feel 
comfortable going forward with the design of a process. If serious deficiencies exist, 
then corrective action should be taken before planning begins. The nature of such action 
may vary. A president may seek consulting assistance, or reorganize the planning 
support staff, or hold off-the-record discussions with the faculty leadership to clarify 
roles and expectations. A board may decide to seek new leadership for the institution. 
Whatever the case, it is best to identify potential leadership problems before the campus 
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embarks on its planning process, for they will surely be made manifest once the work 
has begun. 
Putting; the Answers in Perspective 
Before closing the discussion of this diagnostic approach to the five conditions it 
is important to say something about putting these questions and their answers in 
perspective. Reviewing the entire list of questions it is clear that they suggest an 
extraordinarily high standard of performance. If positive answers must be found for 
each of these questions, then no institution could ever be "ready" to engage in strategic 
planning. 
Obviously, institutions which fall short in one or more of the areas explored 
above can and should try to improve their standing through a strategic planning process. 
In fact, it is one of the ironies of the change process that the institutions least well- 
prepared to change may be most in need of it. The point of this discussion is not to set 
some impossibly high standard that would discourage efforts at institutional renewal. 
Quite to the contrary, the goal of this work is to support the efforts of campuses which 
have concluded, for whatever reason, to take a hard look at themselves and seek 
improvement through change. It is therefore important to state clearly how the 
information obtained through the process of inquisition described herein might best be 
used. 
First, these questions should be seen as a signal to take action where possible to 
improve institutional readiness to engage in strategic planning. If the campus is 
uncertain that change is needed, then steps should be taken to give the members of the 
community greater insight into the current situation and future prospects of the 
institution. If parochial interests dominate, then strategies to broaden the campus's 
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outlook should be developed. If the campus culture is poorly understood, then self- 
awareness should be sought. If participation is weak, then greater demands should be 
placed on the members of the community. If leadership is lacking, then it should be 
bolstered or replaced. 
Second, these questions serve as a caution. Even if an institution feels that it 
must begin planning before it is able to take corrective actions of the kind suggested 
above, it will know where to expect trouble. There are many ways to organize a 
planning process, and the design chosen may be able to compensate for some of the 
weaknesses revealed during the diagnostic stage. A campus with a weak tradition of 
participation, for example, would be wise to avoid launching its planning process by 
empaneling a large number of faculty working groups. 
Third, these questions can help the campus understand itself and set reasonable 
expectations for its planning. An institution revealing significant weakness in its 
"readiness" ought to avoid overly ambitious planning goals. Rather than attempting a 
comprehensive examination of every facet of institutional life, perhaps a more modest 
first step — such as a review of outreach efforts or a discussion of enrollment trends 
and prospects — would be in order. Activities of this kind would be highly relevant to a 
later, comprehensive planning process, of course, and taken in small enough bites they 
might allow some institutional adaptation to occur while building capacity for later 
efforts. The point of all this, after all, is success. There is no doubt that a modest 
success is better than an ambitious failure. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Summary 
American colleges and universities came to the idea of formal planning out of 
necessity, not choice. During the boom years following World War II, spurred by 
growing student demand and massive investments in university-based research on the 
part of the federal government, higher education grew like a coral reef, adding new layers 
over the old. While some elements of planning were necessary to introduce rationality to 
this headlong expansion, few institutions established formal methods for relating 
programs, enrollment, facilities, and finances. Demand grew; higher education filled the 
void. 
By the 1970s, however, the growth curve had begun to flatten. The last wave of 
the Baby Boom was reaching college age, and federal dollars were limited by a stagnant 
economy and rising demands from social welfare programs. State legislatures and higher 
education boards began to worry that the public sector had been "overbuilt." Private 
institutions faced new competition for students. 
The initial response to the flattening of the growth curve was a new emphasis on 
efficiency. Colleges and universities began to borrow planning tools, such as Program 
Planning and Budgeting Systems (PPBS) and Zero-Based Budgeting (ZBB) which had 
already migrated from industry to government. While these kinds of approaches helped 
to rationalize operations and control costs, they were of only limited value in terms of 
programmatic planning. More important, they tended to focus on what the institution 
was; facing an unfamiliar and potentially threatening future, many institutions sought 
better ways of imagining what they might become. 
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The 1980s brought the sobering realization that the financial pinch of the 1970s 
might represent the new reality for higher education. Hopes that institutions might soon 
return to "normal" gradually faded. It became increasingly clear that efficiency, while 
still important, was no longer sufficient. The rules had changed; student interests and 
expectations were shifting; state and federal investments came with more strings 
attached; competition had increased; costs were growing faster than revenues; and 
previously satisfied customers of all kinds were making new demands. 
In this context the focus of planning began to shift from the institution itself to 
the environment within which the institution existed. New "strategic" approaches to 
planning, also borrowed from industry, came into wider use. Institutions were 
encouraged to lift their eyes to the horizon, to become more aggressive and self-conscious 
in their search for opportunities that might exist in their environments, and to redirect 
internal resources toward these opportunities. 
Strategic planning approaches of various kinds were proposed, and many 
institutions developed a new fascination with "stakeholders," "competitive position," 
and "market niche." Committees were formed to "scan" the environment and rethink 
institutional "vision." While these were probably wholesome activities, it soon became 
clear that the kind of adaptive change toward which strategic planning was directed 
was extraordinarily difficult to achieve. Planning processes, undertaken with 
enthusiasm and high expectations, failed to deliver the transformations that many 
believed had been promised. Some planning efforts, rather than drawing the campus 
together around new priorities and directions, simply exacerbated existing tensions. 
Even when a "plan" was developed, it often had little influence over institutional 
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decision making. Old alignments of power and resources tended to reassert themselves, 
regardless of what the plan said. 
The results were not all disappointing, but the difficulty of executing an effective 
strategic planning process dampened the enthusiasm of some institutions. At the same 
time, however, conditions continued to deteriorate and the need for some sort of 
constructive adaptation was clear. As institutions tried new approaches, and as 
scholars of higher education, organizational development, and other fields attempted to 
unravel the complexities of strategic planning, a diverse body of evidence began to 
accumulate. An examination of the literature of strategic planning in higher education 
revealed the unique character of each college and university, but also some themes or 
patterns that helped to explain why planning efforts often fell short of their promise. 
For this study the author examined the planning and related literature, and made 
several observations. First, many planning efforts seemed to fail because they never 
really got started, that is, although the institutional leadership announced a planning 
process, it was unable to encourage or coerce compliance. Second, issues which might 
complicate or undermine planning often remained hidden beneath the surface until late 
in the process, at which time the planning effort would begin to unravel. Third, a failed 
effort at strategic planning seemed to create cynicism on the campus and sap the will of 
administrators and others to engage in subsequent change processes. 
"Conditions" for Successful Planning 
The inquiry focused on steps that an institution might take to prepare the soil for 
successful planning, early actions that could increase the chances that a planning 
process, once begun, might avoid the pitfalls encountered by so many institutions in the 
first decade or two of strategic planning. The literature includes advice of many kinds. 
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including advice related to good planning practice. It does not, however, offer a 
comprehensive examination of early success factors, the "conditions" that an institution 
should have in place before it begins its planning process. The author therefore 
undertook a review of the literature with the specific goal of identifying themes or 
patterns related to such conditions. The question was approached in two ways: (1) are 
there actions an institution might take that increase the chances of success? and (2) are 
there actions the absence of which seems to increase the chances of failure? 
This review yielded five conditions that, in the author's view, should be in place 
before an institution embarks on a strategic planning process: 
1. Consensus for change. Strategic planning is directed at adaptive change. An 
institution should be considering strategic planning because it wishes to identify changes 
that can bring it into closer alignment with important forces operating in its environment. 
For a variety of reasons, however, colleges and universities tend to be resistant to 
change. In fact, in the face of the kind of uncertainty and ferment which might cause an 
institution to engage in strategic planning, many individuals on the campus cling even 
more tenaciously to what is familiar. Institutions that begin their planning processes 
without resolving this ambivalence toward change often find that participation is weak, 
that thinking is narrow, and that implementation is deeply problematic. One condition 
for successful planning, then, is building a consensus within the institution that change is 
necessary and even desirable. 
This can be quite difficult. Some observers suggest educating the campus 
community about the institution's circumstances, some suggest a process that allows 
individuals to "discover" the need for change on their own, still others see a need for 
external pressure or a crisis of some kind. However difficult the task, however, it seems 
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to be worth the investment. Creating a consensus for change can get an institution "over 
the hump" of planning; failure to do so can prevent a planning process from ever taking 
hold. 
2. Focus on Institutional Needs. The modem American college or university is a 
loosely coupled, diffuse collection of independent professionals pursuing goals largely of 
their own device, judged largely by other professionals not associated with the same 
institution. To the extent that there is "organization" on the campus, it is centered in the 
departments, programs, centers, institutes, schools and colleges that represent the 
constituent parts of the institution. The diffuse, fragmented nature of colleges and 
universities presents two related planning challenges. First, it is very difficult to 
maintain a strong sense of institutional "citizenship." Effective strategic planning is 
about the whole institution in relation to its environment, but the centripetal forces at 
work on the campus tend to complicate the identification of faculty with the 
"institution." Second, effective planning requires development of goals and priorities at 
the unit level, but these aspirations must then be integrated into a larger campus-wide 
view. This tends to mean — especially in times of fiscal constraint — that the planning 
process, rather than promoting unit interests, seems to be rejecting them. As a result it 
can be quite difficult to persuade departments to take the later, integrative stages of the 
planning process seriously, with profound implications for implementation. 
A number of strategies to promote an "institutional" view are suggested: 
selection of good institutional "citizens" for service on planning groups, broad 
participation in campus-level planning activities, legitimization of the "political" 
aspects of planning, and leadership by example are all mentioned. Others could be 
imagined. What matters is to maximize an institutional perspective before the planning 
process begins, or to build its development into the planning process itself, to increase 
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chances that the threads of unit-level planning can be knit into an effective campus 
strategy. 
3. Good "fit" with campus culture. Most colleges and universities share basic 
elements of a common organizational culture: they value debate and deliberation in 
decision making; they prefer consensus in reaching decisions; they tolerate and even 
celebrate dissent; they resist "top down" management; they tend to be insular, and 
cherish tradition; and they maintain intricate power and influence relationships. 
Strategic planning, however, carries a connotation — in part a function of its industrial 
roots that seems in conflict with many elements of academic culture: it can seem 
directive; it places a premium on action and closure; it stresses an environmental focus; 
it can force hard questions and difficult choices. A strategic planning process can 
therefore feel like a poor fit, and this feeling can lead to resistance to the process and 
rejection of the product. 
Moreover, despite certain common elements in a broad "academic" culture, each 
institution has a unique tradition, set of values, and sense of self. Planning processes 
cannot be transplanted from one institution to another; the process must match the 
campus if it is to be seen as legitimate and useful. 
It is therefore essential for the institution to design a planning process that "fits" 
the broad academic culture and that respects the unique character of the campus itself. 
This requires a clear understanding of academic culture, as well as intimate familiarity 
with the history and traditions of the specific institution. The literature offers a number 
of perspectives adapted from the study of organizational behavior that can assist an 
institution in understanding how it behaves, how it changes, and thus how an effective 
planning process could be organized. Practical advice is also available, ranging from the 
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importance of care in the use of language and symbolism to careful modulation of 
expectations. Attention to cultural ''fit" may not make the prospect of change any more 
agreeable to the campus, but it may lead to development of a planning process less 
likely to become an issue in an of itself and more likely to help focus attention on the 
real, underlying issues. 
4. Effective faculty participation. As noted above, colleges and universities are 
unique organizations. The are loose, diffuse, and "organized" only at the micro level. 
The literature strongly suggests that successful planning requires broad and effective 
participation on the part of many members of the campus community, but especially on 
the part of faculty. This observation is rooted in several different ideas. First, because 
colleges and universities tend to be "democratic" organizations that value consultation 
and consensus, participation is necessary to promote a sense of legitimacy in the 
planning process. Second, the problems facing many institution are complex, requiring 
careful thought and often calling for innovation. The faculty is the institution's most 
powerful intellectual resource, and it is therefore important to engage faculty in the 
problem-solving aspects of the planning process. Third, because so many aspects of 
institutional practice are within the practical control of faculty (ranging from curriculum 
development to personnel decisions) implementation of plans demands a sense of 
ownership on the part of faculty. It is clear that participation is the best — and perhaps 
the only — way of promoting a sense of ownership. 
Promoting effective participation presents many challenges. Loyalty to 
discipline undermines institutional commitment; broad participation can be 
cumbersome, contentious, and time-consuming; and faculty are often unwilling to make 
the "hard" decisions, yet also unwilling to cede authority for such decisions to the 
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campus administration. Moreover, it seems clear that it is actual, engaged participation 
that is important, not just opportunities for involvement. 
Despite these challenges, broad and effective participation is essential. Practical 
advice of several kinds is offered: good communication and good listening skills on the 
part of the campus leadership are seen as important; adequate time for consultation 
must be allowed, incentives of various kinds should be considered. An important 
consideration is the relationship of the planning process to existing faculty governance 
mechanisms. While some observers argue for special "Joint Big Decision Committees" 
(JBDCs) or Strategic Planning Councils" (SPCs) to accommodate the need for faculty 
participation, others argue that it is a serious mistake to undermine faculty governance. 
Recent thinking seems to support the idea of "strategic governance," in which some 
planning functions are assigned to a special group or groups, but with the explicit 
expectation that planning will converge with governance as the process matures. 
5. Effective leadership. The literature is nearly unanimous in citing leadership 
as a critical variable in effective planning. Strategic planning is seen as extraordinarily 
complex and demanding. Many natural forces tend to work against it; few support it. 
The presence of informed, committed leadership is seen as indispensable in guiding a 
campus through the treacherous waters of strategic planning. 
Leadership seems to be the factor that pulls all the other considerations together. 
Consensus for change is not likely to emerge spontaneously and sustain itself 
indefinitely; parochial interests tend to dominate unless someone argues for the broader 
view; it is up to the campus leadership to design a process that "fits" the campus 
culture; faculty participation must be carefully and wisely managed. While all five 
conditions are seen as important, leadership represents the capstone. 
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Not surprisingly, the literature cites many challenges associated with leadership. 
Resistance to change has already been mentioned. The sheer complexity of the planning 
task is daunting. Nonetheless, certain elements of leadership seem essential, and must 
be present in order to maximize the chances of success. First, planning demands 
commitment from the top. The campus president must be actively and consistently 
supportive of the planning process. This function cannot be delegated, nor can it be 
tentative; if the president's commitment seems uncertain, the campus's is sure to be. 
Second, it must be recognized that the president cannot do the work of planning alone. 
It is essential to build a planning "culture" on the campus which promotes strategic 
thinking on the part of many members of the campus community and which provides a 
"safe" climate in which to think about change. In this sense the leader is best seen as a 
catalyst, motivating others to engage the institution's problems but not providing all the 
answers (or even all the questions). In fact, some observers argue that the leader should 
resist taking responsibility for the institution's problems, and constantly push the 
adaptive work of strategic planning back into the campus community. Third, leadership 
is seen as steering, not rowing, the boat. The campus leadership must possess an 
intimate understanding of the institution's current situation, its values, and its behavior. 
The leader should understand the behavioral models at work within the institution, as 
well as the kinds of interventions appropriate to those models. Because change often 
elicits conflict, political skills that can help manage conflict are important. It is also 
important to understand how institutions make transitions. Different kinds of 
leadership are necessary at different stages in an institution's "life cycle," and 
awareness of these stages can help the campus leadership take constructive action. 
Finally, some observers warn of the dangers of the leadership "trap." The trap 
has two hinges. The first involves the assumption of rationality, that problems can be 
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identified, solutions chosen, and plans implemented in a systemic way. Rationality is 
important, but successful planning involves much more than rationality. The second 
involves the danger that the campus leader will allow the institution to pile 
responsibility for problems on his or her shoulders, even though this is a burden no 
individual can carry alone. Distributing the work and modulating expectations is 
therefore essential. 
Testing the Conditions 
To test these conditions for practical applicability, a case study was conducted 
of all planning activities at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst between 1971 
and 1992. UMass Amherst was seen as a good test case for three reasons: (1) as a 
Carnegie Research I Land Grant institution with a broad array of programs it represents 
a fairly full set of the challenges facing American colleges and universities; (2) it has been 
active in terms of planning, having undertaken or participated in seventeen planning 
processes over the twenty-one year period; and (3) the author has been present on the 
campus for virtually the entire period, and has been actively involved in the University's 
planning efforts for the past fifteen years. This personal involvement permitted both 
participant-observation and excellent access to the formal record. 
The case study revealed a poor record of success in planning. Of the nine 
"strategic" processes undertaken during this period, five resulted in no action; one 
produced a plan which was subsequently superseded; one produced a plan which was 
subsequently modified so as to dilute most of its impact; and two produced plans that 
were implemented. Both of these "successful" processes, however, were of very limited 
scope (in one case eighteen vacancies created by faculty retirements were reallocated 
over a five-year period; in the other modest differential budget cuts were distributed). 
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A number of findings from the case study related to the five conditions. None of 
the nine processes occurred in the context of a consensus for broad change. Twice, in the 
face of crisis, the campus did seem to acknowledge the need for change, but this fragile 
consensus quickly collapsed once the crisis had abated. None of the eight processes 
which moved beyond the design phase involved broad-based faculty involvement. The 
ninth, which was designed with such involvement in mind, was never launched. The 
institution repeatedly encountered difficulty because its planning processes did not fit 
the campus culture; between 1971 and 1981 four consecutive planning efforts failed in 
large part because of problems of "fit." The five "comprehensive" processes (i.e., those 
with broad scope) all began with strong committed leadership from the chancellor, but 
each also saw that commitment erode as the process generated conflict stemming from 
weak consensus for change, poor cultural "fit," or weak faculty participation. All nine 
processes seemed to maintain a focus on institutional needs, although it was not clear 
whether this condition had seen a true test, since the processes tended to fail before 
tensions related to integration of unit aspirations were fully joined. In sum, the case 
study was judged to have supported the importance of the five conditions at an 
exploratory level. 
Finally, the five conditions were recast in the form of a series of questions, a 
diagnostic tool to be used by institutions contemplating initiation of a strategic planning 
process. The questions were designed to reveal, with respect to each of the five 
conditions, the institution's state of "readiness" to plan. If time permits, the campus 
can take ameliorative action to improve its readiness, where needed. Even if planning 
must commence quickly (as in the case, for example, of an external mandate) 
foreknowledge of areas of potential weakness can be valuable for two reasons. First, the 
planning process itself can be designed so as to address weaknesses revealed from 
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application of the diagnostic tool. Second, a realistic sense of the institution's "starting 
point" can help to moderate expectations. 
Implications for Future Research 
The five "conditions," as described herein, should be seen as a work-in-progress. 
They emerged from a purely inductive process, tempered by the author's long experience 
grappling with the practical problems of planning. While the exploratory research 
conducted for the purposes of this study is informative, it raises, perhaps, more 
questions than it answers. Developing the conditions as a useful framework within 
which to explore the problems associated with strategic planning will require additional 
research. Three main directions for such research are suggested here. 
First, while the case study approach does seem well-suited to the comprehensive 
nature of the issues addressed in the five conditions, a single case study of the kind 
reported here merely illustrates how such analyses might be employed. Two approaches 
are possible, and both seem valuable. One approach is to duplicate the in-depth single 
case study at one or more institutions. This would allow for fine-resolution examination 
of planning-related issues, and would be particularly strong with respect to questions 
for which inference is necessary. Ideally, such studies would include participant 
observation. The other approach is to conduct point-in-time case studies at multiple 
institutions, perhaps incorporating survey research to capture participants' perceptions 
of the relevance of the five conditions. This approach could be further refined by 
identifying campuses at various stages of planning, and examining perceptions at the 
same stage across different institutions. 
The point in either case would be to assess the extent to which the conditions 
seem to fit the experience of those who are actually engaged in planning. From such an 
258 
examination it may develop that certain factors seem less critical than suggested here, or 
that other variables, not represented in the five conditions, seem important. 
Second, the diagnostic tool should be applied at one or more institutions 
preparing to engage in strategic planning. Does its use clarify thinking? Does it help to 
identify issues that seem to demand ameliorative action? Does it broaden the 
perspective of the campus community? Does it sharpen the focus of the institutional 
leadership? Does it, perhaps, by highlighting areas of weakness, create contention or 
erode institutional confidence? 
Perceptions of planning actors might be sampled at several stages in the process: 
at the outset, before the tool is put into use; at one or more points during the planning 
process; and at some later point from which a clear retrospective view is possible. Was 
the tool relevant in the preparatory stages? If so, did it maintain its usefulness as the 
process unfolded? Alternatively, did other issues seem to emerge that might profitably 
have been considered at the outset? Did the institution take action as a result of the 
application of the tool? Were those actions seen as useful? In retrospect, did the use of 
the tool provide greater insight into and preparation for the challenges of planning? 
Third, it would be important to undertake quasi-experimental studies of the 
conditions and their predictive power. This would involve several steps, each 
presenting different challenges. It would be necessary first to develop specific tests for 
the presence and extent of each of the five conditions. How does one establish that a 
"consensus for change" exists? What constitutes an "institutional" focus? How does 
one identify the elements of the campus "culture," and how can interventions be 
evaluated in terms of their "fit" with cultural elements or themes? What constitutes 
"broad" participation? How can one distinguish between pro forma participation and 
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true engagement? How can one establish the extent to which "ownership" exists? What 
constitutes commitment on the part of the institutional leadership? How can one judge 
the extent to which a campus president is attuned to the behavioral model within which 
the campus operates? 
Similarly, it would be necessary to develop a protocol for assessing the "success" 
of a planning process. Does this require the statement of planning goals in advance, or 
can success be evaluated in retrospect? Whose judgments matter: the campus 
leadership; the faculty; external constituencies; others? If the "plan" is not 
implemented, but the process of planning was constructive, how should success be 
characterized? 
With evaluative tools of these kinds in hand, one would then identify one or 
more institutions contemplating strategic planning and assess their "readiness" in terms 
of the extent to which the five conditions had been satisfied. One would then select one 
or more subsequent points at which to evaluate the success of the planning effort, and 
explore the correlation between satisfaction of conditions and planning outcomes. 
While stated in experimental terms, it must be recognized that applying strict 
experimental methods to these kinds of processes would be difficult if not impossible. It 
is quite likely that forming conclusions regarding the relationship between the conditions 
and planning outcomes will still require considerable inference and judgment, but the 
effort described above should help sharpen the focus of any subsequent analysis. 
Taken together, these three approaches should help to establish the usefulness of 
the five conditions as a diagnostic tool and as predictors of planning success. 
Additional research of this kind should also clarify the completeness of the set of five. 
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and indicate whether all five should truly be seen as preconditions to successful 
planning. It is also likely that further research will reveal the inter-relatedness of the 
conditions, a quality which is touched on in this study but which deserves further 
exploration. It may well be that what began as five discrete variables, each contributing 
to institutional capacity to plan, turn out to be simply different ways of perceiving a 
coherent approach to organizational change. 
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